What happened
Replaying the Trivy March 2026 compromise
- 1
An earlier incident and residual access
Late February – March 1, 2026; the day of the theft is not statedAn attacker extracts a privileged token from a misconfigured Actions environment, and the rotation of March 1, not atomic or comprehensive, leaves the attacker with access.
- 2
Poisoned tags and a poisoned release
March 19, 2026, from 17:43 UTCThe attacker force-pushes 76 of 77 trivy-action tags and all 7 setup-trivy tags and releases Trivy v0.69.4 through the aqua-bot account; pipelines run the stealer before the real scan.
- 3
Credentials swept and sent out
March 19 – 20, 2026The stealer reads runner memory and more than 50 file paths and sends the data to a typosquatted server, with a public repository on the victim's GitHub account as fallback; Aqua does not confirm exfiltration in any specific environment.
- 4
The attacker keeps publishing
March 20 – 23, 2026Malicious Docker Hub images and public copies of internal repositories appear on March 22, a worm publishes to npm with stolen tokens, and Aqua says on March 23 that the incident appears ongoing.
Poisoned trivy-action and setup-trivy tags and a malicious Trivy v0.69.4 ran a credential stealer in the CI pipelines that used them, for about 3 to 12 hours depending on the artifact; Aqua says all secrets accessible to affected runners must be treated as exposed and does not confirm exfiltration in any specific environment. No source names a victim or reports a cloud account compromised with the swept credentials. The attacker kept publishing on March 22, and Aqua said on March 23 that the incident appeared ongoing.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
The tags, the service-account token and the release automation live in GitHub, so GitHub's own controls act first: the setting that pins actions to a commit SHA refuses a link of the chain, while a ruleset that blocks tag updates, immutable releases and environment approvals bound it. Where the stealer ran, AWS keys that were never created, role credentials usable only inside your VPC and an egress allow list leave a sweep or an upload little to take, and OIDC and bound tokens shorten the life of what is copied. Aqua does not confirm that anything was exfiltrated and no source reports a cloud account compromised; the secrets of other services on the runner stay with their own platforms.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 23 controls would have limited one. 7 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 23
- Contained
- 7
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Trivy March 2026 compromise
1 · An earlier incident and residual access
2 Contained2 Not covered2 · Poisoned tags and a poisoned release
1 Prevented3 Contained2 Not covered3 · Credentials swept and sent out
15 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds4 · The attacker keeps publishing
3 Contained2 Not coveredKey facts
- In late February 2026 an attacker exploited a misconfiguration in Trivy's GitHub Actions environment and extracted a privileged token; Trivy disclosed it and rotated credentials on March 1, and Aqua says the rotation was not comprehensive, so the attacker kept access
- On March 19, 2026 at about 17:43 UTC the attacker force-pushed 76 of 77 trivy-action tags and all 7 setup-trivy tags (75 of 76 trivy-action tags per Wiz), and the aqua-bot service account triggered the release of Trivy v0.69.4
- The exposure windows were about 3 hours for the v0.69.4 binary, about 12 hours for the trivy-action tags and about 4 hours for the setup-trivy tags; the stealer ran before the legitimate scan, so affected pipelines showed no change
- The payload read Runner.Worker memory and more than 50 file paths for SSH keys, cloud credentials and Kubernetes tokens, encrypted the data and sent it to the typosquatted domain scan.aquasecurtiy.org, with a public repository on the victim's own GitHub account as fallback; Aqua does not confirm exfiltration in any specific environment
- Trivy identified and contained the attack at about 20:38 UTC on March 19, but malicious Docker Hub images 0.69.5 and 0.69.6 followed on March 22 at about 16:00 UTC and internal Aqua repositories were published as public at about 21:40; Aqua said on March 23 that the incident appeared ongoing
- No source names a victim organization or reports a cloud account compromised with the swept credentials; the malware labels itself TeamPCP, which Aqua says could be a false flag, and the AWS metadata claim comes from one note that cites other parties
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Trivy Supply Chain Attack: What You Need to KnowAqua Security · Mar 22, 2026 · Vendor reportEarlier incident and incomplete rotation, March 19 timeline, exposure windows, payload targets, attribution caveat, response, follow-on activity
- 2.Trivy ecosystem supply chain temporarily compromised (GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23, CVE-2026-33634)GitHub Security Advisories (aquasecurity/trivy) · Mar 21, 2026 · AdvisoryAffected versions, distribution channels, exposure windows, root cause, indicators, recommended actions
- 3.Trivy Compromised: Everything You Need to Know about the Latest Supply Chain AttackWiz Research · Mar 20, 2026 · ResearchPayload analysis, credential targets, exfiltration paths, tag counts, follow-on activity
- 4.Trivy vulnerability scanner breach pushed infostealer via GitHub ActionsBleepingComputer · Mar 21, 2026 · NewsAqua's statement on the earlier incident, credential types targeted, how the stealer ran before the scan
- 5.TeamPCP: Trivy Supply Chain Attack and Kubernetes WiperCloud Security Alliance · Mar 24, 2026 · ResearchAWS metadata access as reported, cascade of later incidents, recommendations
- 6.Managing GitHub Actions settings for a repositoryGitHub Docs · undated · Vendor reportSHA pinning setting, workflow token permissions, fork pull request approval
- 7.GitHub Actions policy now supports blocking and SHA pinning actionsGitHub Changelog · Aug 15, 2025 · Vendor reportAvailability date of SHA pinning enforcement
- 8.Immutable releasesGitHub Docs · undated · Vendor reportImmutable releases, tag and asset protection, attestations
- 9.Immutable releases are now generally availableGitHub Changelog · Oct 28, 2025 · Vendor reportAvailability date of immutable releases
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.