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IntrusionAWS
10 min read

European Commission AWS account breach via Trivy

Victim
European Commission (europa.eu web hosting backend)
When
Mar 19–25, 2026Disclosed Mar 27, 2026
Entry
An AWS API key collected by a credential stealer inside a compromised Trivy version that the Commission received through its normal software update channels; the AWS API then accepted the key from a network the sources do not name.

On March 19, 2026 the actor obtained an AWS API key of the European Commission through the Trivy supply-chain compromise: the Commission was running a compromised Trivy version received through its normal software update channels, and the key granted control over other Commission AWS accounts. With the stolen secret the actor created and attached a new access key to an existing user, and about 91.7 GB compressed (340 GB uncompressed) was exfiltrated from an AWS account behind the europa.eu web hosting service; alerts on March 24 started the response, and on March 25 the secret was secured and the new keys disabled. CERT-EU has uncovered no indication of movement to the other accounts so far, and ShinyHunters published the dataset on March 28.

What happened

External Parties
Trivy releases
ShinyHunters
CERT-EU
+ 4 more
Internet
AWS APISecurity Token Service
Scanning Pipeline · host not stated
Europa Hosting Backend · AWS account
+ affiliated accounts
+ management rights
+ no movement found
Other Commission AWS Accounts
Trivy Scanner
AWS API Key
CI/CD Pipeline
Hosting Data Stores
Existing User
New Access Key

Replaying the European Commission March 2026 intrusion

  1. 1

    A poisoned scanner collects an AWS key

    Mar 19, 2026

    A compromised Trivy version, received through the Commission's normal software update channels, collects an AWS API key from the environment that runs it; which pipeline or host that was is not stated.

  2. 2

    The stolen key accepted

    From Mar 19, 2026

    The Security Token Service validates the stolen key the day it is taken, and reconnaissance of the account begins; the network the calls came from is not stated.

  3. 3

    A new access key and the data taken

    Dates not stated

    With the stolen secret a new access key is attached to an existing user, and about 91.7 GB compressed (340 GB uncompressed) leaves the account; CERT-EU gives no date or order for either.

  4. 4

    Alerts, disabled keys and a leak

    Mar 24–28, 2026

    Alerts on March 24 start the response, the secret is secured and the new keys are disabled on March 25, and ShinyHunters publishes the dataset on March 28.

Impact

About 91.7 GB compressed (340 GB uncompressed) exfiltrated from an AWS account of the europa.eu web hosting backend; the data may pertain to up to 71 Europa hosting clients and the published dataset contains personal data; no website was taken offline and the Commission's internal systems were not affected.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Where the stolen secret was a long-lived access key used from outside your networks, a service control policy with a network condition would have refused every call it made beyond the identity check, and, in a member account of your organization, a policy that refuses new access keys would have refused the key creation on the existing user; the stolen key would still have worked, and keys that already exist must be found and deleted. A resource control policy would have refused reads of governed stores from outside your approved networks, a permissions boundary would have capped what the key could list, and DNS Firewall on the pipeline's network would have refused the lookup of the stealer's main upload host. The poisoned release, the pipeline's own access and the leak site stay outside every cloud provider's policy: you own your pipeline's pinning, verification and secrets.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 12 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
12
Contained
4
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Trivy releases
ShinyHunters
CERT-EU
+ 4 more
Internet
AWS APISecurity Token Service
Scanning Pipeline · host not stated
Europa Hosting Backend · AWS account
+ affiliated accounts
+ management rights
+ no movement found
Other Commission AWS Accounts
Trivy Scanner
AWS API Key
CI/CD Pipeline
Hosting Data Stores
Existing User
New Access Key

Replaying the European Commission March 2026 intrusion

1 · A poisoned scanner collects an AWS key

3 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds

2 · The stolen key accepted

4 Contained6 on other clouds

3 · A new access key and the data taken

5 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Alerts, disabled keys and a leak

2 Not covered

Key facts

  • On March 19, 2026 the actor obtained an AWS API key through the Trivy supply-chain compromise, ran TruffleHog and validated the credentials through the Security Token Service; which pipeline or host ran the compromised Trivy is not stated
  • Trivy v0.69.4 was public from 18:22 UTC to about 21:42 UTC on March 19, and 76 of 77 trivy-action version tags stayed force-pushed to credential-stealing commits until about 05:40 UTC on March 20, per Aqua Security
  • With the stolen secret the actor created and attached a new access key to an existing user; CERT-EU gives no date for it and none for the exfiltration
  • About 91.7 GB compressed (340 GB uncompressed) was exfiltrated from the compromised account; the data may pertain to up to 71 Europa hosting clients, 42 internal Commission clients and at least 29 other Union entities
  • The Commission's Cybersecurity Operations Center received alerts on March 24; on March 25 CERT-EU was notified, the secret was secured and the newly created access keys were disabled
  • ShinyHunters published the stolen dataset on its leak site on March 28, 2026; how the group obtained the data is not stated

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    European Commission cloud breach: a supply-chain compromiseCERT-EU · Apr 2, 2026 · AdvisoryEntry vector, AWS actions, exfiltration volume, affected clients, alerts, containment, lateral movement, timeline, recommendations
  2. 2.
    Commission responds to cyber-attack on its Europa web platform (IP/26/748)European Commission · Mar 27, 2026 · Vendor reportDisclosure, detection date, scope statement, service availability, internal systems
  3. 3.
    Trivy ecosystem supply chain temporarily compromised (GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23, CVE-2026-33634)Aqua Security (GitHub Security Advisory) · Mar 21, 2026 · AdvisoryAffected versions, exposure windows, payload, root cause, remediation guidance
  4. 4.
    Trivy Supply-Chain Attack: What You Need to Know (updates through 2026-04-01)Aqua Security · Apr 1, 2026 · Vendor reportUpstream timeline, payload stages, attribution reasoning
  5. 5.
    Trivy Compromised: Everything You Need to Know about the Latest Supply Chain AttackWiz Research · Mar 23, 2026 · ResearchPayload analysis, exfiltration infrastructure
  6. 6.
    Tracking TeamPCP: Investigating Post-Compromise Attacks Seen in the WildWiz Research · Mar 30, 2026 · ResearchUse of stolen Trivy secrets across the campaign: validation, AWS discovery, Azure application secrets
  7. 7.
    Guidance for detecting, investigating, and defending against the Trivy supply chain compromiseMicrosoft Defender Security Research Team · Apr 27, 2026 · ResearchCredential collection paths, tag mutability

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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