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IntrusionAWS
6 min read

AWS keys scraped from exposed website files and kept in an open S3 bucket

Victim
Unnamed organizations using AWS
When
As early as March 2024, by the researchers' beliefDisclosed Dec 9, 2024
Entry
Secrets left readable on customer websites hosted in AWS address ranges: exposed .env files, configuration files, .git repositories and framework endpoints that returned long-term AWS access keys among other credentials.

vpnMentor researchers found an S3 bucket, left open by its owner, that held over 2 TB of an operation's tools, logs, results and stolen secrets. The tools had swept the published AWS address ranges for exposed .env files, configuration files and .git repositories, collected at least 1,526 valid AWS customer keys until August 2024, checked each key's IAM, SES, SNS and S3 access, and priced it for sale in Telegram channels under the name Nemesis. The report links some tools to ShinyHunters by their similarity; whether data was copied from the reachable buckets, or administrator users were created, is not stated.

What happened

External Parties
vpnMentor researchers
Telegram channels
AWS Security
+ 1 more
Internet
AWS APIlong-term access keys
Customer Websites in AWS Ranges
Victim AWS Accounts
+ tools, logs, results
+ thousands of stolen keys
+ lists of targets
The Group's Open S3 Bucket
Customer Web App
.env + .git Files
IAM User Access Key
SES + SNS Quotas
Private S3 Buckets

Replaying the Nemesis 2024 intrusion

  1. 1

    Secrets read from AWS-hosted sites

    From as early as March 2024

    Scanners request .env files, configuration files, .git repositories and framework endpoints from sites in the AWS address ranges, with no credential, and read AWS keys from the responses; on some sites known exploits plant remote shells.

  2. 2

    Keys verified and priced

    Until August 2024

    Each AWS access key is tested against the AWS API, checked for IAM, SES, SNS and S3 access, and priced by its sending limits; keys with S3 access reach private buckets, though which were read is not stated.

  3. 3

    The haul in an open bucket

    Found in August 2024

    The operation keeps over 2 TB of tools, logs, results and stolen keys in an S3 bucket open to anyone, where the researchers find it in their own scans; its owner, the setting that left it open and when it was closed are not stated.

Impact

At least 1,526 valid AWS customer keys were collected until August 2024, priced by their SES and SNS limits and sold in Telegram channels; 8,244 private buckets were accessible with the keys, though which were read is not stated; the haul and the group's tools sat in an S3 bucket open to anyone.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

On AWS, an AWS WAF protection pack (web ACL) that blocks requests for /.env and /.git paths refuses them only where a site's traffic passes through a resource the pack protects, and the sources do not say what served the scanned sites. With a key in hand, service control policies that refuse IAM user calls without MFA, accept calls only from your networks, or deny the SES, SNS and IAM actions would have left it opening nothing worth selling, though the key could still be seen as valid. A resource control policy or a bucket policy that keeps S3 to your networks would have bounded the reach into private buckets; resource control policies date from after the campaign was found. S3 Block Public Access refuses a public ACL or a public bucket policy, but only where the account that holds the bucket applies it, and neither the bucket's owner nor the setting that left it open is stated. The exploits that planted remote shells are not named, so no provider control can be judged against them.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 8 controls would have limited how far it went. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
8
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
vpnMentor researchers
Telegram channels
AWS Security
+ 1 more
Internet
AWS APIlong-term access keys
Customer Websites in AWS Ranges
Victim AWS Accounts
+ tools, logs, results
+ thousands of stolen keys
+ lists of targets
The Group's Open S3 Bucket
Customer Web App
.env + .git Files
IAM User Access Key
SES + SNS Quotas
Private S3 Buckets

Replaying the Nemesis 2024 intrusion

1 · Secrets read from AWS-hosted sites

1 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds

2 · Keys verified and priced

6 Contained7 on other clouds

3 · The haul in an open bucket

1 Contained3 on other clouds

Key facts

  • The tools expanded the published AWS IP ranges to 26,798,669 addresses and scanned 479,711 sites for AWS credentials, requesting .env files, configuration files, .git repositories and framework endpoints on ports 80 and 443 with no credential
  • At least 1,526 unique valid AWS customer credentials were collected until August 2024; the report also counts 252,466 exposed Git repositories
  • For each valid key the tools checked IAM privileges, then read the SES Max24HourSend quota and the SNS MonthlySpendLimit to price it; the accesses were sold in Telegram channels for hundreds of euros per breach
  • 8,244 private buckets were accessible with the exposed keys; which buckets were read and what was copied are not stated
  • The researchers found the group's open S3 bucket, with over 2 TB in it, in August 2024 and sent their report to AWS Security on September 26, 2024, which alerted affected customers and finished handling the issue on November 9, 2024
  • AWS said no AWS infrastructure was breached and that the issue sits on the customer side of the shared responsibility model; on December 9, 2024 the researchers said the operation was still ongoing

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    From Vulnerabilities to Breaches: The Shiny Nemesis Cyber OperationvpnMentor · Dec 9, 2024 · ResearchDiscovery, open S3 bucket, scanning method, exposed .env and .git files, framework endpoints, remote shells, credential types, AWS key validation, IAM SES SNS S3 checks, counts, attribution, disclosure timeline, AWS position
  2. 2.
    Crooks stole AWS credentials from misconfigured sites then kept them in open S3 bucketThe Register · Dec 9, 2024 · NewsAWS statement, quarantine policy, start estimate, bucket discovery, ongoing status

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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