What happened
Replaying the Microsoft 365 AiTM BEC attempt Mitiga reported in 2022
- 1
A spoofed email and a reverse proxy
Date not statedA spoofed email that fails DMARC reaches the executive, and its link leads to a proxy page that relays the sign-in and keeps the session cookie.
- 2
The session replayed and the deal read
Date not statedThe stolen session is replayed from distant locations and opens the executive's mail and files, where the attacker finds the transaction thread.
- 3
A second Authenticator app with no MFA challenge
Date not stated; about 30 seconds from sign-in to registrationThe attacker signs in to the My Access portal on the token's MFA claim and registers a second Authenticator app in about 5 seconds.
- 4
Look-alike domains and new wire instructions
Date not statedThe attacker registers look-alike domains and sends the buyer changed wire instructions, and the people on the transaction stop the transfer.
The attacker held the executive's Microsoft 365 session, read the mail and the SharePoint files about an upcoming transaction, added a second Authenticator app for lasting access and sent the buyer changed wire instructions from a look-alike law-firm domain. The recipients recognized the fraud and no transfer was made. The sources give no dates, no amount for this transaction and no duration of access.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In Microsoft Entra ID, a Conditional Access policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength would have refused the sign-in the proxy relayed for your executive, and with it the session the attacker used. Mitiga says a compliant-device requirement stops the same sign-in; Microsoft's documentation does not say that a relayed sign-in fails the device check. The same strength on the Register security information user action refuses a new Authenticator app from a session whose MFA claim came from a relayed approval; authentication strengths arrived after this incident. Trusted locations and compliant devices cap the reach of a replayed session only where the attacker's address and device fall outside them, which the sources do not state. Honoring the sender's DMARC policy keeps a spoofed email out of the inbox unless an allow entry overrides it. The look-alike domains and the email to the buyer stay outside your tenant, and here the people on the transaction stopped the transfer.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 6 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 6
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Microsoft 365 AiTM BEC attempt Mitiga reported in 2022
1 · A spoofed email and a reverse proxy
1 Prevented2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · The session replayed and the deal read
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · A second Authenticator app with no MFA challenge
1 Prevented2 Contained3 on other clouds4 · Look-alike domains and new wire instructions
2 Not coveredKey facts
- Mitiga published its advisory on August 22, 2022; no source gives a calendar date for any step, and neither account names the victim
- The phishing email failed DMARC, but a misconfiguration of the organization's mail settings let it reach the executive's inbox; the exact setting is not stated
- The reverse-proxy page relayed the password and the MFA approval to Microsoft and captured a session cookie that worked with no password and no further MFA
- The session was used from locations in Asia, the Middle East and the US West Coast, none matching the executive's usual locations, to read Outlook mail and SharePoint files
- About 30 seconds after signing in to the My Access portal, where the sign-in log recorded MFA as satisfied by the claim in the token, the attacker registered a second Authenticator app in about 5 seconds with no MFA challenge
- A reply-all from a look-alike law-firm domain gave the buyer changed wire instructions; recipients at both companies flagged it and the transfer did not go through. Microsoft declined to comment
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Advisory: Persistent MFA circumvention in an advanced BEC campaign on Microsoft 365 targetsMitiga · Aug 22, 2022 · ResearchAiTM initial access, sign-in locations, My Access sign-in, previously satisfied MFA, security info registration, recommendations
- 2.Advanced BEC scam campaign targeting executives on O365Cloud Security Alliance (republishing Mitiga) · Dec 15, 2022 · ResearchLure delivery, reverse-proxy AiTM, session cookie capture, sign-in locations, mailbox and SharePoint reconnaissance, look-alike domains, fraudulent wire email, detection, response, audit log operation
- 3.Sophisticated BEC scammers bypass Microsoft 365 multi-factor authenticationCSO Online · Aug 24, 2022 · NewsLink between the two Mitiga accounts, the transfer that did not go through
- 4.Mitiga: Attackers evade Microsoft MFA to lurk inside M365TechTarget · Aug 25, 2022 · NewsMicrosoft declining to comment
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.