What happened
Replaying the Meson CDN February 2024 intrusion
- 1
Exposed applications
Feb 26, 2024A Laravel flaw and a WordPress misconfiguration are exploited on services the honeynet exposes; the sources do not say which hosts ran them.
- 2
Compromised AWS users
Feb 26, 2024The credentials of AWS users reach the AWS API, and automated reconnaissance learns their privileges; how the credentials were obtained, and their type, is not stated.
- 3
Mass launch
Feb 26, 2024, from 20:33 UTCWith the users' privileges, scripted launch calls start batches of 500 micro instances per region, in multiple regions, and almost 6,000 instances run within minutes.
- 4
Meson nodes
Feb 26, 2024At boot, each instance downloads and starts the Meson CDN client under the attacker's account, and serves its bandwidth and storage to the Meson network.
Almost 6,000 micro EC2 instances ran the Meson CDN client in the honeynet account, spending its bandwidth, storage and public IPv4 addresses for the attacker's Meson tokens; Sysdig estimated more than $2,000 per day for the nodes and up to $22,000 a month in public IPv4 charges for 6,000 nodes, and when the instances were stopped is not stated.
Where AWS controls fit
No AWS control patches the Laravel flaw or the WordPress setting, or decides where your applications keep cloud credentials; both are yours as the application's owner. Every AWS control here caps reach rather than stopping the chain outright, because the sources do not say what the compromised users could do, from where they called, or what their credentials were. A service control policy that allows calls only from your networks, or refuses IAM user calls without MFA, would have refused the users' calls where those conditions held. A service control policy that leaves instance launches to approved administrators, and one that denies unapproved Regions, would have capped the batches of 500. EC2 Allowed AMIs and VPC Block Public Access, set through declarative policies, would have refused the public image or the internet path, but both arrived in December 2024, after the incident. Sysdig estimated more than $2,000 per day for the nodes and does not say when they were stopped.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 6 controls would have limited how far it went. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 6
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Meson CDN February 2024 intrusion
1 · Exposed applications
1 Not covered2 · Compromised AWS users
2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds3 · Mass launch
3 Contained3 on other clouds4 · Meson nodes
1 Contained3 on other cloudsKey facts
- On February 26, 2024, Sysdig's Threat Research Team responded to alerts on exposed services in its honeynet, where an attacker had exploited CVE-2021-3129 in a Laravel application and a WordPress misconfiguration
- The attacker ran automated reconnaissance of the compromised AWS users' privileges; how their credentials were obtained, and their type, was not stated
- The launch record Sysdig shows requested 500 instances in one call; the attacker launched batches of 500 micro instances per region, in multiple regions, from a public Ubuntu image
- Within minutes, almost 6,000 instances ran in the account, and the user data of each launch installed and started the Meson CDN client at boot
- A limit on the account kept new instances micro-sized, which Sysdig said kept the attacker from larger, more expensive instances
- Sysdig estimated more than $2,000 per day for the nodes and up to $22,000 a month in public IPv4 charges for 6,000 nodes; it did not say when the instances were stopped
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Cloud Threats Deploying Crypto CDNSysdig Threat Research Team · Mar 11, 2024 · ResearchEntry vector, reconnaissance, instance launch pattern, image and user data, account limit, instance count, Meson node behavior, cost estimate
- 2.New Cloud Attack Targets Crypto CDN Meson Ahead of LaunchInfosecurity Magazine · Mar 12, 2024 · NewsSecondary report of the Sysdig research; the Meson token unlock planned for March 15, 2024 (context)
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.