What was exposed
Replaying the NCF October 2017 exposure
- 1
Configured: a customer file bucket open to the internet
Not stated; upload dates back to June 2015 (unconfirmed)The crm-mvp bucket is configured for public access, so no credential is needed to download it; which setting opened it, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: 111 GB of credit files at a public URL
Until November 10, 2017 at the latest; start not statedAnyone who enters the bucket's URL can download 111 GB in about 47,000 files with no credential, and new customer files keep arriving until the finder's notice.
- 3
Found and closed: secured within 38 days of the find
October 3 to November 10, 2017An UpGuard researcher finds the bucket and downloads its contents, UpGuard notifies NCF, and NCF secures the open buckets by November 10, per CyberScoop.
111 GB in about 47,000 files, with identity document images, full credit reports and full Social Security, bank account and card numbers, was downloadable by anyone with the bucket's URL until NCF secured it, by November 10, 2017 per CyberScoop; whether anyone besides the finder read it is not stated, and UpGuard says nothing indicates theft by malicious actors.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account, or set for every account by an organization policy, would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the bucket, and Object Ownership would have closed the ACL path, if an ACL is what opened it; a service control policy would have kept the write to approved administrators. While the grant stood, a resource control policy would have refused the anonymous download, and the same block would have kept the internet out, including the files added while the bucket was public. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint, and Oracle Cloud with a Security Zone. Finding a public bucket and closing it stay your job: the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the NCF October 2017 exposure
1 · Configured: a customer file bucket open to the internet
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: 111 GB of credit files at a public URL
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: secured within 38 days of the find
2 Not coveredKey facts
- The crm-mvp bucket was configured for public access, and UpGuard downloaded its contents by entering its URL with no credential; which setting opened it was not stated
- As of the discovery on October 3, 2017, the bucket held 111 GB in about 47,000 files, mostly PDF and text documents, per UpGuard and CyberScoop
- UpGuard estimated fewer than forty thousand affected individuals as of November 29, 2017; iTWire gave about 40,000 as of December 1, 2017
- The bucket kept being updated with new files until the finder's notice; CyberScoop read upload dates back to June 2015, an unconfirmed start
- The finder first spoke with NCF on October 25, 2017, and NCF secured the open buckets by November 10, 2017, per CyberScoop; how was not stated, and no source described any bucket besides crm-mvp
- No source reported a read by anyone besides the finder; the screen recordings showed customer records, and the systems they showed were not named or reported reached
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Credit Crunch: Detailed Financial Histories Exposed for ThousandsUpGuard · Nov 29, 2017 · ResearchDiscovery on October 3, 2017, the bucket configured for public access and downloadable with no credential, the contents, 111 GB in about 47,000 files, the estimate below forty thousand individuals, the notice to NCF, the securing of the open buckets, no indication of theft by malicious actors
- 2.Florida-based credit firm left 111GB of sensitive customer data exposed on AWS serverCyberScoop · Nov 30, 2017 · NewsFirst contact on October 25, 2017, the data secured by November 10, 2017, upload dates back to June 2015, S3 buckets private by default, NCF's non-response, unclear whether anyone else read the data
- 3.US credit repair biz damages own security: 111GB of personal info exposed in S3 blunderThe Register · Dec 2, 2017 · NewsUpGuard's notice to NCF in October 2017, NCF not available for comment
- 4.Credit repair service leaks data of about 40,000iTWire · Dec 1, 2017 · NewsAbout 40,000 Americans affected; a discovery date of October 23 that disagrees with UpGuard's page
- 5.Credit repair agency exposes private data on misconfigured Amazon cloud instanceSiliconANGLE · Nov 30, 2017 · NewsThe finder's statement that nothing indicated access by malicious actors
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.