Skip to main content
Back
IntrusionAWS
7 min read

Adversary-in-the-middle phishing of AWS console credentials

Victim
Unnamed AWS account holders; one account sign-in is the only confirmed compromise
When
First observed Feb 23, 2026Disclosed Mar 9, 2026
Entry
A spoofed AWS security notice about cross-account IAM role assumption led to a phishing page that proxied the real AWS sign-in page, validating the credentials against AWS before redirecting the victim.

Datadog first observed the campaign's infrastructure on February 23, 2026: a spoofed AWS security notice about cross-account IAM role assumption led cloud administrators to look-alike domains that cloned the AWS console sign-in page and acted as a reverse proxy to the real one. The kit forwards the credentials to AWS in real time and relays the MFA responses; Datadog says it likely captures one-time codes and has not confirmed it. In one case the attacker signed in to the console from a VPN exit within 20 minutes; Datadog describes no action afterwards and names no actor.

What happened

External Parties
Look-alike proxy
Datadog Security Labs
Internet
AWS Console Sign-inOAuth flow, MFA
AWS Account · Console Access
Cloud Administrator
Resources Behind the Session

Replaying the AWS console AiTM phishing campaign, 2026

  1. 1

    Look-alike pages and a spoofed notice

    Jan 14 – Feb 26, 2026

    Look-alike domains and a proxy kit are set up, and a spoofed AWS security notice about cross-account IAM role assumption reaches cloud administrators; no source gives a target count.

  2. 2

    Credentials proxied in real time

    From February 2026

    The look-alike page forwards the submitted credentials to the real AWS sign-in in real time and relays the MFA exchange; Datadog says it likely captures one-time codes and has not confirmed it.

  3. 3

    Console session

    Date not stated

    In one case the attacker signs in to the AWS Console from a VPN exit within 20 minutes of the submission; no source describes what the session did.

Impact

Datadog confirms one case in which an attacker signed in to an AWS account with credentials phished through the proxy, within 20 minutes of the submission and from a VPN exit node; it describes no action in the account, gives no victim count, names no victim and no actor, and no source says that any data was read or changed.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

On AWS, a resource control policy on AWS Sign-In refuses console sign-in from outside your trusted networks in the member accounts of an organization, even with valid credentials. A request that a proxy forwards from its own server, or a sign-in from a VPN exit, comes from outside those networks. The sources do not say whether the account in the confirmed case was a member account or which kind of identity signed in. AWS announced these policies on June 16, 2026, after the campaign, and they do not cover console access through IAM Identity Center. Once a session exists, a service control policy on IAM writes and a permissions boundary bound what it can reach, and no source says what this session did. The domains, the email and the password typed into a look-alike page are outside the cloud provider's reach.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 5 controls would have limited how far it went. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
5
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Look-alike proxy
Datadog Security Labs
Internet
AWS Console Sign-inOAuth flow, MFA
AWS Account · Console Access
Cloud Administrator
Resources Behind the Session

Replaying the AWS console AiTM phishing campaign, 2026

1 · Look-alike pages and a spoofed notice

2 Not covered

2 · Credentials proxied in real time

2 Contained1 Not covered6 on other clouds

3 · Console session

3 Contained6 on other clouds

Key facts

  • Datadog first observed the first kit cluster on February 23, 2026 and says its server was possibly active from the start of February, which is unconfirmed; the domains were registered on January 14 and 15 and on February 25, 2026, and all three share one registrar
  • The lure impersonated an AWS security notification that claimed unusual cross-account IAM role assumption patterns in the recipient's AWS Organization; the sender address is treated as spoofed, but Datadog has no original headers, only a partial screenshot
  • The kit clones the console sign-in page, mimics the OAuth flow including PKCE parameters and proxies the credentials to the real AWS endpoint in real time, so AWS validates them before the victim is redirected; it relays MFA responses, and Datadog says it likely captures one-time codes and has not confirmed it
  • In one case the attacker authenticated to the AWS Console from a Mullvad VPN egress node within 20 minutes of the credentials being submitted; the date, the account and whether an automated pipeline or an operator acted are not stated
  • Datadog describes no action after the sign-in; Help Net Security lists potential impact, such as viewing data, modifying resources and creating IAM users, which is not observed activity
  • Datadog published on March 9, 2026 and reported the infrastructure to AWS Security, who were coordinating disruption and takedown; AWS announced resource-based policies and resource control policies for AWS Sign-In on June 16, 2026, after the campaign

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Behind the console: Active phishing campaign targeting AWS console credentialsDatadog Security Labs · Mar 9, 2026 · ResearchLure, kit behavior, infrastructure timeline, MFA relay, the 20-minute sign-in, indicators, detection advice
  2. 2.
    Attackers use AiTM phishing kit, typosquatted domains to hijack AWS accountsHelp Net Security · Mar 10, 2026 · NewsTargets as reported, timing as reported, potential impact, mitigations as reported
  3. 3.
    Behind the console: An AiTM phishing kit harvesting AWS console credentials and beyondDatadog Security Labs · Jun 24, 2026 · ResearchLater wave, second factors the kit asks for, delivery as inferred
  4. 4.
    AWS Multi-factor authentication in IAMAWS · undated · Vendor reportMFA types, passkeys and security keys, phishing resistance, SMS MFA ended
  5. 5.
    Controlling console access with resource-based policies and resource control policiesAWS · undated · Vendor reportConsole sign-in restriction, supported actions and condition keys, limits, Identity Center incompatibility
  6. 6.
    AWS Sign-in now supports resource-based policies and resource control policiesAWS · Jun 16, 2026 · Vendor reportAvailability date of the sign-in policies, regions, price

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

More cloud attack breakdowns

All breakdowns