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IntrusionAWS
11 min read

Capital One data breach

Victim
Capital One Financial Corporation
When
Mar 12, 2019 – Apr 21, 2019Disclosed Jul 29, 2019
Entry
A misconfigured web application firewall on an internet-facing server relayed outside commands; the server's role credentials were obtained and then accepted by the AWS API from VPN addresses and from addresses the complaint believes are TOR exit nodes.

In March 2019 an attacker reached an internet-facing Capital One server through a misconfigured web application firewall, obtained the temporary credentials of the server's IAM role and used them from VPN addresses and from addresses the complaint believes are TOR exit nodes to list more than 700 Amazon S3 buckets and copy credit card application data to a home server. Capital One learned of it from an external researcher on July 17, 2019 and fixed the configuration on July 19, and the FBI seized the copied data on July 29. Whether the credentials came from the instance metadata service is reported by researchers and not confirmed by Capital One or the DOJ.

What happened

External Parties
IPredator VPN
TOR exit nodes
Home server
+ 4 more
Internet
Instance metadatarole credentials
Amazon EC2
Web Tier · internet-facing
Customer Data · Amazon S3
Web App Firewall · misconfigured
IAM Role · WAF-Role
Web Application
Web Server
S3 Buckets · 700+
Credit Application Files
Encrypted Fields
Tokenized Fields

Replaying the Capital One March 2019 data breach

  1. 1

    Scanning, allegedly behind VPN and TOR

    Up to Mar 12, 2019

    A scanner looks for misconfigured firewalls on public-facing servers; the first attempt reaches Capital One through a VPN address.

  2. 2

    Through the firewall to the role credentials

    On or before Mar 22, 2019

    The misconfigured firewall relays outside commands to the server; the first command obtains the credentials of the server's IAM role.

  3. 3

    Stolen credentials accepted from the internet

    Mar 22 and Apr 21, 2019

    The role's credentials sign Amazon S3 requests from VPN addresses and from addresses believed to be TOR exit nodes; the List Buckets Command returns more than 700 names.

  4. 4

    Copied to a home server

    Mar 22, 2019

    The Sync Command copies the buckets the role can read, credit card application files among them, to a server at the accused's home; the access also enables decrypting data.

Impact

Credit card application and customer data of approximately 100 million people in the United States and approximately 6 million in Canada copied, about 140,000 Social Security numbers and about 80,000 bank account numbers among it; an $80 million OCC penalty and a $190 million customer settlement followed.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

IMDSv2, set on the instance or required by an organization policy, answers only a session that starts with a PUT request, which narrows which relays reach the role credentials; the sources do not confirm that the credentials came from the metadata service or say what the relay could send. A service control policy with network conditions binds only the member accounts of an organization, and the sources do not say which kind of account held the role. A resource control policy on the buckets and an S3 endpoint policy would have kept the reach of those credentials inside your VPC; a permissions boundary would have capped the role at its own buckets, and the same perimeter on AWS KMS would have delivered ciphertext. A web ACL with managed rule groups would have narrowed who could probe the server and refused the request patterns it lists, though the scanner's addresses and the request pattern are not in the sources. The firewall rule set itself stays your configuration on every cloud.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 13 controls would have limited how far it went. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
13
Contained
0
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
IPredator VPN
TOR exit nodes
Home server
+ 4 more
Internet
Instance metadatarole credentials
Amazon EC2
Web Tier · internet-facing
Customer Data · Amazon S3
Web App Firewall · misconfigured
IAM Role · WAF-Role
Web Application
Web Server
S3 Buckets · 700+
Credit Application Files
Encrypted Fields
Tokenized Fields

