What was exposed
Replaying the Autoclerk September 2019 exposure
- 1
Configured: the search database answers the internet
Before Sep 13, 2019; start not statedAn Elasticsearch database hosted on AWS answers requests from the internet with no protection; the setting that opened it, who set it and when are not stated.
- 2
Reachable: read from a browser with no credential
Until Oct 2, 2019; start not statedAnyone on the internet can read the reservations, the government travel logs and the stored login credentials through a web browser, with no credential.
- 3
Found and closed: found on September 13, closed on October 2
Sep 13 to Oct 2, 2019vpnMentor researchers find the database by port scanning and notify US government contacts; the database is closed on October 2, and who closed it is not stated.
Over 179 GB of hotel and travel reservations, per the finders, among them travel logs of US government and military personnel and unencrypted login credentials for connected property management and review systems, readable with no credential from a date not stated until October 2, 2019, at least 19 days after the finders found it; no source reports that anyone other than the finders read the data.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Had the database run as an Amazon OpenSearch Service domain, which the sources do not say, VPC access would have given it no public endpoint to open, and a domain access policy that allows only named IAM principals would have refused the unsigned browser requests that reached a public one. For servers in a VPC, a service control policy that denies internet gateways, or VPC Block Public Access set for your organization, leaves an open rule with no reader on the internet; both bound the reach rather than refuse the rule, and VPC Block Public Access came after the incident. Whether the database asks for a login, and how your application stores the credentials it holds, stay with the software. The scan that found it and the fix that closed it stay outside the provider's controls.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 4 controls would have limited how far it went. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 4
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Autoclerk September 2019 exposure
1 · Configured: the search database answers the internet
3 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: read from a browser with no credential
1 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: found on September 13, closed on October 2
2 Not coveredKey facts
- An Elasticsearch database hosted by Amazon Web Services in the US answered requests from any web browser with no protection, per the finders; which setting opened it, and when, were not stated
- Per the finders, it held over 179 GB of data: hundreds of thousands of booking reservations affecting thousands of people, with millions of new records added daily; The Register questioned the gap between the two counts
- Reservation records held full names, dates of birth, home addresses, phone numbers, travel dates and costs and masked card details; records for US government and military personnel held travel logs, and the finders saw many unencrypted login credentials for systems outside the database, such as property management and guest review systems
- vpnMentor researchers found the database on September 13, 2019 by port scanning and contacted US CERT, which did not reply; they contacted the US Embassy in Tel Aviv on September 19, and a Pentagon representative said on September 26 that the issue would be dealt with
- The database was closed on October 2, 2019, 19 days after the find; who closed it, and how, were not stated
- The finders said the owner's identity had not been confirmed at the time of writing; Autoclerk and Best Western did not comment, the US Department of Defense said it was looking into the claims, and no source reported that anyone other than the finders read the data
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Report: US Military and Government Travel Data Exposed in Massive LeakvpnMentor · Jul 17, 2023 · ResearchAWS hosting, Elasticsearch, no protection, browser access, size, contents, unencrypted credentials, connected platforms, discovery method, notification dates, closure date, owner attribution
- 2.Messed Western: Vuln hunters say hotel giant's Autoclerk code exposed US soldiers' info, travel plans, passwordsThe Register · Oct 23, 2019 · Newscompany response, DoD response, doubts on scale and technology, 2019 dates
- 3.Customer data from Best Western and other hotels exposed in massive data breachSiliconANGLE · Oct 21, 2019 · Newsownership, company response
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.