Skip to main content
Back
IntrusionSaaS
11 min read

Okta support case system intrusion and session hijacks

Victim
Okta and its customers: files associated with 134 customers accessed in Okta's customer support system, and the Okta sessions of 5 customers hijacked, per Okta
When
Sep 28, 2023 – Oct 18, 2023Disclosed Oct 20, 2023
Entry
The username and password of a service account of Okta's customer support system, saved into an employee's personal Google account through Chrome on an Okta-managed laptop. How the credential was exposed is unconfirmed: Okta names compromise of the personal Google account or personal device as the most likely avenue.

From September 28, 2023 an actor signed in to Okta's customer support system with a service account whose password had been saved into an employee's personal Google account; how it was exposed is unconfirmed. It ran a report of every support system user and took files associated with 134 customers, HAR files with session tokens among them, and used the tokens to hijack the Okta sessions of 5 customers, among them 1Password, BeyondTrust and Cloudflare. Okta disabled the account on October 17 and revoked the tokens it found; no source names a cloud provider in the path.

What happened

External Parties
Threat actor
Personal Google account
Reported source IPs
+ 3 more
Internet
Okta Org Sessionsreplayed session tokens
Okta Customer Support System
Customer Okta Orgs
+ Chrome browser
+ personal Google profile
+ saved service password
Okta-Managed Laptop
+ Microsoft Entra tenant
+ Google Workspace and Cloud
+ AWS console sign-in
Federated Clouds · if any
Support Service Account
Support System Reports
Case and HAR Files
Support Platform Vendor
1Password Okta Org
BeyondTrust Okta Org
Cloudflare Okta Org
Two Unnamed Orgs

Replaying the Okta support system September 2023 intrusion

  1. 1

    A password outside Okta's estate

    Before Sep 28, 2023; dates not stated

    The support system's service account password sits in an employee's personal Google account, saved through Chrome on an Okta-managed laptop; how it reached the actor is unconfirmed.

  2. 2

    Okta's support system

    Sep 28 to Oct 17, 2023

    The actor signs in as the service account, runs a report of every support system user and takes files associated with 134 customers, HAR files with session tokens among them.

  3. 3

    1Password's Okta org

    Sep 29, 2023; the actor returned on Oct 2

    A session from 1Password's HAR file opens its Okta admin portal; an identity provider tied to Google is changed and activated, and a report of all admins is requested.

  4. 4

    Four more Okta orgs

    Oct 2 to Oct 18, 2023

    Sessions are used against BeyondTrust, Cloudflare and two orgs no source names; BeyondTrust's console policy refuses the session, and the actor creates a backdoor user through its admin API.

  5. 5

    Found and closed

    Oct 13 to Oct 20, 2023

    With an IP address BeyondTrust gave it, Okta finds the service account, disables it and revokes the session tokens in the files it finds.

Impact

From September 28 to October 17, 2023 the actor accessed files associated with 134 Okta customers in Okta's customer support system, some of them HAR files with session tokens, and hijacked the legitimate Okta sessions of 5 customers: 1Password, BeyondTrust, Cloudflare and two that no source names. In those orgs it changed and activated an identity provider and requested an admin report (1Password), created a backdoor user (BeyondTrust) and compromised two employee accounts (Cloudflare); each of the three says the actor did not reach its customer data or its systems beyond Okta. The actor also downloaded a report with the names and email addresses of all customer support system users; Okta says none of the data taken includes credentials or sensitive personal data, and on November 29, 2023 it had no evidence of exploitation. Okta says its production service was not impacted.

Outcome

A chain above the cloud control plane

This chain lived in a vendor's support system and in identity tenants, above the cloud control plane. The password sat in a personal Google account, the service account in Okta's support system, and the session tokens in HAR files that customers uploaded for support; no AWS, Azure, Google Cloud or Oracle Cloud policy sees any of them. The controls that reach these steps are yours to set outside the cloud: Chrome sign-in policy on your laptops, HAR files sanitized before you share them, and in your Okta org, phishing-resistant authenticators, admin sessions bound to a network and short admin sessions. No cloud control reaches the next hop either. Where your Okta org signs you in to Microsoft Entra, Google Cloud, the AWS console or Oracle Cloud, the cloud's own sign-in controls decide that later sign-in, not a session replayed against your Okta org. No source says any targeted customer had such a federation, or that the actor tried to reach a cloud.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 5 controls would have limited one. 12 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
5
Contained
12
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Threat actor
Personal Google account
Reported source IPs
+ 3 more
Internet
Okta Org Sessionsreplayed session tokens
Okta Customer Support System
Customer Okta Orgs
+ Chrome browser
+ personal Google profile
+ saved service password
Okta-Managed Laptop
+ Microsoft Entra tenant
+ Google Workspace and Cloud
+ AWS console sign-in
Federated Clouds · if any
Support Service Account
Support System Reports
Case and HAR Files
Support Platform Vendor
1Password Okta Org
BeyondTrust Okta Org
Cloudflare Okta Org
Two Unnamed Orgs

