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IntrusionSaaS
8 min read

UNC5537 data theft from Snowflake customer accounts

Victim
Snowflake customer organizations: about 165 notified as potentially exposed. AT&T and Live Nation report their incidents in their own filings; the DOJ filings describe the other victims by sector only
When
Apr 14, 2024 – Jun 1, 2024Disclosed May 31, 2024
Entry
Snowflake customer usernames and passwords, stolen by infostealer malware on contractor systems from November 2020 onward and in some cases unrotated for as long as four years, accepted by accounts that had no MFA and no network allow list.

UNC5537 used Snowflake customer credentials that infostealer malware had taken from contractor systems, some unrotated for as long as four years. The impacted accounts had no MFA and no network allow list, so a password from a VPN exit address was enough to sign in, read tables and download them through a temporary stage. Mandiant and Snowflake notified about 165 potentially exposed organizations, and the victims were extorted.

What happened

External Parties
UNC5537
Contractor Systems
VPS and MEGA
+ 10 more
Internet
Snowflake Sign-Inper customer account
Snowflake
Customer Accounts
+ platform: no breach found
+ corporate systems
+ former employee's demos
Snowflake's Own Environment
Single-Factor Users
Customer Tables
Temporary Stage

Replaying the Snowflake customers April 2024 intrusion

  1. 1

    Infostealer credentials

    From November 2020; the gathering is not dated

    Infostealer malware takes Snowflake credentials from contractor systems, and UNC5537 likely gathers them from infostealer logs.

  2. 2

    Single-factor sign-ins

    Apr 14 to Jun 1, 2024, as charged; the demo-account access is not dated

    Stolen passwords from VPN exit addresses sign in to customer accounts that have no MFA and no network policy; a former employee's demo accounts at Snowflake are accessed too, on a date not stated.

  3. 3

    Tables staged and taken

    From Apr 14, 2024, within the charged access windows

    FROSTBITE lists users, roles and sessions; the actor reads tables, compresses them into a temporary stage and downloads the files.

  4. 4

    Extortion and sale

    May 13 to Oct 2, 2024, as charged

    UNC5537 extorts victims and offers the data for sale on criminal forums; at least three victims pay.

  5. 5

    Notice and response

    Apr 19 to Jun 10, 2024

    Victims, Mandiant and Snowflake respond, about 165 potentially exposed organizations are notified, and CISA relays Snowflake's notice.

Impact

UNC5537 signed in to Snowflake customer accounts that accepted a stolen username and password alone, listed and read tables, staged and downloaded the data, and extorted the victims. Mandiant and Snowflake notified about 165 potentially exposed organizations; the DOJ filings charge access to the instances of at least 10 organizations and admit data theft from at least nine. AT&T reports the theft of records of call and text interactions of nearly all its wireless customers; Live Nation reports unauthorized activity in a third-party cloud database environment and an offer of its user data for sale. No source found a vulnerability, misconfiguration or breach of the Snowflake platform.

Outcome

The control that stops this lives in the Snowflake account

The control that refuses these sign-ins is a Snowflake account setting: a network policy whose network rules admit only your own addresses. An authentication policy that requires MFA bounds the password sign-ins of enrolled users, and an authentication policy that allows only SAML sign-in leaves the decision to your identity provider, for example with Microsoft Entra Conditional Access. No AWS, Azure or Google Cloud policy sees a sign-in to a Snowflake account, a query inside it or a COPY INTO an internal stage. To narrow the bulk path, set PREVENT_UNLOAD_TO_INTERNAL_STAGES to TRUE on the account.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 3 controls would have limited one. 9 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
3
Contained
9
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
UNC5537
Contractor Systems
VPS and MEGA
+ 10 more
Internet
Snowflake Sign-Inper customer account
Snowflake
Customer Accounts
+ platform: no breach found
+ corporate systems
+ former employee's demos
Snowflake's Own Environment
Single-Factor Users
Customer Tables
Temporary Stage

