What was exposed
Replaying the Vitagene July 2019 exposure
- 1
Configured: two buckets with public-read ACLs
In or about 2016; the exact date is unknownVitagene creates two S3 buckets, one of Health Reports and one of raw genetic data, whose bucket ACLs allow read access from any user on the internet; the company says a contractor put the files there, and how the individual files were made readable is not stated.
- 2
Reachable: health and genetic files open to anyone
In or about 2016 to July 1, 2019Anyone on the internet can read the Health Reports and the raw genetic data with no credential, unencrypted and unlogged; an AWS email in July 2017 and a penetration test in November 2018 name the open data, and access stays open after both.
- 3
Found and closed: shut off the day the links arrive
June 27, 2019 to August 2019A security researcher sends the company public links to files in both buckets on July 1, 2019, and external access is shut off that day, per Bloomberg; with no access logs, whether anyone else read the data is not stated.
The Health Reports of at least 2,383 consumers and the raw genetic data of at least 227 consumers, more than 2,600 consumers in all per the FTC complaint issued September 6, 2023, were readable by anyone on the internet, with no encryption or access logs, from in or about 2016 until July 1, 2019, when external access was shut off, per Bloomberg. A researcher reached files in both buckets; whether anyone else read the data is not stated, and the company says it found no evidence of improper access.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
With Amazon S3 Block Public Access on for your account, S3 refuses the public-read bucket ACLs that opened these buckets, and a public bucket policy too. AWS introduced it on November 15, 2018, while these buckets were still open, so setting it then would have closed both. S3 Object Ownership set to bucket owner enforced turns ACLs off, and a service control policy keeps ACL and bucket policy writes to approved administrators; both came after the buckets were created. On a bucket that is already public, IgnorePublicAcls and RestrictPublicBuckets, a resource control policy that refuses anonymous S3 requests, or SSE-KMS under a key whose policy names only your application's roles each refuse the anonymous read. Acting on the AWS email of July 2017 and the penetration test of November 2018, and keeping the access logs that would show who else read the files, stay with you.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 5 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 5
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Vitagene July 2019 exposure
1 · Configured: two buckets with public-read ACLs
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: health and genetic files open to anyone
3 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: shut off the day the links arrive
2 Not coveredKey facts
- In or about 2016 Vitagene created two Amazon S3 buckets whose bucket ACLs allowed read access from any user on the internet, one with Health Reports of at least 2,383 consumers and one with raw genetic data of at least 227 consumers, more than 2,600 consumers in all per the FTC complaint issued September 6, 2023; the data had no access controls, encryption, access logging, monitoring or inventory
- AWS emailed the company in July 2017 that six of its buckets, both of these among them, had ACLs allowing read access from any user on the internet, and a penetration test in November 2018 found uploaded DNA data in Amazon S3 without any access controls; the company did not restrict access to the two buckets after either, per the complaint, and no source describes the other four buckets or says whether they were read
- A security researcher emailed the company's support inbox on June 27, 2019 and on July 1, 2019 sent publicly accessible links to Health Reports and files in both buckets; external access was shut off that day, per Bloomberg, and how is not stated
- Bloomberg reported on July 9, 2019 that more than 3,000 user files were publicly accessible, almost 300 of them raw genotype files, and that 1,401 user files sat in a setting open to more employees than were authorized to view them, which no source says were read; the company said no credit card data, passwords or financial data were exposed
- With no access logs, the company could not determine when the buckets were created or whether anyone besides the researcher accessed the data; its chief executive said in June 2023 that it found no evidence of improper access, and it notified affected consumers in August 2019
- The FTC finalized its order on September 7, 2023 by a 3-0 vote, with a $75,000 payment and an information security program, and sent refunds of more than $49,500 to 2,432 consumers on September 9, 2024
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.In the Matter of 1Health.io Inc., also d/b/a Vitagene, Inc.: Complaint (FTC File No. 192 3170)Federal Trade Commission · Sep 6, 2023 · AdvisoryAmazon S3 as the store of Health Reports and genotype data, two public buckets created in or about 2016, at least 2,383 and 227 consumers, more than 2,600 consumers in all, no access controls, encryption, logging, monitoring or inventory, AWS email of July 2017 on bucket ACLs readable by anyone listing six buckets, penetration test of November 2018, researcher emails of June 27 and July 1, 2019, media reports of July 2019, investigation in July 2019, no logs to tell creation or other access, consumer notice in August 2019, no data inventory from about 2016 to July 1, 2019
- 2.Vitagene, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment (88 FR 41104, FR Doc. 2023-13329)Federal Trade Commission (Federal Register) · Jun 23, 2023 · Advisoryproposed complaint summary, two public buckets in or about 2016, counts, no access controls, encryption, logging, monitoring or inventory, at least three warnings from July 2017 to June 2019, exposure until July 2019, comment period
- 3.FTC Says Genetic Testing Company 1Health Failed to Protect Privacy and Security of DNA Data and Unfairly Changed its Privacy PolicyFederal Trade Commission · Jun 16, 2023 · Advisorynearly 2,400 health reports and raw genetic data of at least 227 consumers in public AWS buckets, some with first names, no encryption, access restriction, logging, monitoring or inventory, at least three warnings over two years, researcher contact in June 2019, consumer notice, $75,000, information security program, 3-0 vote
- 4.FTC Finalizes Order with 1Health.io Over Charges it Failed to Protect Privacy and Security of DNA Data and Unfairly Changed its Privacy PolicyFederal Trade Commission · Sep 7, 2023 · Advisoryorder finalized, 3-0 vote, one public comment, $75,000
- 5.FTC Sends Refunds to Consumers Deceived by Genetic Testing Firm 1Health.io Over Data Deletion and Security PracticesFederal Trade Commission · Sep 9, 2024 · Advisoryrefunds of more than $49,500 to 2,432 consumers
- 6.DNA Testing Service Left Client Health Records Open to PublicInsurance Journal (Bloomberg) · Jul 12, 2019 · Newsmore than 3,000 user files publicly accessible on AWS, 4,186 files in one AWS collection, almost 300 raw genotype files, files created 2015 to 2017, public until July 1, 2019, external access shut off when notified, 1,401 files in a setting open to more employees, company statements, customers not yet notified
- 7.FTC Orders 1Health.io to Improve DNA Data Privacy, SecurityInformation Security Media Group (GovInfoSecurity) · Jun 16, 2023 · NewsAWS email of 2017 listing open buckets, penetration test of 2018, researcher in 2019, company says 3,754 files on the exposed bucket, company statements
- 8.FTC Fines Genetic Testing Company for Data Privacy and Security FailuresThe HIPAA Journal · Jun 20, 2023 · Newscompany says a contract test engineer hired in 2016 put customer files in an open S3 bucket against company policy, 3,754 files, fewer than 3,000 customers from 2016 and 2017, no record of actual access
- 9.FTC accuses DNA testing company of lying about dumping samplesThe Register · Jun 21, 2023 · NewsCEO statement: files inadvertently stored in a publicly accessible location, first alerted in July 2019, no evidence of improper access
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.