What was exposed
Replaying the Mexican voter list April 2016 exposure
- 1
Configured: the voter list goes on a public cloud server
Mar 2 to 3, 2015; opening date not statedThe IT vendor provisions an AWS virtual server with a public address and hands it to the party's representative, who imports the voter list into MongoDB; the setting that opened the database, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: 93,424,710 records read with no password
Until Apr 22, 2016; start not statedAnyone who reaches the server's address can read the voter list with no password; INE staff do so on April 20, 2016 with a database client and count 93,424,710 records.
- 3
Found and closed: found on April 14, closed on April 22
Apr 14 to 25, 2016A MacKeeper researcher finds the database and reports it; INE traces the records to the party's copy, and on April 22 the AWS EC2 abuse team writes to the vendor and the party has the content removed.
A MongoDB database on an AWS virtual server answered the internet with no password and held Movimiento Ciudadano's copy of the Mexican voter list for review: 93,424,710 records with names, addresses, birth data and electoral keys. The list may have been on the server from March 3, 2015; when it became reachable is not stated, and Interpol's message says it may have been available since September 2015. It went offline on April 22, 2016, eight days after the find; no source establishes that anyone besides the finders and INE staff read the data.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
A service control policy that denies internet gateways, or VPC Block Public Access set for your organization, would have left the open database with no reader on the internet. Both bound the reach rather than refuse the setting, both need the account in an AWS organization whose owner sets them, and both came after the incident: AWS Organizations in 2017, VPC Block Public Access in 2024. The party's filing says the AWS account was its IT vendor's. Whether MongoDB asks for a password stays with the database software you run. The find, the tracing and the removal stay outside the provider's controls.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 2 controls would have limited how far it went. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 2
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Mexican voter list April 2016 exposure
1 · Configured: the voter list goes on a public cloud server
1 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: 93,424,710 records read with no password
1 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: found on April 14, closed on April 22
2 Not coveredKey facts
- In February 2015 INE delivered to each party's representative a copy of the voter list for review, encrypted to that representative and carrying traceability marks of its own; Movimiento Ciudadano's committee approved keeping its copy on AWS on its IT vendor's advice
- The vendor provisioned a virtual server on AWS on March 2, 2015 and handed it on March 3, with its public address, a database user and a temporary password, to the party's representative, who imported the list into MongoDB; INE concluded the list may have been on the server from that day
- On April 20, 2016 INE staff connected to the database with no password, copied its files and counted 93,424,710 records with the 27 fields of the voter list, among them names, date and place of birth, full address and electoral key; CSO Online put the database at 132 GB
- INE searched the marks of the 15 sets delivered to 10 parties and found in the copied records only those of the set encrypted to the party's representative; in March 2018 it fined the party MXN 34,158,411.30, a 10% cut of its annual ordinary public funding
- A MacKeeper researcher found the database on April 14, 2016; on April 22 the AWS EC2 abuse team emailed the vendor recommending that the content be deleted, the party ordered it removed, and INE certified that the server no longer answered, eight days after the find
- The setting that opened the database was not stated, nor whether anyone besides the finders and INE staff read it; INE found no evidence of an attack, and Amazon said the database was stored insecurely and was reachable through the internet
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Resolución INE/CG271/2018, procedimiento sancionador ordinario UT/SCG/Q/CG/12/2016 y su acumulado UT/SCG/Q/JLM/CG/13/2016Instituto Nacional Electoral, Consejo General · Mar 28, 2018 · Advisoryvoter list copy issued to the party, AWS chosen on the vendor's advice, server provisioned March 2, 2015 and handed over March 3, 2015, MongoDB import by the representative, vendor held the AWS account per the party's filing, the finders' reports of April 18, 2016 and April 19, 2016, read with no password on April 20, 2016, 93,424,710 records, 27 fields, traceability marks of the party's copy, Interpol message, AWS abuse notice and removal on April 22, 2016, server unreachable on April 22, 2016, Amazon's public position as INE recorded it, the party's hack claim rejected, the sanctions
- 2.36 Data Breaches We Found and Reported in 2016MacKeeper · Feb 20, 2026 · Researchfound April 14, 2016 by a MacKeeper researcher, database on an Amazon cloud server, reported to the US State Department, DHS, the Mexican Embassy in Washington, INE and Amazon, taken offline April 22, 2016
- 3.Personal info of all 94.3 million Mexican voters publicly exposed on AmazonCSO Online · Apr 24, 2016 · Newsmisconfigured MongoDB on an Amazon cloud server, no password or authentication, 132 GB, 93,424,710 records, data as of February 2015, found April 14, 2016, eight days of reporting, Amazon abuse reporting system, secured April 22, 2016, watermarked party copies
- 4.Amazon responde a Movimiento Ciudadano: no hubo 'hackeo'El Financiero · Apr 28, 2016 · NewsAmazon says its security measures and networks worked as designed, the database was stored insecurely and was reachable through the internet, and it followed its protocols once notified; the party's claim of a cyber attack
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.