What the demonstration did
Replaying Tenable's Azure service tag demonstration / published June 2024; the run date is not stated
- 1
An internal app admits one service tag
Not dated; reported to MSRC on Jan 24, 2024The internal App Service admits only the Application Insights availability service tag, so availability tests can reach it; a direct request gets a forbidden response.
- 2
Another tenant's availability test passes the rule
Not datedAn availability test set up in another tenant, with custom headers and a chosen HTTP method, sends from the shared test addresses the tag covers, so the access restriction admits it and it reaches the app.
- 3
The response shows up in the attacker's results
Not datedThrough the standard test, the attacker views the internal app's response and the custom headers it sent, in the results of a test it controls.
No victim: the proof of concept showed that an internal App Service whose only gate is the Application Insights availability service tag answers requests that another tenant's availability test shapes, and hands the response back to that tenant; Tenable and MSRC found the same pattern in more than ten Azure services, and Microsoft reports no exploitation, by a third party or in the wild.
What the service tag demonstration shows about your allow rules
An access restriction that admits a service tag admits every customer of that service, not only you: an availability test set up in another tenant passed the rule, reached the internal app and showed its response in that tenant's results. On your App Service apps, App Service authentication limited to your own tenant refuses a request that carries no token your tenant issued, though any identity of your tenant still passes unless you narrow it. The Public network access setting set to Disabled, kept so by an Azure Policy assignment with the Deny effect, refuses every request on the public endpoint. Either control also refuses your own availability tests from Azure's public test locations: with authentication they need a credential the app accepts, and with the public endpoint closed the app is checked from inside its network. Microsoft kept the behavior and changed its documentation, so the fix stays with you.
Would the controls have stopped it?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 3
- Prevented
- 0
- Contained
- 1
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying Tenable's Azure service tag demonstration / published June 2024; the run date is not stated
1 · An internal app admits one service tag
1 Prevented3 on other clouds2 · Another tenant's availability test passes the rule
2 Prevented3 on other clouds3 · The response shows up in the attacker's results
1 Not coveredKey facts
- Tenable reported the behavior to MSRC on January 24, 2024; MSRC confirmed it on January 31, rated it Elevation of Privilege, Important, and paid a bounty
- On February 26, 2024 MSRC chose a documentation update over a product change; Microsoft later told Tenable in writing that the issue was not an SSRF vulnerability (April 3) and not a firewall bypass vulnerability (May 3)
- Microsoft published the service tags documentation changes on Microsoft Learn on May 10, 2024, saying service tags are not to be treated as a security boundary; Tenable's post, its advisory TRA-2024-19 and MSRC's guidance post followed on June 3, 2024
- Tenable and MSRC listed 11 Azure services with the same pattern, among them Azure DevOps, Azure Machine Learning, Azure Logic Apps, Azure Container Registry and Azure API Management; Tenable described only Application Insights step by step
- Microsoft's guidance for availability tests was a token sent as an HTTP header in the test, which the service checks, rejecting requests without it; the availability tests page warns that the test service uses shared IP addresses
- No third party reported exploitation or abuse of service tags to Microsoft, and Microsoft's own investigation saw none in the wild; Tenable's advisory rated the risk High
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.These Services Shall Not Pass: Abusing Service Tags to Bypass Azure Firewall Rules (Customer Action Required)Tenable Research · Jun 3, 2024 · ResearchThe internal App Service and its access restriction, the refused direct request, the availability test with custom headers and methods, the response read back, the cross-tenant reach, the affected services, the disclosure timeline, MSRC's rating and bounty, and Tenable's recommendations
- 2.Microsoft Azure Firewall Bypass Vulnerability (TRA-2024-19)Tenable Research · Jun 3, 2024 · AdvisoryThe affected services, the advisory's risk rating, Microsoft's response as Tenable records it, the solution and the disclosure timeline
- 3.Improved Guidance for Azure Network Service TagsMicrosoft Security Response Center · Jun 3, 2024 · AdvisoryMicrosoft's timeline and bounty, its position that service tags are not a security boundary, the documentation change of May 10, 2024, the header guidance for availability tests and the statement that no exploitation was reported or seen
- 4.Application Insights availability testsMicrosoft · undated · Vendor reportWhat a standard test lets its owner set, the warning that the test service uses shared IP addresses, and the header check for traffic from availability tests
The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.