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ExposureAWS
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Los Angeles County 211 hotline call notes exposed in Amazon S3

Owner
211 LA County, the nonprofit hotline operator
When
Start unknown. Found March 14, 2018.Disclosed May 17, 2018
Entry
UpGuard observed a listing open to anyone without AWS credentials. It did not publish the underlying bucket policy or ACL.

The nonprofit that operates Los Angeles County’s 211 hotline kept service records in Amazon S3. UpGuard could list the bucket without signing in and read some of its backups and exports. The organization’s security contact was reached on April 24, 2018. UpGuard confirmed that public access ended less than a day later.

What was exposed

Public reporting
UpGuard
Internet
Amazon S3
Hotline records

Replaying the 211 LA March 2018 exposure

  1. 1

    Public bucket listing

    March to April 2018

    UpGuard found an anonymous listing of the hotline bucket. The report did not identify the setting that granted each permission.

  2. 2

    Readable hotline records

    March to April 2018

    The finder read sensitive records from some files. Other listed files refused anonymous downloads.

Impact

UpGuard found downloadable notes for over 200,000 hotline calls, along with operator credentials. Some other files were visible in the bucket listing but could not be downloaded anonymously.

Could this have been prevented?

Keep hotline records outside public S3 grants

If hotline records should be private, enable all four S3 Block Public Access settings on their bucket. That protects both the bucket listing and its objects against public grants. A resource control policy can also deny anonymous requests to a covered member-account bucket. AWS introduced both controls after the hotline bucket was closed.

Incident control assessments

2
Prevented
0
Contained
0
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Public reporting
UpGuard
Internet
Amazon S3
Hotline records

Replaying the 211 LA March 2018 exposure

1 · Public bucket listing

1 Prevented

2 · Readable hotline records

1 Prevented

Key facts

  • UpGuard counted over three million call-log rows and about 200,000 detailed notes. These were counts of records, not distinct callers.
  • The downloadable material included sensitive crisis-service records and operator credentials. The report does not establish that anyone used those credentials.
  • UpGuard found the exposure on March 14, 2018. It did not identify the date the bucket first became public.
  • UpGuard reached the hotline’s security team on April 24, 2018, and confirmed less than 24 hours later that the bucket was no longer public.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    LA Confidential: How Leaked Emergency Call Records Exposed LA County’s Abuse & Crisis VictimsUpGuard · May 17, 2018 · ResearchFirst-hand discovery, public listing, uneven object readability and confirmation of closure.
  2. 2.
    Blocking public access to your Amazon S3 storageAmazon Web Services · undated · Vendor reportThe four S3 Block Public Access settings and treatment of public ACLs and bucket policies.
  3. 3.
    Introducing Amazon S3 Block Public Access – another layer of protection for your accounts and bucketsAmazon Web Services · Nov 15, 2018 · Vendor reportLaunch of the bucket and account settings after these exposures.
  4. 4.
    Resource control policies (RCPs)Amazon Web Services · undated · Vendor reportResource policy coverage for S3 in member accounts and exceptions.
  5. 5.
    Introducing resource control policies (RCPs) to centrally restrict access to AWS resourcesAmazon Web Services · Nov 13, 2024 · Vendor reportNovember 2024 introduction of resource control policies.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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