What happened
Incident overview
- 1
Application access through the proxy
August 2022Microsoft’s responders found that the intruder reached a vulnerable customer application through Azure AD Application Proxy. They did not identify which sign-in checks the application used.
- 2
Unauthorized sign-ins on federation servers
After the application accessMicrosoft confirmed the customer’s altered federation servers accepted unauthorized certificate-based sign-ins. Responders captured the certificates used and helped move authentication to Azure AD.
Impact
Microsoft confirmed illicit sign-ins on the customer’s federation servers. The customer moved authentication to Azure AD during recovery.
Could this have been prevented?
Protect the published app and the servers that vouch for users
Microsoft Entra preauthentication and a device requirement can limit access through the application proxy. Once the federation servers themselves were compromised, Microsoft and the customer moved authentication to Azure AD. The investigation did not name a downstream cloud service the intruder accessed.
Incident control assessments
- 0
- Prevented
- 1
- Contained
- 1
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Incident overview
1 · Application access through the proxy
1 Contained2 · Unauthorized sign-ins on federation servers
1 Not coveredKey facts
- Microsoft attributed the incident to the group it then called NOBELIUM.
- The customer contacted Microsoft after seeing unusual authentication requests.
- Investigators captured certificates presented during unauthorized sign-ins.
- The customer moved authentication off its on-premises federation servers.
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Cyberattack report: NOBELIUM MagicWeb exploitMicrosoft Incident Response · undated · Vendor reportPages 2–5 report application access through Azure AD Application Proxy, illicit authentications observed on customer federation servers and the move to Azure AD.
- 2.MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyoneMicrosoft · Aug 24, 2022 · Vendor reportThe August disclosure identifies the affected federation software and distinguishes persistent access from the original compromise.
- 3.Plan a Microsoft Entra application proxy deploymentMicrosoft Learn · undated · AdvisoryMicrosoft Entra preauthentication supports Conditional Access and device compliance on a published application.
- 4.Require device compliance with Conditional AccessMicrosoft Learn · undated · AdvisoryAn enforced grant requirement checks whether the device is marked compliant. It depends on an effective device compliance policy.
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.