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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra
6 min read

Midnight Blizzard Teams phishing from renamed Microsoft 365 tenants

Victim
Fewer than 40 unnamed organizations in government, NGOs, IT services, technology, discrete manufacturing and media
When
since at least late May 2023; no day givenDisclosed Aug 2, 2023
Entry
External Teams chats from renamed small business Microsoft 365 tenants, posing as technical support, asked targets to enter a sign-in code into Microsoft Authenticator, which completed the actor's own sign-in.

Per Microsoft Threat Intelligence, from at least late May 2023 Midnight Blizzard renamed small business Microsoft 365 tenants it had compromised in earlier attacks, added onmicrosoft.com subdomains with security- or product-themed names and new users, and sent targets external Teams chat requests posing as technical support or a security team. Targets who entered the actor's sign-in code into the Microsoft Authenticator prompt completed the actor's own sign-in, which gave it a token for their Microsoft 365 account; the actor then typically took information and in some cases tried to add a device as managed. Microsoft says fewer than 40 organizations were affected, names none and does not say what was taken.

What happened

External Parties
Midnight Blizzard
Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDissues the token to the actor's sign-in
Renamed Small Business Tenants
Targeted Microsoft 365 Tenant
Security-themed tenant name
New onmicrosoft.com subdomain
New sender user
Targeted user
Microsoft 365 data
Entra ID device registry

Replaying the Midnight Blizzard Teams 2023 intrusion

  1. 1

    Infrastructure: a renamed small business tenant

    From at least late May 2023; dates of single tenants not stated

    The actor renames small business Microsoft 365 tenants it compromised in earlier attacks, adds a security- or product-themed onmicrosoft.com subdomain and creates a new user to send messages; how it got the tenants is not stated.

  2. 2

    Lure: an external Teams chat from fake support

    From at least late May 2023; dates of single chats not stated

    The target receives an external Teams chat request from a user posing as technical support or a security team; once it is accepted, a chat asks the target to enter a code into Microsoft Authenticator.

  3. 3

    Sign-in: the target enters the actor's code

    From at least late May 2023; dates of single sign-ins not stated

    The actor starts a Microsoft Entra sign-in with the target's valid credentials or against a passwordless account; the target enters the displayed code in the Authenticator prompt and the actor receives a token for the target's Microsoft 365 account.

  4. 4

    Access: information theft and a device for Conditional Access

    From at least late May 2023; dates not stated

    The actor typically takes information from the compromised tenant and in some cases tries to add a device as managed, likely to get past device-based Conditional Access; what was taken and whether a registration succeeded are not stated.

Impact

Accounts in fewer than 40 organizations in government, NGOs, IT services, technology, discrete manufacturing and media were targeted or compromised through Teams chats that got users to enter the actor's sign-in code. After sign-in the actor typically took information and in some cases tried to register a device. The report names no victim and does not say what was taken.

Outcome

Where Microsoft Teams and Entra controls fit

A Teams external access setting that allows only your partners' domains would have refused the chat request from a new onmicrosoft.com subdomain. A Conditional Access policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength would have refused the sign-in the target completed with a code in Microsoft Authenticator, so no token would have reached the actor. A policy that requires a compliant device, and device settings that keep users from registering or joining devices, would have bounded what a token and a device attempt could open, where enrollment restrictions keep the actor's devices out. The tenants the actor already held, and requests made with a token that meets every policy, sit outside your settings. Check whether your tenant still allows external chat from all domains, the Teams default.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright, and 5 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

3
Prevented
5
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Midnight Blizzard
Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Internet
Microsoft Entra IDissues the token to the actor's sign-in
Renamed Small Business Tenants
Targeted Microsoft 365 Tenant
Security-themed tenant name
New onmicrosoft.com subdomain
New sender user
Targeted user
Microsoft 365 data
Entra ID device registry

Replaying the Midnight Blizzard Teams 2023 intrusion

1 · Infrastructure: a renamed small business tenant

1 Not covered

2 · Lure: an external Teams chat from fake support

1 Prevented

3 · Sign-in: the target enters the actor's code

1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds

4 · Access: information theft and a device for Conditional Access

1 Prevented4 Contained1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported on August 2, 2023 that the pattern had been seen since at least late May 2023 and had affected fewer than 40 unique global organizations; it named none
  • The targets were in government, non-government organizations, IT services, technology, discrete manufacturing and media; Microsoft assessed that the activity likely served specific espionage objectives
  • The actor used Microsoft 365 tenants of small businesses compromised in earlier attacks, renamed them, added onmicrosoft.com subdomains with security- or product-themed names and created new users to send the chats; how the tenants were compromised was not stated
  • The actor either held valid credentials for the targeted users or targeted passwordless accounts; the target entered the code shown during the actor's sign-in into Microsoft Authenticator and the actor received a token; how the passwords were obtained was not stated
  • Post-compromise activity typically involved information theft, and in some cases the actor tried to add a device as managed through Microsoft Entra ID, likely to get past device-based Conditional Access; what was taken and whether a registration succeeded were not stated
  • Midnight Blizzard, previously NOBELIUM, was attributed by the US and UK governments to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); Microsoft mitigated the actor's use of the domains and notified targeted or compromised customers

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Midnight Blizzard conducts targeted social engineering over Microsoft TeamsMicrosoft Threat Intelligence · Aug 2, 2023 · Vendor reportThe actor, attribution, start of activity, scope count, sectors, tenant takeover and renaming, Teams external chat lure, Authenticator code prompt, token and account access, information theft, device registration attempts, mitigations

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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