What happened
Replaying the Malwarebytes intrusion, flagged December 2020
- 1
Privileged access to the tenant
Not statedThe actor holds privileged access in the tenant that lets it add a credential to an application; how it gained that access is not stated.
- 2
A certificate on a dormant application
Not statedA self-signed certificate is added as a credential to the service principal of a dormant email protection application.
- 3
Mail read as the application
Not stated; before Microsoft's notice of December 15, 2020The application's identity authenticates with the added certificate and requests email through Microsoft Graph; a limited subset of internal email is read.
A limited subset of internal company email read; no unauthorized access found in the on-premises or production environments, and no compromise found in the source code or the build and delivery processes.
Where Microsoft Entra and Exchange Online controls fit
No setting would have refused this chain outright: how the actor gained its privileged access is not stated, and the roles that can add a certificate to an application can also undo several of the settings that guard it. Disable sign-in for every enterprise application you no longer use, so a credential added to it yields no token. Scope each mail application's Exchange Online access to the mailboxes it serves, restrict which certificates an application may take and for how long with an application management policy, and keep your administrator roles eligible in Privileged Identity Management, behind approval and phishing-resistant MFA. Application management policies, authentication strengths and Role Based Access Control for Applications in Exchange Online all arrived after the incident.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 6 controls would have limited how far it went. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 6
- Contained
- 0
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Malwarebytes intrusion, flagged December 2020
1 · Privileged access to the tenant
2 Contained3 on other clouds2 · A certificate on a dormant application
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Mail read as the application
2 Contained3 on other cloudsKey facts
- On December 15, 2020 the Microsoft Security Response Center told Malwarebytes of suspicious activity from a third-party application in its Office 365 tenant; the activity matched the tactics of the actor behind the SolarWinds attacks
- The actor added a self-signed certificate to the service principal of a dormant email protection product in the tenant, a product Malwarebytes' CEO also confirmed to SearchSecurity
- With the certificate's key the actor could authenticate as the application and request email through Microsoft Graph; it gained access to a limited subset of internal company email, and no source gave a count
- Malwarebytes did not say how the actor gained the privileged access it needed in the tenant; it pointed to a CISA report of password guessing, password spraying and misused administrative or service credentials in the campaign
- The investigation, with Microsoft's Detection and Response Team, found no unauthorized access to the on-premises or production environments, and a review of the source code and the build and delivery processes found no compromise
- Malwarebytes, which did not use SolarWinds products, disclosed the intrusion on January 19, 2021
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Malwarebytes targeted by Nation State Actor implicated in SolarWinds breachMalwarebytes · Jan 19, 2021 · Vendor reportNotification by Microsoft, dormant application, self-signed certificate on the service principal, Graph mail requests, scope, no on-premises or production access, no SolarWinds use, code and build review
- 2.Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments (AA21-008A)Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) · Apr 15, 2021 · AdvisoryCredentials added to existing service principals, Graph mailbox access, reuse of dormant applications, entry routes other than Orion
- 3.Malwarebytes breached by SolarWinds hackersTechTarget SearchSecurity · Jan 19, 2021 · NewsCorroboration of the dormant product, the scope and the notification date
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.