Replaying the Capital One March 2019 data breach

1 · Scanning, allegedly behind VPN and TOR

2 Contained6 on other clouds

2 · Through the firewall to the role credentials

4 Contained6 on other clouds

3 · Stolen credentials accepted from the internet

3 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Copied to a home server

4 Contained6 on other clouds

Key facts

  • An IPredator VPN address attempted to reach the data on March 12, 2019; the List Buckets and Sync commands ran on March 22 from VPN addresses and from addresses believed to be TOR exit nodes
  • The List Buckets Command returned more than 700 bucket names, a command the role did not invoke in the ordinary course of business
  • Approximately 100 million people in the United States and approximately 6 million in Canada were affected; about 140,000 Social Security numbers and about 80,000 linked bank account numbers were among the data
  • An external researcher reported the leaked bucket list on July 17, 2019; Capital One fixed the configuration on July 19 and the FBI seized devices holding a copy of the data on July 29
  • AWS attributed the intrusion to a misconfigured web application firewall; AWS believes server-side request forgery was used, and the path to the metadata service is the researchers' inference
  • The OCC assessed an $80 million penalty in August 2020 for risk assessment failures before the cloud migration; the DOJ states that customer lawsuits settled for $190 million

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Capital One Announces Data Security IncidentCapital One · Jul 29, 2019 · Vendor reportDiscovery, access dates, data types, counts, encryption and tokenization, cost estimate, arrest
  2. 2.
    Complaint for Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), United States v. Paige A. Thompson, No. MJ19-0344 (W.D. Wash.)U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Jul 29, 2019 · AdvisoryTechnical chain, logged dates, TOR and VPN use, bucket count, disclosure email, counts at the time, evidence trail
  3. 3.
    Seattle Tech Worker Arrested for Data Theft Involving Large Financial Services CompanyU.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Jul 29, 2019 · NewsArrest, charge, cause wording, discovery dates, seizure
  4. 4.
    Former Seattle Tech Worker Indicted on Federal Charges for Wire Fraud and Computer Data TheftU.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Aug 28, 2019 · NewsIndictment, other victims, scanner, cryptojacking, no evidence of dissemination
  5. 5.
    Superseding Indictment, United States v. Paige A. Thompson, No. CR19-0159 (W.D. Wash.), Document 102U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Jun 17, 2021 · AdvisoryScheme, manner and means, charged dates, other victims, counts
  6. 6.
    Former Seattle tech worker convicted of wire fraud and computer intrusionsU.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Jun 17, 2022 · NewsVerdict, counts, trial facts, settlement figure
  7. 7.
    OCC Assesses $80 Million Civil Money Penalty Against Capital OneOffice of the Comptroller of the Currency · Aug 6, 2020 · NewsPenalty, regulatory basis, cloud migration risk assessment finding
  8. 8.
    Consent Order, In the Matter of Capital One, N.A. and Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., AA-EC-20-49 (#2020-037)Office of the Comptroller of the Currency · Aug 5, 2020 · AdvisoryControl deficiencies, 2015 cloud migration, internal audit, remediation requirements
  9. 9.
    What We Can Learn from the Capital One HackKrebs on Security · Aug 2, 2019 · ResearchSSRF account, WAF product, metadata service, AWS statement, expert commentary
  10. 10.
    A Technical Analysis of the Capital One HackCloudSploit · Aug 2, 2019 · ResearchMetadata service mechanics, credential use from outside AWS, S3 commands, mitigations
  11. 11.
    A Case Study of the Capital One Data Breach (Revised), Working Paper CISL# 2020-16MIT Sloan, Cybersecurity Interdisciplinary Systems Laboratory · Mar 1, 2020 · ResearchAttack step reconstruction, ATT&CK mapping, cloud migration context, data volume claim
  12. 12.
    Add defense in depth against open firewalls, reverse proxies, and SSRF vulnerabilities with enhancements to the EC2 Instance Metadata ServiceAmazon Web Services, AWS Security Blog · Nov 19, 2019 · AdvisoryIMDSv2 mechanics, enforcement controls, threats addressed
  13. 13.
    Amazon Web Services finds no 'significant issues' at other companies allegedly breached by Paige ThompsonCyberScoop · Aug 16, 2019 · NewsAWS account of the cause, SSRF acknowledgement, other customers, AWS commitments

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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