What happened
Replaying the Exchange Online BEC intrusion / reported by Microsoft in June 2021
- 1
Entry: a phished password
Date not statedA voice-message email with an HTML attachment shows an imitation Microsoft sign-in page and sends the typed password to the attackers.
- 2
Password check from rented VMs
Date not statedA legacy-protocol client on rented cloud machines checks each stolen password against Exchange Online through the ROPC flow, and accounts with MFA return an error.
- 3
Forwarding rules and mail theft
Date not statedRules forward mail with financial words to two attacker addresses and delete the copies, and a POP3/IMAP client pulls mail from selected mailboxes.
Microsoft reported hundreds of compromised mailboxes in multiple organizations as of June 14, 2021. Rules on them forwarded financial mail to the attackers and deleted the forwarded copies, and selected mailboxes were also read over POP3 and IMAP. Whether any payment was diverted is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In Microsoft Entra ID, a Conditional Access policy that requires multifactor authentication for all users would have refused the password-only sign-ins that opened your mailboxes; Microsoft says the check of a password returned an error for an account with MFA. It holds for a policy that covers legacy authentication clients, for accounts outside its exclusions, and where an account with no method cannot register one of the attacker's own. With the POP3 and IMAP4 settings off on every mailbox, Exchange Online refuses the mail pulls. Automatic forwarding set to Off in the outbound spam filter policy keeps the matched mail inside your organization, but the rules are still created and the deletion rules still run. Inbox Rules disabled in the Outlook on the web mailbox policy caps the rules only if they were made in Outlook on the web, which the source does not state. The phishing email and the password typed into it stay outside every cloud control.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 4 controls would have refused a step outright, and 2 controls would have limited one. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 4
- Prevented
- 2
- Contained
- 1
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Exchange Online BEC intrusion / reported by Microsoft in June 2021
1 · Entry: a phished password
1 Not covered2 · Password check from rented VMs
1 Prevented3 on other clouds3 · Forwarding rules and mail theft
3 Prevented2 ContainedKey facts
- Microsoft published its write-up on June 14, 2021; it gave no date for any step and named no victim organization and no cloud provider
- A voice-message email with an HTML attachment showed an imitation Microsoft sign-in page with the user name filled in and sent the typed password through a redirector at another cloud provider
- Each stolen password was checked against Exchange Online through the ROPC OAuth flow; for an account with MFA the request returned an invalid-grant error and sent no prompt
- Forwarding rules sent mail with words such as invoice, payment or statement to two attacker-controlled external addresses, and a second rule deleted the forwarded copies
- Microsoft reported hundreds of compromised mailboxes in multiple organizations as of June 14, 2021, and mail was also pulled from selected mailboxes with a POP3/IMAP client
- Each rented virtual machine ran one operation; the cloud providers' security teams suspended the subscriptions after Microsoft reported them, which took the infrastructure down
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC infrastructureMicrosoft Threat Intelligence · Jun 14, 2021 · ResearchLure and credential theft, credential check method and its failure under MFA, forwarding and deletion rules, POP3 and IMAP mail pulls, cloud-hosted attacker infrastructure, takedown, recommendations
- 2.Microsoft experts disrupted a large-scale BEC campaignSecurity Affairs · Jun 14, 2021 · NewsCorroboration of the rules and the multi-cloud infrastructure
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.