What the demonstration did
Replaying Wiz Research's SAPwned demonstration / published July 2024; the run date is not stated
- 1
Code in a pod, past Istio
Not dated · before Jan 25, 2024A training job runs the researchers' code in a Kubernetes pod, and two pod settings the admission controller missed take its traffic out of the Istio fence.
- 2
A trusted internal network
Not dated · before Jan 25, 2024Inside the network, a Loki config endpoint returns AWS secrets to its S3 log bucket, and six EFS file systems serve customer files with no credential.
- 3
Cluster admin, then cloud keys
Not dated · before Jan 25, 2024An unauthenticated Tiller server installs a cluster-admin pod, which reads Kubernetes Secrets holding customer cloud keys and an SAP read-write registry key.
From an ordinary customer pod, the chain reached cluster-admin on the shared SAP AI Core cluster and read Kubernetes Secrets in plaintext, including customer cloud keys (AWS, SAP HANA, Docker Hub) and a read-write SAP Google Container Registry key; Wiz and SAP both state no customer data was compromised.
What the demonstration shows about your shared clusters
The chain needed no cloud vulnerability. Once the pod left the Istio fence, a config endpoint, six EFS file systems and a Tiller server all answered with no authentication, because the internal network was trusted. On your cloud, a security group on file-share mount targets and a guardrail on long-lived keys cap two of those steps, for keys created after the guardrail is set. The rest sits in Kubernetes: admission policies bound the pod fields and the service accounts a training pod may carry, and NetworkPolicies keep training pods' egress to what they need.
Would the controls have stopped it?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 9 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 9
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying Wiz Research's SAPwned demonstration / published July 2024; the run date is not stated
1 · Code in a pod, past Istio
1 Contained2 Not covered2 · A trusted internal network
4 Contained4 on other clouds3 · Cluster admin, then cloud keys
4 Contained2 Not covered2 on other cloudsKey facts
- Wiz Research began as an SAP AI Core customer with basic permissions; an Argo Workflow file it submitted spawned a Kubernetes pod running its own code, by design
- The admission controller blocked root but allowed shareProcessNamespace, which exposed the Istio sidecar's Istiod token, and UID 1337, which Istio's iptables rules exclude, so the pod's traffic was no longer restricted
- A Grafana Loki /config endpoint returned the AWS secrets Loki used for Amazon S3, and six AWS EFS file systems answered on NFS port 2049 with no credential, holding code and training data in folders by customer ID
- An unauthenticated Helm v2 Tiller server on gRPC port 44134 revealed registry and Artifactory secrets and installed a Helm package that spawned a pod with cluster-admin privileges
- With cluster admin, Wiz read Kubernetes Secrets in plaintext, including its own account's AWS, SAP HANA and Docker Hub keys and an SAP Google Container Registry key it confirmed as read-write
- Wiz reported to SAP on January 25, 2024, bypassed the first patch with two new vulnerabilities on February 28, and SAP deployed fixes for all reported vulnerabilities on May 15, 2024; SAP stated that no customer data or systems were impacted
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.SAPwned: SAP AI vulnerabilities expose customers' cloud environments and private AI artifactsWiz Research · Jul 17, 2024 · ResearchEntry, admission controller gaps, Istio bypass, Loki AWS secrets, EFS shares, Tiller secrets, cluster admin, customer secrets, GCR key, disclosure timeline, no customer data compromised
- 2.SAP Core AI bugs allowed access to internal network servers, say researchersThe Register · Aug 6, 2024 · NewsSAP statement, patch sequence, Black Hat presentation
- 3.SAP AI Core Vulnerabilities Allowed Service Takeover, Customer Data AccessSecurityWeek · Jul 18, 2024 · NewsCoverage, permissions needed, patch date
The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.