Replaying the Snowflake customers April 2024 intrusion

1 · Infostealer credentials

2 Not covered

2 · Single-factor sign-ins

1 Prevented2 Contained1 Not covered4 on other clouds

3 · Tables staged and taken

1 Contained4 Not covered

4 · Extortion and sale

1 Not covered

5 · Notice and response

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Mandiant and Snowflake notified about 165 potentially exposed organizations; the indictment charged access to the instances of at least 10 organizations, and the plea agreement admitted data theft from at least nine
  • The credentials were primarily taken by infostealer malware on contractor systems, the earliest infection in November 2020; at least 79.7% of the accounts the actor used had prior credential exposure, and some credentials were unrotated for as long as four years
  • The impacted accounts had no MFA and no network allow list; the sign-ins came primarily from Mullvad and Private Internet Access VPN addresses
  • AT&T reported that files with call and text records of nearly all its wireless customers were exfiltrated from a third-party cloud platform between April 14 and 25, 2024, and its spokesperson said they were stolen from Snowflake; Live Nation reported unauthorized activity in a third-party cloud database environment on May 20, 2024
  • At least three victims paid at least 36 bitcoin, about $2.5 million at the time of payment, and the victims' actual losses exceeded $9.5 million, per the plea agreement
  • Snowflake, CrowdStrike and Mandiant found no evidence of a vulnerability, misconfiguration or breach of the Snowflake platform

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    UNC5537 Targets Snowflake Customer Instances for Data Theft and ExtortionMandiant (Google Cloud Blog) · Jun 17, 2024 · Researchactor, credential source, enabling conditions, access tooling, reconnaissance, staging and exfiltration, infrastructure, extortion, notification count, campaign dates, recommendations
  2. 2.
    Snowflake account hacks linked to Santander, Ticketmaster breachesBleepingComputer · Jun 1, 2024 · NewsSnowflake notice wording, awareness date, activity start, indicators named
  3. 3.
    Snowflake: No evidence of platform breachTechTarget · Jun 3, 2024 · Newsjoint statement findings, demo accounts, Snowflake statements, recommendations
  4. 4.
    Snowflake Recommends Customers Take Steps to Prevent Unauthorized AccessCybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) · Jun 3, 2024 · Advisoryofficial alert, Snowflake notice date, hunting recommendation
  5. 5.
    Form 8-K, Item 8.01 (date of report 2024-05-20)Live Nation Entertainment (SEC EDGAR) · May 31, 2024 · Vendor reportvictim detection date, sale offer, response
  6. 6.
    Form 8-K, Item 1.05 (date of report 2024-05-06)AT&T (SEC EDGAR) · Jul 12, 2024 · Vendor reportexfiltration window, data taken and not taken, discovery date, containment
  7. 7.
    AT&T says criminals stole phone records of 'nearly all' customers in new data breachTechCrunch · Jul 12, 2024 · NewsSnowflake as AT&T's platform, per AT&T's spokesperson
  8. 8.
    Snowflake Admins Can Now Enforce Mandatory MFASnowflake · Jul 9, 2024 · Vendor reportaccount-wide MFA enforcement, Trust Center, network policy and password policy guidance
  9. 9.
    Snowflake Strengthens Security with Default Multi-Factor Authentication and Stronger Password PoliciesSnowflake · Sep 13, 2024 · Vendor reportMFA by default for new accounts, plan to end password-only sign-ins
  10. 10.
    Planning for the deprecation of single-factor password sign-insSnowflake (documentation) · undated · Vendor reportphases that end single-factor password sign-ins, estimated dates
  11. 11.
    Indictment, No. 2:24-cr-00180-LK (W.D. Wash.), Document 1U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Oct 10, 2024 · Advisoryaccess dates per victim, organizations accessed, tooling, extortion events, ransom total
  12. 12.
    Plea Agreement, No. CR24-180 LK (W.D. Wash.)U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Aug 5, 2026 · Advisoryvictims with data stolen, ransom total, sale offers, losses, reconnaissance program

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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