What was exposed
Replaying the Deep Root Analytics June 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: a warehouse bucket partly open
Not stated; after June 1, 2017 per Deep RootIn the bucket, 1.1 TB lacks any protection against access while 24 TB stays configured to prevent public access; which setting opened the public portion is not stated.
- 2
Reachable: 1.1 TB of voter files at a public address
Until the night of June 14, 2017; start not statedAnyone with the bucket's address can download its 1.1 TB public portion with no credential: voter files on more than 198 million potential voters.
- 3
Found and closed: secured two days after the find
June 12–14, 2017An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket, downloads the public portion and notifies federal authorities; the bucket is secured on the night of June 14.
The 1.1 TB public portion of the bucket, with voter files on more than 198 million potential voters, was downloadable by anyone with its address until the night of June 14, 2017; whether anyone other than the finder read it is not stated, and Deep Root believes no malicious third party did.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the public portion, and Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, if an ACL is what opened it; a service control policy would have kept the write to approved administrators. While the grant stood, a resource control policy or the same block would have refused the anonymous download. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Finding a public bucket and closing it stay your job: the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Deep Root Analytics June 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: a warehouse bucket partly open
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: 1.1 TB of voter files at a public address
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured two days after the find
2 Not coveredKey facts
- The 1.1 TB public portion of the bucket was downloadable by anyone with its address and no credential; another 24 TB was configured to prevent public access
- The bucket held voter files on more than 198 million potential voters, last updated around the January 2017 inauguration
- Which setting opened the public portion and who set it were not stated; Deep Root said the access came through a change in asset access settings since June 1, 2017, and the finder said the period was unknown
- An UpGuard researcher found the bucket in the early evening of June 12, 2017 and downloaded the public portion over about two days
- The researcher notified federal authorities, and the bucket was secured against public access on the night of June 14, 2017; what was changed was not stated
- No source reported access by anyone other than the finder; Deep Root said it did not believe malicious third parties accessed the data during the 12 days it was exposed
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.The RNC Files: Inside the Largest US Voter Data LeakUpGuard · Jun 19, 2017 · ResearchPublic access with no protection, the bucket's owner, 1.1 TB public and 24 TB non-public, the data fields, discovery on June 12, 2017, download over about two days, notice to federal authorities, closure on the night of June 14, 2017
- 2.GOP Data Firm Accidentally Leaks Personal Details of Nearly 200 Million American VotersGizmodo · Jun 19, 2017 · NewsDeep Root's statement: the settings update on June 1, the 12-day exposure window as the company puts it, its belief that no malicious third party accessed the data; ownership confirmed; access by anyone with the address and no password
- 3.Republican data analytics firm exposes voting records on 198 million AmericansCSO Online · Jun 19, 2017 · NewsDeep Root's wording on a change in asset access settings since June 1, 2017
- 4.US voter info stored on wide-open cloud box, thanks to bungling Republican contractorThe Register · Jun 19, 2017 · NewsAccess by anyone who knew the bucket's address, the notice to Deep Root, the storage secured as private as of June 14, 2017
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.