Replaying the Okta support system September 2023 intrusion

1 · A password outside Okta's estate

2 Not covered

2 · Okta's support system

3 Not covered

3 · 1Password's Okta org

1 Prevented2 Contained3 Not covered4 on other clouds

4 · Four more Okta orgs

3 Contained3 Not covered

5 · Found and closed

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • From September 28 to October 17, 2023 the actor had access to files in Okta's customer support system associated with 134 Okta customers, less than 1% of them, per Okta's root cause of November 3
  • Okta said the actor used session tokens from those files to hijack the legitimate Okta sessions of 5 customers; 1Password, BeyondTrust and Cloudflare published their own accounts, and no source names the other two
  • On October 24, 2023 an Okta spokesperson told TechCrunch that about 1% of its 17,000 corporate customers, or 170 organizations, were affected; Okta's count of 134 came later, in its root cause
  • The service account's username and password had been saved into an employee's personal Google account through Chrome on an Okta-managed laptop; Okta called compromise of that account or device the most likely avenue, which stays unconfirmed
  • For 14 days Okta's investigation did not identify the downloads: the actor went straight to the Files tab, which logs a different event than opening a file attached to a case
  • On September 28, 2023 at 15:06 UTC the actor ran a report of all customer support system users; for 99.6% of them it held no contact information other than a full name and an email address, per Okta's update of November 29

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Unauthorized Access to Okta's Support Case Management System: Root Cause and RemediationOkta · Nov 3, 2023 · Vendor reportaccess window, service account and its likely exposure, 134 and 5 customers, detection gap, investigation timeline, containment, remediation
  2. 2.
    Tracking Unauthorized Access to Okta's Support SystemOkta · Oct 20, 2023 · Vendor reportstolen credential, support case management system, HAR files and session tokens, token revocation, indicators of compromise
  3. 3.
    October Customer Support Security Incident - Update and Recommended ActionsOkta · Nov 29, 2023 · Vendor reportreport of all support system users and its fields, 99.6% figure, exploitation statement, admin session binding and timeouts
  4. 4.
    Okta October 2023 Security Incident Investigation ClosureOkta · Feb 8, 2024 · Vendor reportlater Okta features: MFA for protected admin actions, allowlisted network zones for APIs
  5. 5.
    Okta Support System incident and 1Password1Password · Oct 23, 2023 · Vendor reportsession hijack at 1Password, detection, confirmation of the source, Google instance not impacted
  6. 6.
    1Password confirms attacker tried to pull list of admin users after Okta intrusionThe Register · Oct 24, 2023 · Newsactions in 1Password's Okta org: identity provider change, admin report, detection email, Okta logs
  7. 7.
    1Password also affected by Okta Support System breachHelp Net Security · Oct 24, 2023 · Newsearly-morning access on September 29, LeaseWeb server, unlogged actions, return on October 2
  8. 8.
    BeyondTrust Discloses Limited Impact from Okta IncidentAnvilogic · Nov 2, 2023 · ResearchBeyondTrust's FIDO2 and managed-device policy, admin API pivot, backdoor user and its removal
  9. 9.
    Okta says its support system was breached using stolen credentialsBleepingComputer · Oct 20, 2023 · NewsBeyondTrust's timeline and its words on its policy controls and Okta's security model
  10. 10.
    How Cloudflare mitigated yet another Okta compromiseCloudflare · Oct 20, 2023 · Vendor reportsession hijack at Cloudflare on October 18, two employee accounts within Okta, detection and containment
  11. 11.
    Okta's latest hack fallout hits Cloudflare, 1PasswordTechCrunch · Oct 24, 2023 · Newsabout 1% of 17,000 corporate customers, or 170 organizations, per an Okta spokesperson

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

More cloud attack breakdowns

All breakdowns