What the demonstration did
Replaying Datadog's Key Vault access policy demonstration / reported to MSRC October 2024; the run date is not stated
- 1
Phished administrator session
Assumed by the scenario; not stagedThe scenario assumes that a systems administration user signs in through an adversary-in-the-middle link and that the attacker takes the user's session tokens.
- 2
Access policy self-grant
Test date not statedSeeing that the user's roles give no data access, the attacker uses Key Vault Contributor's Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/write permission to add its own identity to the vault's access policy with all permissions.
- 3
Secrets read
Test date not statedThe new access policy entry authorizes the attacker's data plane requests, and the attacker reads the vault's secrets, including an application API key.
In the staged test, a Key Vault Contributor documented as having no data access added itself to a vault's access policy and read the vault's secrets, including an application API key. Microsoft closed the report as not a vulnerability and added a warning to the role documentation; the write-up does not say whether the behavior changed, and it reports no use in the wild.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
In Microsoft Entra ID, a Conditional Access policy that requires the phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength for your administrators would have refused the relayed sign-in the scenario assumes, so no session would have reached your key vault. In Azure, an Azure Policy assignment that denies vault and access policy writes caps the self-grant only where your phished user sits outside its exemption, which the write-up does not say, and a read-only resource lock blocks updates of the vault, though Microsoft's lock documentation does not name access policy changes. Key Vault network rules with public network access disabled limit secret reads to your private endpoints; the write-up does not say where the requests came from. In the test, the role added itself to the access policy and read the vault's secrets, including an application API key.
Would the controls have stopped it?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 3 controls would have limited one. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 0
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying Datadog's Key Vault access policy demonstration / reported to MSRC October 2024; the run date is not stated
1 · Phished administrator session
1 Prevented3 on other clouds2 · Access policy self-grant
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Secrets read
1 Contained3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Datadog Security Labs reported the behavior to MSRC on October 25, 2024, and published its write-up on December 16, 2024
- Microsoft documented Key Vault Contributor as managing key vaults without access to secrets, keys or certificates, yet the role held Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/write, the permission the write-up names for the access policy change
- A test user holding Key Vault Contributor had no direct access to the vault data before the change; after adding itself to the access policy, it could get, list and update all of the vault's data
- The phishing of the systems administration user through an adversary-in-the-middle link was assumed by the scenario, not staged, and the write-up does not say how the read API key would have been used
- Microsoft added an access policy warning to the Key Vault Contributor documentation on October 31, 2024, and MSRC closed the case as not a vulnerability on November 11, 2024
- The write-up reports no use of the technique in the wild and does not say whether the behavior itself changed
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Escalating privileges to read secrets with Azure Key Vault access policiesDatadog Security Labs · Dec 16, 2024 · ResearchRole permissions, access policy self-grant, secret read, MSRC timeline, Microsoft documentation change, recommendations
The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.