What was exposed
Replaying the Attunity May 2019 exposure
- 1
Configured: three buckets readable by anyone
Before May 13, 2019; date not statedThree Amazon S3 buckets, attunity-it, attunity-patch and attunity-support, let anyone on the internet read them; which setting opened them, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: about a terabyte sampled while open
Until May 17, 2019; start not statedAnyone on the internet can download the files without credentials: email and OneDrive backups, system passwords, private keys, a client list, client files and an employee spreadsheet.
- 3
Found and closed: a researcher, a phone call, one day
May 13–17, 2019An UpGuard researcher finds the buckets on May 13 and samples about a terabyte; a phone call to Qlik support on May 16 is followed by public access removed by the next day.
Files of uncertain total size, of which the finder sampled about a terabyte, with 750 GB of compressed email backups, employee OneDrive backups with system passwords, private keys, a client list, client files and an employee spreadsheet of 354 rows, readable by anyone on the internet until public access was removed by May 17, 2019; the start of the window is not stated, and no source reports misuse.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Amazon S3 Block Public Access on the account would have refused the ACL or bucket policy that opened the three buckets. Object Ownership refuses only an ACL, and a service control policy keeps Block Public Access on only in a member account of an organization; the sources state neither which setting opened the buckets nor whether the account sat in an organization. With a grant already in place, the ignore and restrict settings of Block Public Access would have refused every read through it, the researcher's included, and a resource control policy would have refused unsigned requests across the organization. Azure and Google Cloud refuse the same opening and the same read with the anonymous-access setting and the public access prevention constraint; an Oracle Cloud Security Zone refuses the opening, and does not refuse a read of a bucket that is already public. The three days from the discovery to the owner and the day to the fix stay outside the provider's controls: your disclosure intake routes a finder's call, and the provider's checks report a public bucket rather than refuse it.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright, and 5 controls would have limited one. 2 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 3
- Prevented
- 5
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Attunity May 2019 exposure
1 · Configured: three buckets readable by anyone
1 Prevented2 Contained5 on other clouds2 · Reachable: about a terabyte sampled while open
1 Prevented2 Contained5 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: a researcher, a phone call, one day
1 Prevented1 Contained2 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- UpGuard found the three buckets on May 13, 2019 and, on a date not stated, downloaded a sample of about a terabyte, 750 GB of it compressed email backups; the total size was uncertain and the sample was not analyzed in full
- The files included employee OneDrive backups with email correspondence and system passwords, private keys in configuration directories, a 'Production VLAN' spreadsheet, a client list and an employee spreadsheet of 354 rows with dates of birth and salaries
- Client files included Ford IT architecture, TD Bank invoices and log-in details for a database Attunity created in 2015 while trying to sign Netflix; Netflix said it never became a customer, and TD Bank found no evidence that its customers' personal and financial information was exposed
- The oldest files dated from September 2014 and the newest from days before the discovery; when the buckets became public was not stated
- The researcher notified Attunity on May 16, 2019, after Qlik completed its acquisition on May 6, reaching Qlik support by phone; public access was removed by the next day
- No source reported misuse: UpGuard had no evidence of it, Qlik's preliminary indication was that the finder was the only external access, and the outcome of Qlik's investigation was not found
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Data Warehouse: How a Vendor for Half the Fortune 100 Exposed a Terabyte of BackupsUpGuard · Jun 27, 2019 · ResearchBucket names, contents, sample size, file dates, discovery date, notification, closure, cause as the finder states it, what the finder did not do
- 2.Qlik Completes Attunity Acquisition to Offer Enterprise Data Integration and Real-Time AnalyticsQlik · May 6, 2019 · Vendor reportAcquisition completion date, shareholder approval date, price
- 3.Ford, TD Bank Files Found Online in Cloud Data ExposureBloomberg, syndicated by Yahoo Finance · Jun 27, 2019 · NewsCompany statements, misuse statements, client file descriptions, employee count, follow-up delay, acquisition month and price
- 4.Leaky Amazon S3 Buckets Expose Data of Netflix, TD BankThreatpost · Jun 27, 2019 · NewsQlik statement, disclosure date, timeline as re-reported, what UpGuard could not confirm
- 5.Provider of Data Integration Services for Fortune 100 Firms Exposed Sensitive FilesSecurityWeek · Jun 28, 2019 · NewsQlik remediation statement, Qlik hosting statement, unknown public-access start, timeline as re-reported
- 6.Fortune 100 company data exposed by misconfigured Attunity AWS instanceSiliconANGLE · Jun 30, 2019 · NewsQlik response statement, Qlik silence on cause, acquisition date as it states it, commentary
- 7.Attunity data exposed in unsecured Amazon S3 bucketsiTWire · Jun 30, 2019 · NewsQlik notification statement, Qlik remediation statement, acquisition month, timeline as re-reported
- 8.UpGuard: Unsecured Amazon S3 Buckets Exposed 1 TB of DataGovInfoSecurity (Information Security Media Group) · Jul 1, 2019 · NewsQlik standards statement, access-unknown statement, timeline as re-reported with its disagreements
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.