What was exposed
Replaying the Booz Allen NGA May 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: a project bucket open to the internet
Before May 24, 2017; date not statedAn Amazon S3 bucket holding files of an NGA project is readable by anyone with no password; which setting opened it, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: SSH keys and administrative credentials
Until 17:42 UTC, May 25, 2017; start not statedAnyone who finds the bucket can download it with no credential; it holds an engineer's SSH keys, administrative credentials for a data center operating system and, per Gizmodo, more logins and passwords.
- 3
Found and closed: nine minutes after the NGA email
May 24–25, 2017An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket and emails Booz Allen, then the NGA; the repository is secured nine minutes after the NGA email.
What appear to be the SSH keys of a Booz Allen engineer and administrative credentials for a data center operating system, plus, per Gizmodo, portal credentials, a second bucket's login and contractor passwords in about 28GB, readable by anyone until May 25, 2017; access by anyone other than the finder and any use of the credentials are not reported.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the bucket, and Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, though the sources do not say an ACL opened the bucket; a resource control policy or the same block would have refused the anonymous download while the grant stood. Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting, the public access prevention constraint and a Security Zone. If the second bucket's login was an AWS access key, a service control policy that denies long-term keys and a resource control policy on source networks would have bounded what it could do. The SSH keys, the data center administrative credentials, the portal logins and the passwords open systems the sources place on no cloud: keeping them out of shared storage and revoking them is your systems' job, and the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 6 controls would have limited one. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 6
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Booz Allen NGA May 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: a project bucket open to the internet
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: SSH keys and administrative credentials
4 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: nine minutes after the NGA email
2 Not coveredKey facts
- An Amazon S3 bucket holding files of an NGA project was readable from the internet with no password until May 25, 2017; which setting opened it, who set it and when were not stated
- Per Gizmodo, the bucket held more than 60,000 files, about 28GB in total
- The files held what appear to be the SSH keys of a Booz Allen engineer and credentials granting administrative access to at least one data center's operating system; per Gizmodo, also credentials for a Pentagon authentication portal, login credentials for a second Amazon bucket and at least six unencrypted contractor passwords
- An UpGuard researcher emailed Booz Allen's chief information security officer on May 24, 2017 with no response, then emailed the NGA at 17:33 UTC on May 25; the repository was secured nine minutes later, and how was not stated
- Booz Allen replied about seven hours after the closure; the NGA said it revoked the affected credentials and that no classified information was disclosed
- No source reported access by anyone other than the finder, or any use of the credentials
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Spy Games: How Booz Allen Hamilton Exposed Pentagon Access KeysUpGuard · May 31, 2017 · ResearchPublic access with no password, SSH keys and administrative credentials, link to the NGA and its contractors, notification times, closure nine minutes after the NGA email, Booz Allen reply, preservation request, potential impact as the finder assesses it
- 2.Top Defense Contractor Left Sensitive Pentagon Files on Amazon Server With No Password [Updated]Gizmodo · Jun 1, 2017 · NewsSize and file count, credential types and systems, NGA and Booz Allen statements, revocation of credentials
- 3.Booz Allen, NGA probe intel leakFCW (Nextgov) · May 31, 2017 · NewsNGA statement, Booz Allen statement, DevOps environment, discovery date as reported
- 4.Security company finds unsecured bucket of US military images on AWSThe Register · Jun 1, 2017 · NewsNotification sequence as relayed, no comment from Booz Allen or the NGA at press time
- 5.US defense contractor stored intelligence data on Amazon server without a passwordCSO Online · Jun 1, 2017 · NewsNGA statement, Booz Allen statement, the gap between the closure and the Booz Allen reply
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.