What happened
Replaying the TruffleNet intrusion, 2025 / start not stated; reported October 2025
- 1
Stolen keys tested at scale
Date not stated, before October 31, 2025Stolen AWS access keys are checked against the AWS API from more than 800 hosts, and a separate component asks Amazon SES how much mail each valid key's account can send; how the keys were stolen is not stated.
- 2
Escalation attempt
Date not stated, before October 31, 2025With a valid key the actor lists SES identities and service quotas, then tries to create a new IAM identity; the attempt fails, and the write-up does not say which call failed.
- 3
Sending identities set up in SES
Date not stated, before October 31, 2025An IAM user with SES rights changes the SES account settings and creates six email identities, one carrying a DKIM signing key taken from a compromised website, so SES signs mail for that domain.
- 4
Fake invoice
Date not stated, before October 31, 2025One of the six identity domains carries a fake invoice that asks an oil and gas target for a USD 50,000 payment; that it went through SES is implied, not stated, and whether the payment was made is not stated.
Stolen AWS keys were checked at scale; with one of them the actor set up six Amazon SES sending identities, one signed with another site's DKIM key, and a domain among them carried a fake invoice for USD 50,000. Whether any payment was made is not stated.
Where the provider's controls fit
On AWS, a service control policy that accepts calls only from your organization's networks would have refused the send quota calls, which came from hosting networks, where your keys are used only from known networks; it refuses the later calls only where they come from outside those networks. A service control policy that refuses IAM user calls without MFA bounds what a stolen IAM user key can do; the write-up does not say that the keys belonged to IAM users. Neither stops the key check itself, which needs no permission. A service control policy that denies Amazon SES holds only in accounts that send no email, and the write-up does not say whether these accounts did; where your account does send email, one that keeps identity creation and account changes to your email administration role would have bounded the setup. The attempt to create a new identity failed in the incident; a service control policy that keeps IAM writes and console passwords to approved administrators refuses those calls for every other identity. These policies need AWS Organizations. Where the keys were stolen is not stated, and no cloud control reaches that place, the compromised website whose DKIM key was reused, or a recipient's decision to pay.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 10 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 10
- Contained
- 3
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the TruffleNet intrusion, 2025 / start not stated; reported October 2025
1 · Stolen keys tested at scale
1 Prevented4 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Escalation attempt
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Sending identities set up in SES
3 Contained1 Not covered4 · Fake invoice
1 Contained1 Not coveredKey facts
- Stolen AWS access keys were checked from more than 800 unique hosts across 57 Class C networks in 10 hosting ASNs; how the keys were stolen was not stated
- The hosts ran an open-source secret scanner, and a separate component asked Amazon SES for the sending quota of each valid key's account; no follow-on action came from these hosts
- With a valid key the actor attempted a privilege escalation by creating a new IAM identity, and the attempt failed; the write-up did not say which call failed
- An IAM user with SES rights changed the SES account settings and created six email identities, one carrying a DKIM signing key taken from a compromised website
- One of the identity domains was then used in a fake invoice that asked an oil and gas target for a USD 50,000 payment; that it went through SES was implied, not stated, and whether the payment was made was not stated
- It was unclear to the authors whether the SES abuse and TruffleNet were one actor
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Cloud Abuse at Scale: TruffleNet, AWS SES, and Business Email CompromiseFortiGuard Labs (Fortinet) · Oct 31, 2025 · ResearchCredential validation, SES quota check, infrastructure, failed privilege escalation, SES account changes, sending identities with a reused DKIM key, business email compromise message
- 2.Cloud Abuse: TruffleNet BEC Campaign Hijacks AWS SES and Portainer to Orchestrate 800+ Malicious HostsSecurityOnline.info (Daily CyberSecurity) · Nov 3, 2025 · NewsCredential validation, SES quota check, sending identities
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.