Skip to main content
Back
DemonstrationAWS
5 min read

ALBeast: forged AWS ALB authentication tokens accepted by applications, staged by Miggo Research

Environment
None; Miggo Research staged the chain with an ALB in its own AWS account and names no affected company
When
Mar 21, 2024Disclosed Aug 20, 2024
Entry
A token signed by an ALB in the attacker's own account, refreshed to carry the target's issuer and sent straight to an application that does not check the signer field and whose security group admits traffic from beyond its own ALB.

Miggo Research built an ALB with user authentication in its own AWS account and signed in through an identity provider it controlled, for an ALB-signed token with claims of its choosing. After it changed the issuer setting to the target's, a fresh sign-in failed with HTTP 401, but a token refresh produced a token carrying the target's issuer, still signed by its ALB. Sent straight to an application around the target's ALB, which overwrites the header on requests it forwards, such a token passes as an authenticated user when the application skips the signer check and its security group admits more than the ALB; Miggo says an application is safe only with both measures, no source names one that was exploited, and AWS kept ALB's behavior and changed its documentation.

What the demonstration did

Outside parties
Attacker's identity provider
Target's identity provider
AWS
+ 1 more
Internet
ALB OIDC authenticationregional ALB public key
Application Load Balancer
Target application
Attacker's AWS account
Target's ALB
Target application
Attacker's ALB

Replaying the ALBeast August 2024 demonstration / published August 20, 2024; the run date is not stated

  1. 1

    Staging: an ALB in the attacker's account

    Not dated; published Aug 20, 2024

    The attacker builds an ALB with OIDC authentication in its own account, in the target's region, and signs in through its own identity provider for a token with claims it chooses.

  2. 2

    Forging: a refresh carries the target's issuer

    Not dated

    The attacker sets its ALB's issuer to the target's; a fresh sign-in fails, but a refresh signs a token that carries the target's issuer.

  3. 3

    Delivery: around the target's ALB

    Not dated

    The token goes straight to the target application, around the ALB that would overwrite the header, and an application that skips the signer check takes it as an authenticated user.

Impact

No victim: the chain is Miggo Research's technique, and no source reports exploitation. The attacker's ALB signed a token with claims of its choosing, and a refresh after an issuer change produced one carrying the target's issuer, though a fresh sign-in with the changed issuer failed. The target's ALB overwrites the header, so the token works only when sent around it, to an application that skips the signer check and whose targets admit traffic from beyond the ALB. Miggo counted over 15,000 potentially vulnerable applications as of August 20, 2024; AWS calls it a configuration issue and says far fewer are affected.

Outcome

What ALBeast shows about trusting the ALB token header

An application behind ALB authentication that checks only the signature and the issuer takes a token signed by another customer's ALB: a refresh puts your issuer in it, and its signature verifies against the same regional key service. A security group on your targets whose only inbound rule for the application port names the ALB's security group refuses the token sent around the ALB, though any resource in that group can still send it. VPC Block Public Access in ingress-only mode blocks the internet path to your targets, not a path from inside your network. The signer check in your code has no cloud control behind it, and Miggo says you are safe only with both the rule and the check. AWS kept ALB's behavior at the disclosure and changed its documentation, so the fix stays with you.

Would the controls have stopped it?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 1 control would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
1
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside parties
Attacker's identity provider
Target's identity provider
AWS
+ 1 more
Internet
ALB OIDC authenticationregional ALB public key
Application Load Balancer
Target application
Attacker's AWS account
Target's ALB
Target application
Attacker's ALB

Replaying the ALBeast August 2024 demonstration / published August 20, 2024; the run date is not stated

1 · Staging: an ALB in the attacker's account

1 Not covered

2 · Forging: a refresh carries the target's issuer

1 Not covered

3 · Delivery: around the target's ALB

1 Prevented1 Contained1 Not covered2 on other clouds

Key facts

  • Miggo found a customer service using ALB authentication that appeared vulnerable on March 21, 2024, and reported the issue to AWS on April 6, 2024
  • AWS updated the ALB authentication documentation to require checking the signer field on May 1, 2024, and added security group best practices on July 19, 2024; at the disclosure it had chosen not to change the ALB component
  • Miggo counted over 15,000 potentially vulnerable applications out of about 371,000 ALB instances, per Censys, as of August 20, 2024, and called it a conservative estimate; AWS said the misconfigured applications were significantly fewer and gave no number
  • Miggo said more than 95% of the implementations it reviewed lacked the signer check, in its write-up of August 20, 2024
  • On October 21, 2024 AWS published bulletins CVE-2024-8901 and CVE-2024-10125 for two deprecated AWS libraries that skipped the signer and issuer checks, with no fix
  • No source reports exploitation; AWS told SecurityWeek on August 21, 2024 that it had contacted each affected customer directly

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    ALBeast: uncovering an auth vulnerability in AWS ALBMiggo Research · Aug 20, 2024 · ResearchThe attack steps, the preconditions, the affected-application count, the disclosure timeline, AWS's position and the mitigations
  2. 2.
    Miggo Research identifies over 15,000 potentially impacted applications using AWS ALBMiggo Research · Aug 20, 2024 · ResearchThe affected-application count, how issuers are found, the timeline summary and the mitigations
  3. 3.
    Beauty and the ALBeast: Miggo takes the stage at RSAC 2025Miggo Research · Jul 1, 2025 · ResearchAWS's later response as Miggo reports it, and related disclosures
  4. 4.
    Authenticate users using an Application Load BalancerAWS · undated · Vendor reportThe token format, the signer verification requirement, the security group recommendation and the refresh behavior
  5. 5.
    CVE-2024-8901: missing JWT issuer and signer validation in aws-alb-route-directive-adapter-for-istioAWS · Oct 21, 2024 · AdvisoryAn affected AWS library and AWS's recommended actions
  6. 6.
    CVE-2024-10125: missing JWT issuer and signer validation in aws-alb-identity-aspnetcoreAWS · Oct 21, 2024 · AdvisoryA second affected AWS library and AWS's recommended actions
  7. 7.
    Thousands of apps using AWS ALB exposed to attacks due to configuration issueSecurityWeek · Aug 21, 2024 · NewsAWS's statement on customer contact and scale, and the scale dispute

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

More cloud attack breakdowns

All breakdowns