What the demonstration did
Research environment / Rhino Security Labs’ AWS service-permission research
- 1
Notebook entry could be delegated to a user
July 2019 researchRhino described a user who could obtain interactive access to a SageMaker notebook instance. Notebook entry and authorization for work done inside it were separate decisions.
- 2
Notebook work inherited the execution role’s scope
July 2019 researchThe research showed that the IAM role associated with a notebook determined the AWS authority available to workloads running within that notebook.
- 3
An independent Lambda example concerned layer ownership
A separate July 2019 exampleRhino described a Lambda function allowed to load a layer from a third-party AWS account. The researchers recommended restricting permitted layer origins.
Impact
Rhino showed how a notebook could expose more workload authority than an individual operator needed. A separate Lambda example demonstrated why the origin of a shared code dependency matters. No affected customer population was reported.
Would the controls have stopped it?
Set notebook and dependency permissions independently
Restrict interactive access to assigned notebooks and give each notebook an execution role limited to its work. In Lambda, require layers to come from organization-owned publishing accounts where those publishers cover every dependency the workload needs.
Incident control assessments
- 1
- Prevented
- 2
- Contained
- 0
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Research environment / Rhino Security Labs’ AWS service-permission research
1 · Notebook entry could be delegated to a user
1 Contained2 · Notebook work inherited the execution role’s scope
1 Contained3 · An independent Lambda example concerned layer ownership
1 PreventedKey facts
- The article was published on July 23, 2019.
- The SageMaker examples concerned classic notebook instances.
- The author described evaluating permissions in a test environment.
- The Lambda example involved the source account of a shared layer.
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation – Part 2Rhino Security Labs · Jul 23, 2019 · ResearchFirst-hand research reported separate findings about SageMaker notebook access and execution roles, and about the provenance of code dependencies used by Lambda.
- 2.CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrlAmazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryAWS documents IAM authorization for access to classic notebook instances.
- 3.How to use SageMaker AI execution rolesAmazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryAWS documents the execution role’s function and the use of granular workload permissions.
- 4.Granting users access to a Lambda layerAmazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryAWS documents the layer condition key for limiting which layers can be used by functions.
- 5.Permissions boundaries for IAM entitiesAmazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryAWS describes the maximum identity permissions, explicit denies and the treatment of resource-based grants to sessions.
- 6.Service control policies (SCPs)Amazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryAWS describes the member-account scope of SCPs and the management-account and service-linked role exceptions.
The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.