What was exposed
Replaying the CISA November 2025 exposure
- 1
Configured: admin keys copied to a personal public repository
Nov 13, 2025, repository createdCISA's build and deployment repository holds admin and build credentials; a contractor copies it, credentials included, to a personal public GitHub repository created on November 13, 2025. Among the credentials are administrative AWS GovCloud keys, per KrebsOnSecurity; when they arrived is not confirmed.
- 2
Reachable: admin keys to three GovCloud accounts, open to anyone
Repository public Nov 13, 2025 to the takedownAnyone on the internet can clone the 844 MB repository; the AWS keys in it carry administrative access to three GovCloud accounts, validated at a high privilege level by a Seralys researcher, per KrebsOnSecurity. The repository is public from November 13, 2025; when the keys arrive in it is not confirmed.
- 3
Found and closed: CISA reached through a reporter, keys valid after the takedown
May 14, 2026, found; emails by May 13GitGuardian finds the repository and reaches CISA through KrebsOnSecurity; the repository goes offline, on May 15 per CISA and GitGuardian or May 18 per Truffle Security, and the AWS keys stay valid 48 hours after CISA is notified, per KrebsOnSecurity.
Anyone on the internet could read 844 MB of CISA-related data, per GitGuardian: Infrastructure as Code and build code, a file of administrative credentials to three AWS GovCloud accounts that a Seralys researcher validated at a high privilege level, per KrebsOnSecurity, plaintext passwords for dozens of internal CISA systems, Artifactory credentials, a GitHub App private key and TLS private keys. KrebsOnSecurity says the credentials were public for almost six months and the finder that the repository sat public for six months; when the AWS keys arrived in it is not confirmed. Per CISA's log analysis the leaked credentials were not used outside CISA environments and no customer or mission data was exposed; who else read the repository is not stated, and no source reports misuse.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
If the leaked keys were long-term access keys, which no source states, a service control policy that refuses the creation of that class would have kept new keys out of the copied repository: a pipeline on role sessions holds credentials that expire within hours, and no new AWS access key needs rotating after a takedown. Where such keys already exist, a service control policy that denies IAM user and root calls without MFA bounds a leaked key's reach if it is one of those keys, which no source states, and network conditions and a permissions boundary cap where a leaked key works and what it can do. Microsoft Entra, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud refuse the creation of their own counterparts: client secrets blocked by an application management policy, service account key creation refused by an Organization Policy constraint, and user capabilities switched off. The copy to a personal public repository, its discovery and its takedown stay with source control and your incident response: push protection, secret scanning and a reporting channel finders can use act there, and no provider control refuses the push.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 10 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 10
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the CISA November 2025 exposure
1 · Configured: admin keys copied to a personal public repository
4 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Reachable: admin keys to three GovCloud accounts, open to anyone
5 Contained1 Not covered5 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: CISA reached through a reporter, keys valid after the takedown
1 Contained2 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Private-CISA was created on November 13, 2025 on a contractor's personal GitHub account, outside CISA's official GitHub, and held 844 MB across its working tree and Git history, per GitGuardian; Truffle Security said the most sensitive secrets appeared in it in late April 2026, without naming which
- A file named importantAWStokens held administrative credentials to three AWS GovCloud accounts, per KrebsOnSecurity; a Seralys researcher tested the keys and said he validated access to the three accounts at a high privilege level, and CISA stated no count
- The repository also held plaintext passwords for dozens of internal CISA systems, Artifactory credentials, a GitHub App private key with administration write on the CISA-IT organization and TLS private keys; per KrebsOnSecurity, commit logs reportedly show that GitHub's default block on secrets in public pushes was disabled on it
- GitGuardian's automated program emailed the commit author nine times by May 13, 2026 with no response; its researcher found the leak on May 14, reported it to the CERT/CC portal, which sent only an automated reply, and on May 15 asked KrebsOnSecurity to forward it to CISA
- CISA and GitGuardian dated the takedown May 15, 2026, KrebsOnSecurity the weekend before its May 18 report and Truffle Security's timeline May 18; the AWS keys reportedly stayed valid 48 hours after CISA was notified, per KrebsOnSecurity, two more days per The Record and more than 48 hours in KrebsOnSecurity's July report, and CISA gave no revocation date
- CISA said its logs showed the leaked credentials were not used outside its environments and no customer or mission data was exposed; it rotated credentials across every environment where the individual was an administrator, which took longer than expected, and no source reported misuse
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Lessons from CISA's Cyber IncidentCISA · Jul 9, 2026 · Vendor reportResponse timeline, what was copied, no-misuse finding, corrective actions, lessons
- 2.CISA Admin Leaked AWS GovCloud Keys on GithubKrebsOnSecurity · May 18, 2026 · NewsRepository contents, discovery, key validity, CISA May statement, exposure start
- 3.Lawmakers Demand Answers as CISA Tries to Contain Data LeakKrebsOnSecurity · May 22, 2026 · NewsCongressional response, rotation status, when the sensitive secrets appeared, push protection setting
- 4.Lessons Learned from CISA's Recent GitHub LeakKrebsOnSecurity · Jul 13, 2026 · NewsRotation duration, finder's account, postmortem reaction, repository size
- 5.How We Got a CISA GitHub Leak Taken Down in Under a DayGitGuardian · May 19, 2026 · ResearchDiscovery timeline, notification path, repository size, secret types, takedown time
- 6.CISA's Leaked Admin GitHub Token Remained Live 2 Days After Krebs Reported It LeakedTruffle Security · May 22, 2026 · ResearchSecret inventory, GitHub App key validity, rotation timing, rotation scope
- 7.Lessons Learned: US Cybersecurity Agency Leaked SecretsGovInfoSecurity (ISMG) · Jul 17, 2026 · NewsNotification timeline, corrective actions, finder's reaction
- 8.CISA details security lapses that led to GitHub leak of passwords, cloud access keysCybersecurity Dive · Jul 10, 2026 · NewsCISA statements, corrective actions
- 9.Senator presses CISA for answers about alleged GitHub repository leakThe Record · May 20, 2026 · NewsCISA May statement, congressional response, key validity
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.