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ExposureAWS
2 min read

Birst exposed a test appliance through public S3 storage

Owner
Birst
When
Files uploaded Nov 2017. Public access found Jan 2018. – Jan 15, 2018Disclosed Feb 27, 2018
Entry
A Birst employee placed proof-of-concept appliance files in a publicly readable S3 bucket.

Birst used a public S3 bucket to deliver a test appliance to a prospective customer. UpGuard found appliance administrator credentials, passwords and a private key in the bucket. Birst said it held no data or credentials from the prospective customer. Public access ended within an hour of notification.

What was exposed

Independent research
UpGuard
Internet
Birst software delivery
Appliance files

A public data exposure / Birst

  1. 1

    A test delivery is open to the public

    By January 15, 2018

    A Birst employee made a non-production appliance available in S3 for one prospective customer. Public read access extended beyond that customer.

  2. 2

    Appliance files can be read

    By January 15, 2018

    UpGuard found 50.4 GB across three folders and inspected software from two appliance versions. Birst said the files contained no customer data.

  3. 3

    Access closes within an hour

    January 15, 2018

    UpGuard notified Capital One. Access was removed within an hour. Birst subsequently confirmed that it disabled public access.

Impact

UpGuard found two versions of Birst’s test appliance, administrative credentials, passwords and an appliance private key in the 50.4 GB bucket. Birst said it held no data or credentials from the prospective customer.

Could this have been prevented?

Give the intended customer access to the test appliance

A named customer can receive the files through authenticated access. Today, S3 Block Public Access can keep a wider grant from exposing them. AWS introduced the feature after Birst closed this bucket.

Incident control assessments

2
Prevented
0
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Independent research
UpGuard
Internet
Birst software delivery
Appliance files

A public data exposure / Birst

1 · A test delivery is open to the public

1 Prevented

2 · Appliance files can be read

1 Prevented

3 · Access closes within an hour

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • UpGuard found the public bucket on January 15, 2018. Birst disabled public access within an hour of the notification.
  • UpGuard dated the upload of the newer appliance to November 13, 2017, about two months before closure.
  • UpGuard identified an RSA private key for the test appliance. Birst said it let the administration client connect to the application server and corrected the earlier description of it as an encryption key.
  • Capital One said the test appliance neither accessed its data nor connected to its systems. UpGuard found no evidence of Capital One customer or enterprise data in the bucket.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Cloud Burst: Software Delivery via Public Cloud StorageUpGuard · Feb 27, 2018 · ResearchAppliance files, response time and subsequent corrections from Birst and Capital One

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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