What happened
Replaying the Snowflake customers April 2024 intrusion
- 1
Infostealer credentials
From November 2020; the gathering is not datedInfostealer malware takes Snowflake credentials from contractor systems, and UNC5537 likely gathers them from infostealer logs.
- 2
Single-factor sign-ins
Apr 14 to Jun 1, 2024, as charged; the demo-account access is not datedStolen passwords from VPN exit addresses sign in to customer accounts that have no MFA and no network policy; a former employee's demo accounts at Snowflake are accessed too, on a date not stated.
- 3
Tables staged and taken
From Apr 14, 2024, within the charged access windowsFROSTBITE lists users, roles and sessions; the actor reads tables, compresses them into a temporary stage and downloads the files.
- 4
Extortion and sale
May 13 to Oct 2, 2024, as chargedUNC5537 extorts victims and offers the data for sale on criminal forums; at least three victims pay.
- 5
Notice and response
Apr 19 to Jun 10, 2024Victims, Mandiant and Snowflake respond, about 165 potentially exposed organizations are notified, and CISA relays Snowflake's notice.
UNC5537 signed in to Snowflake customer accounts that accepted a stolen username and password alone, listed and read tables, staged and downloaded the data, and extorted the victims. Mandiant and Snowflake notified about 165 potentially exposed organizations; the DOJ filings charge access to the instances of at least 10 organizations and admit data theft from at least nine. AT&T reports the theft of records of call and text interactions of nearly all its wireless customers; Live Nation reports unauthorized activity in a third-party cloud database environment and an offer of its user data for sale. No source found a vulnerability, misconfiguration or breach of the Snowflake platform.
The control that stops this lives in the Snowflake account
The control that refuses these sign-ins is a Snowflake account setting: a network policy whose network rules admit only your own addresses. An authentication policy that requires MFA bounds the password sign-ins of enrolled users, and an authentication policy that allows only SAML sign-in leaves the decision to your identity provider, for example with Microsoft Entra Conditional Access. No AWS, Azure or Google Cloud policy sees a sign-in to a Snowflake account, a query inside it or a COPY INTO an internal stage. To narrow the bulk path, set PREVENT_UNLOAD_TO_INTERNAL_STAGES to TRUE on the account.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 3 controls would have limited one. 9 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 9
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Snowflake customers April 2024 intrusion
1 · Infostealer credentials
2 Not covered2 · Single-factor sign-ins
1 Prevented2 Contained1 Not covered4 on other clouds3 · Tables staged and taken
1 Contained4 Not covered4 · Extortion and sale
1 Not covered5 · Notice and response
1 Not coveredKey facts
- Mandiant and Snowflake notified about 165 potentially exposed organizations; the indictment charged access to the instances of at least 10 organizations, and the plea agreement admitted data theft from at least nine
- The credentials were primarily taken by infostealer malware on contractor systems, the earliest infection in November 2020; at least 79.7% of the accounts the actor used had prior credential exposure, and some credentials were unrotated for as long as four years
- The impacted accounts had no MFA and no network allow list; the sign-ins came primarily from Mullvad and Private Internet Access VPN addresses
- AT&T reported that files with call and text records of nearly all its wireless customers were exfiltrated from a third-party cloud platform between April 14 and 25, 2024, and its spokesperson said they were stolen from Snowflake; Live Nation reported unauthorized activity in a third-party cloud database environment on May 20, 2024
- At least three victims paid at least 36 bitcoin, about $2.5 million at the time of payment, and the victims' actual losses exceeded $9.5 million, per the plea agreement
- Snowflake, CrowdStrike and Mandiant found no evidence of a vulnerability, misconfiguration or breach of the Snowflake platform
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.UNC5537 Targets Snowflake Customer Instances for Data Theft and ExtortionMandiant (Google Cloud Blog) · Jun 17, 2024 · Researchactor, credential source, enabling conditions, access tooling, reconnaissance, staging and exfiltration, infrastructure, extortion, notification count, campaign dates, recommendations
- 2.Snowflake account hacks linked to Santander, Ticketmaster breachesBleepingComputer · Jun 1, 2024 · NewsSnowflake notice wording, awareness date, activity start, indicators named
- 3.Snowflake: No evidence of platform breachTechTarget · Jun 3, 2024 · Newsjoint statement findings, demo accounts, Snowflake statements, recommendations
- 4.Snowflake Recommends Customers Take Steps to Prevent Unauthorized AccessCybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) · Jun 3, 2024 · Advisoryofficial alert, Snowflake notice date, hunting recommendation
- 5.Form 8-K, Item 8.01 (date of report 2024-05-20)Live Nation Entertainment (SEC EDGAR) · May 31, 2024 · Vendor reportvictim detection date, sale offer, response
- 6.Form 8-K, Item 1.05 (date of report 2024-05-06)AT&T (SEC EDGAR) · Jul 12, 2024 · Vendor reportexfiltration window, data taken and not taken, discovery date, containment
- 7.AT&T says criminals stole phone records of 'nearly all' customers in new data breachTechCrunch · Jul 12, 2024 · NewsSnowflake as AT&T's platform, per AT&T's spokesperson
- 8.Snowflake Admins Can Now Enforce Mandatory MFASnowflake · Jul 9, 2024 · Vendor reportaccount-wide MFA enforcement, Trust Center, network policy and password policy guidance
- 9.Snowflake Strengthens Security with Default Multi-Factor Authentication and Stronger Password PoliciesSnowflake · Sep 13, 2024 · Vendor reportMFA by default for new accounts, plan to end password-only sign-ins
- 10.Planning for the deprecation of single-factor password sign-insSnowflake (documentation) · undated · Vendor reportphases that end single-factor password sign-ins, estimated dates
- 11.Indictment, No. 2:24-cr-00180-LK (W.D. Wash.), Document 1U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Oct 10, 2024 · Advisoryaccess dates per victim, organizations accessed, tooling, extortion events, ransom total
- 12.Plea Agreement, No. CR24-180 LK (W.D. Wash.)U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington · Aug 5, 2026 · Advisoryvictims with data stolen, ransom total, sale offers, losses, reconnaissance program
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.