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Tenable Research's Azure service tag demonstration on App Service

Environment
A staged internal App Service in Tenable's proof of concept; the tenants it used are not stated
When
not stated; reported to MSRC on Jan 24, 2024Disclosed Jun 3, 2024
Entry
An Application Insights availability test set up in another tenant, whose requests come from the shared addresses that the admitted service tag lists.

Tenable Research staged a proof of concept against an internal App Service whose access restrictions admitted only the Application Insights availability service tag; a direct request to the app got a forbidden response. An availability test set up in another tenant, with custom headers and a chosen HTTP method, sent its requests from the shared test addresses the tag covers, so the access restriction admitted them, and the standard test showed the app's response in that tenant's results. Microsoft kept the service behavior, changed its documentation on May 10, 2024 to say service tags are not a security boundary, and reports no exploitation.

What the demonstration did

Outside parties
Tenable Research
Microsoft (MSRC)
Internet
Internal App Service
Attacker's Application Insights
Access restrictions
Internal app
Availability test
Test results

Replaying Tenable's Azure service tag demonstration / published June 2024; the run date is not stated

  1. 1

    An internal app admits one service tag

    Not dated; reported to MSRC on Jan 24, 2024

    The internal App Service admits only the Application Insights availability service tag, so availability tests can reach it; a direct request gets a forbidden response.

  2. 2

    Another tenant's availability test passes the rule

    Not dated

    An availability test set up in another tenant, with custom headers and a chosen HTTP method, sends from the shared test addresses the tag covers, so the access restriction admits it and it reaches the app.

  3. 3

    The response shows up in the attacker's results

    Not dated

    Through the standard test, the attacker views the internal app's response and the custom headers it sent, in the results of a test it controls.

Impact

No victim: the proof of concept showed that an internal App Service whose only gate is the Application Insights availability service tag answers requests that another tenant's availability test shapes, and hands the response back to that tenant; Tenable and MSRC found the same pattern in more than ten Azure services, and Microsoft reports no exploitation, by a third party or in the wild.

Outcome

What the service tag demonstration shows about your allow rules

An access restriction that admits a service tag admits every customer of that service, not only you: an availability test set up in another tenant passed the rule, reached the internal app and showed its response in that tenant's results. On your App Service apps, App Service authentication limited to your own tenant refuses a request that carries no token your tenant issued, though any identity of your tenant still passes unless you narrow it. The Public network access setting set to Disabled, kept so by an Azure Policy assignment with the Deny effect, refuses every request on the public endpoint. Either control also refuses your own availability tests from Azure's public test locations: with authentication they need a credential the app accepts, and with the public endpoint closed the app is checked from inside its network. Microsoft kept the behavior and changed its documentation, so the fix stays with you.

Would the controls have stopped it?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

3
Prevented
0
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside parties
Tenable Research
Microsoft (MSRC)
Internet
Internal App Service
Attacker's Application Insights
Access restrictions
Internal app
Availability test
Test results

Replaying Tenable's Azure service tag demonstration / published June 2024; the run date is not stated

1 · An internal app admits one service tag

1 Prevented3 on other clouds

2 · Another tenant's availability test passes the rule

2 Prevented3 on other clouds

3 · The response shows up in the attacker's results

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Tenable reported the behavior to MSRC on January 24, 2024; MSRC confirmed it on January 31, rated it Elevation of Privilege, Important, and paid a bounty
  • On February 26, 2024 MSRC chose a documentation update over a product change; Microsoft later told Tenable in writing that the issue was not an SSRF vulnerability (April 3) and not a firewall bypass vulnerability (May 3)
  • Microsoft published the service tags documentation changes on Microsoft Learn on May 10, 2024, saying service tags are not to be treated as a security boundary; Tenable's post, its advisory TRA-2024-19 and MSRC's guidance post followed on June 3, 2024
  • Tenable and MSRC listed 11 Azure services with the same pattern, among them Azure DevOps, Azure Machine Learning, Azure Logic Apps, Azure Container Registry and Azure API Management; Tenable described only Application Insights step by step
  • Microsoft's guidance for availability tests was a token sent as an HTTP header in the test, which the service checks, rejecting requests without it; the availability tests page warns that the test service uses shared IP addresses
  • No third party reported exploitation or abuse of service tags to Microsoft, and Microsoft's own investigation saw none in the wild; Tenable's advisory rated the risk High

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    These Services Shall Not Pass: Abusing Service Tags to Bypass Azure Firewall Rules (Customer Action Required)Tenable Research · Jun 3, 2024 · ResearchThe internal App Service and its access restriction, the refused direct request, the availability test with custom headers and methods, the response read back, the cross-tenant reach, the affected services, the disclosure timeline, MSRC's rating and bounty, and Tenable's recommendations
  2. 2.
    Microsoft Azure Firewall Bypass Vulnerability (TRA-2024-19)Tenable Research · Jun 3, 2024 · AdvisoryThe affected services, the advisory's risk rating, Microsoft's response as Tenable records it, the solution and the disclosure timeline
  3. 3.
    Improved Guidance for Azure Network Service TagsMicrosoft Security Response Center · Jun 3, 2024 · AdvisoryMicrosoft's timeline and bounty, its position that service tags are not a security boundary, the documentation change of May 10, 2024, the header guidance for availability tests and the statement that no exploitation was reported or seen
  4. 4.
    Application Insights availability testsMicrosoft · undated · Vendor reportWhat a standard test lets its owner set, the warning that the test service uses shared IP addresses, and the header check for traffic from availability tests

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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