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ExposureAWS
2 min read

Intern applicants’ résumés exposed on the Trump campaign website

Owner
Donald J. Trump for President campaign
When
Initial exposure date unreportedDisclosed Sep 14, 2016
Entry
Private internship applications were stored in a publicly reachable S3 website asset collection.

A researcher downloaded internship applications from the Trump campaign’s Amazon S3 storage without signing in. Blocking the list of files had left the underlying documents readable. The campaign secured them after a journalist reached its staff.

What was exposed

Outside the campaign
Researcher
Internet
Campaign website
S3 asset store

Campaign website

  1. 1

    Private applications share the website asset store

    Before disclosure

    The researcher found that the website’s Amazon S3 asset store revealed the presence of an applicant-document collection even though the bucket did not allow directory listing.

  2. 2

    A browser can read the applications

    Before disclosure

    The researcher’s browser retrieved internship résumés from the S3 asset store without a sign-in.

  3. 3

    Notification leads to restricted access

    Before September 14

    The journalist reached campaign staff through an intermediary and reported that the exposed files were secured shortly thereafter.

Impact

The researcher confirmed public access to internship applications. The campaign did not publish the number of people affected or the exposure window.

Could this have been prevented?

Protect private documents independently of the public website

Keep applicant records in a private location or explicitly deny anonymous reads of those records in the S3 bucket policy. Hiding a directory listing leaves a document readable when someone already has its address.

Incident control assessments

1
Prevented
0
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside the campaign
Researcher
Internet
Campaign website
S3 asset store

Campaign website

1 · Private applications share the website asset store

1 Not covered

2 · A browser can read the applications

1 Prevented

3 · Notification leads to restricted access

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Directory listing was disabled on the asset bucket.
  • The researcher confirmed that documents could still be downloaded without signing in.
  • A journalist reached the campaign through an intermediary.
  • Public access was closed after the notification.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Trump Website LeakMacKeeper Security Research Center, Chris Vickery · Sep 14, 2016 · ResearchResearcher’s own account of discovering the public website storage and reading applicant files.
  2. 2.
    Trump’s campaign mute about data security failDataBreaches.net · Sep 14, 2016 · ResearchFirst-person account by the journalist who reached the campaign and confirmed that access was subsequently closed.
  3. 3.
    Bucket policies for Amazon S3Amazon Web Services · undated · Vendor reportResource policies can control which principals may read or write specified objects.
  4. 4.
    Policy evaluation logicAmazon Web Services · undated · Vendor reportAn applicable explicit denial takes precedence over an allow.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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