What the demonstration did
Replaying Tenable's Copilot Studio demonstration / advisory August 2024; the run date is not stated
- 1
An HTTP action that runs from Azure
Not dated · before Aug 6, 2024The topic's HTTP request action calls the researcher's server, and the request arrives from Azure infrastructure with the custom header.
- 2
Past the request filter to the metadata service
Not dated · before Aug 6, 2024Direct requests to the metadata service are refused; a redirect and a multiline header value reach it and return instance metadata.
- 3
A managed identity token for Azure Resource Manager
Not dated · before Aug 6, 2024The metadata service issues a managed identity token, which lists two subscriptions and a Cosmos DB account whose master keys are readable.
- 4
Into the internal Cosmos DB and the local subnet
Not dated · before Aug 6, 2024A request signed with the master key gets a valid response from inside Microsoft's ranges, and other hosts on the local subnet are reached.
From the HTTP request action, the researcher read instance metadata, got a managed identity token for Azure Resource Manager, listed two subscriptions, read the master keys of an internal Cosmos DB account, got a valid response from it and reached other internal hosts on the local subnet; direct requests to the metadata service were refused, and tests from several tenants found no cross-tenant information immediately accessible.
What the demonstration shows about your Azure workloads
The chain needed only a feature that sends a request wherever its user points it. Once the request got past the service's own filter, the network path and the identity behind the host decided what it reached. If you run a service that fetches URLs for users, an outbound network security group rule that denies the AzurePlatformIMDS service tag, or the Metadata Security Protocol with an allowlist in Enforce mode, bounds what a relayed request gets from the metadata service. On your Cosmos DB accounts, key-based authentication turned off and public network access disabled bound what a leaked master key does, and a ReadOnly lock refuses the listing of the read-write keys. Microsoft fixed its service before its August 6, 2024 advisory; no source says what the fix changed.
Would the controls have stopped it?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 10 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 10
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying Tenable's Copilot Studio demonstration / advisory August 2024; the run date is not stated
1 · An HTTP action that runs from Azure
1 Not covered2 · Past the request filter to the metadata service
3 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds3 · A managed identity token for Azure Resource Manager
4 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds4 · Into the internal Cosmos DB and the local subnet
3 Contained3 on other cloudsKey facts
- A request from the HTTP request action of a Copilot Studio topic to a researcher-controlled server arrived from Azure infrastructure, with the custom header and several Azure headers the researcher had not added
- Direct requests to the metadata address, an alternate encoding of it and a domain resolving to it failed; a redirect from the researcher's server got past the filter, the first redirected request got a 400 error, and with a multiline header value the metadata service returned instance metadata
- The same path got a managed identity access token for Azure Resource Manager, and the management API listed two subscriptions associated with the identity
- In one subscription, a Cosmos DB account's master keys were readable; a request authorized with a token built from a key, sent through the HTTP action from inside the Microsoft internal ranges the account allowed, got a valid response, and the post does not say any data was read
- The researcher also reached other unrestricted internal hosts on the local subnet, and tests from several tenants found no cross-tenant information immediately accessible
- Microsoft published CVE-2024-38206 on August 6, 2024, rated Critical with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.5, as already fully mitigated and not exploited; no source dates the research, the report or the fix
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.SSRFing the Web with the Help of Copilot StudioTenable Research · Aug 20, 2024 · Researchthe HTTP request action and custom headers, the outbound request from Azure infrastructure, the blocked metadata requests, the redirect bypass, the header workaround, instance metadata, the managed identity token, the two subscriptions, the Cosmos DB endpoints and master keys, the network restriction to Microsoft addresses, the valid response through Copilot, the cross-tenant testing, other internal hosts, CVE-2024-38206
- 2.CVE-2024-38206: Microsoft Copilot Studio Information Disclosure VulnerabilityMicrosoft Security Response Center · Aug 6, 2024 · Advisorythe CVE and its description, the Critical severity and the CVSS 3.1 score, full mitigation by Microsoft, no customer action, not exploited, the release date
- 3.CVE-2024-38206 Microsoft Copilot Studio Information Disclosure VulnerabilityCVE Program (record assigned by Microsoft) · Jul 10, 2025 · AdvisoryCWE-918, the record's publication and update times, the CVSS vector and base score
- 4.SSRF Security Feature Bypass in Azure AI and ML StudiosTenable Research · Jun 17, 2024 · Researchthe earlier redirect bypass in Azure AI Studio and Azure Machine Learning Studio that the Copilot Studio research built on, and its disclosure timeline
- 5.Microsoft Copilot Studio Vulnerability Led to Information DisclosureSecurityWeek · Aug 21, 2024 · Newsthe advisory's mitigation statement as reported, the redirect type as reported, the cross-tenant statement as reported
The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.