What happened
Replaying the Mimecast intrusion, disclosed January 2021
- 1
SUNBURST inside Mimecast
Not stated; Orion installations identified in December 2020The SUNBURST backdoor in Mimecast's SolarWinds Orion install gives the actor its initial access, and the actor moves laterally to a small number of Windows servers in one segment of Mimecast's production grid.
- 2
The certificate and customer data taken
Not stated; before Microsoft's notification in January 2021From the production grid segment the actor takes the Mimecast-issued certificate, a private key in Microsoft's words, and reaches encrypted customer credentials, configuration and contact data; it also downloads source code and accesses internal email.
- 3
The certificate turned on customer tenants
Not stated; before January 12, 2021The stolen certificate connects to a low single-digit number of customers' Microsoft 365 tenants from non-Mimecast IP address ranges, as Microsoft reported; the SEC order counts five customers' cloud platforms compromised, and what the actor did there is not stated.
- 4
Certificate blocked, actor evicted
January 2021 (notification); January 18, 2021 (block, as reported); by January 26, 2021 (former keys disabled); March 2021 (investigation completed)Microsoft notifies Mimecast, customers re-create the connection with a new certificate, and Microsoft blocks the certificate at Mimecast's request; Mimecast completes its investigation with Mandiant and says it eliminated the actor's access.
The certificate that about ten percent of Mimecast's customers used to authenticate Mimecast products to Microsoft 365 Exchange Web Services was taken and used from non-Mimecast IP address ranges against a low single-digit number of customers' Microsoft 365 tenants; the SEC order counts five customers' cloud platforms compromised, and what the actor did there is not stated. The actor also reached encrypted customer credentials, server and configuration information, contact information, internal email and part of Mimecast's source code; Mimecast is not aware of any credential decrypted or misused, and has no evidence of access to customer email or archive content held by Mimecast.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
The SUNBURST entry, the move to the production grid and the theft of the certificate happen inside Mimecast's own environment, and no source places it in a cloud provider. In your Microsoft Entra tenant, a Conditional Access policy for workload identities that admits a vendor's service principal only from the vendor's IP address ranges bounds where a stolen certificate can be presented from; it applies only to a single-tenant service principal, and the sources do not say which kind the Mimecast connection was. A certificate lifetime limit and an Exchange Online RBAC for Applications scope bound how long and how far a stolen certificate reaches.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 3 controls would have limited how far it went. 7 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 7
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Mimecast intrusion, disclosed January 2021
1 · SUNBURST inside Mimecast
2 Not covered2 · The certificate and customer data taken
3 Not covered3 · The certificate turned on customer tenants
3 Contained6 on other clouds4 · Certificate blocked, actor evicted
2 Not coveredKey facts
- The initial intrusion resulted from SUNBURST, the backdoor in the compromised SolarWinds Orion version Mimecast used; per the SEC order, Mimecast identified the Orion installations in December 2020 and, at that time, no further unauthorized activity
- The actor moved laterally to a small number of Windows servers in one segment of Mimecast's production grid and accessed Mimecast-issued certificates and related customer server connection information; Microsoft said a Mimecast private key was stolen
- About ten percent of Mimecast's customers used the certificate to authenticate Mimecast Sync and Recover, Continuity Monitor and IEP to Microsoft 365 Exchange Web Services
- Microsoft reported that the actor used the certificate from non-Mimecast IP address ranges against a low single-digit number of customers' Microsoft 365 tenants; the SEC order counted five customers' cloud platforms compromised, and no source said what the actor did there
- The SEC order found that the actor accessed encrypted credentials for about 31,000 customers and server and configuration information for about 17,000, and exfiltrated 58% of the exgestion, 50% of the M365 authentication and 76% of the M365 interoperability source code; Mimecast neither admitted nor denied the findings
- Microsoft blocked the certificate at Mimecast's request on January 18, 2021, per a Microsoft spokesperson, and by January 26 had disabled the former connection keys for all affected customers; Mimecast completed its investigation with Mandiant in March 2021
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Important Update from MimecastMimecast · Jan 12, 2021 · Vendor reportMicrosoft notification, certificate purpose, affected products, share of customers, targeted tenants, customer remediation, mail flow impact
- 2.Public Statement: Important Security UpdateMimecast · Jan 26, 2021 · Vendor reportActor attribution to the SolarWinds actor, encrypted service account credentials, connected services, former connection keys disabled, customer remediation
- 3.Incident ReportMimecast (SEC Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.2) · Mar 16, 2021 · Vendor reportInitial intrusion through SUNBURST, production grid access, lateral movement, additional access methods, certificate use from non-Mimecast IP ranges, data accessed, source code, remediation, investigation completion
- 4.In the Matter of Mimecast Limited: Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (Release No. 33-11322)U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission · Oct 22, 2024 · AdvisoryOrion installations identified in December 2020, certificate exfiltration, five customers' cloud platforms compromised, credential and configuration counts, internal email, source code shares, disclosure findings
- 5.Microsoft Digital Defense Report shares new insights on nation-state attacksMicrosoft · Oct 25, 2021 · ResearchActor name (NOBELIUM) and the theft of a Mimecast private key, in Microsoft's words
- 6.Mimecast certificate compromised by SolarWinds hackersTechTarget SearchSecurity · Jan 26, 2021 · NewsMicrosoft spokesperson's statement: the certificate blocked on January 18, 2021 at Mimecast's request
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.