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DemonstrationAWS
2 min read

S3 research showed why the bucket owner must control its encryption keys

Environment
Rhino Security Labs’ Amazon S3 demonstration
When
Published June 10, 2019. Test date unknown.Disclosed Jun 10, 2019
Entry
The researchers examined a bucket writer permitted to select an encryption key outside the bucket owner’s control.

Rhino Security Labs examined how an S3 writer’s choice of a KMS key could interrupt access to stored data. Its companion defense article discussed restricting permitted keys and retaining earlier versions. These protect different parts of recovery.

What the demonstration did

Researcher
Rhino Security Labs
Internet
Amazon S3
Object version

Research environment / Rhino Security Labs’ Amazon S3 demonstration

  1. 1

    A writer could choose a key outside the owner’s control

    June 2019 research

    Rhino demonstrated that an authorized bucket writer could choose an encryption key the bucket owner could not use. The current object data then became unreadable to the owner.

  2. 2

    Recovery depended on an earlier readable version

    June 2019 research

    Rhino explained that earlier versions could preserve the ability to recover object data. Versions that had not been retained offered no such fallback.

Impact

Rhino showed that a new encrypted version could leave the bucket owner unable to read that version. Whether the earlier content could be recovered depended on what was retained and whether its key remained usable.

Would the controls have stopped it?

Control the write key and preserve a readable version

Where every writer can use the approved key, a bucket policy can refuse writes that select another key. Retain a readable prior version under Object Lock and preserve access to its key so recovery remains possible if the current version is disrupted.

Incident control assessments

1
Prevented
1
Contained
0
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Researcher
Rhino Security Labs
Internet
Amazon S3
Object version

Research environment / Rhino Security Labs’ Amazon S3 demonstration

1 · A writer could choose a key outside the owner’s control

1 Prevented

2 · Recovery depended on an earlier readable version

1 Contained

Key facts

  • The first article was published on June 10, 2019.
  • The demonstrated loss of readability concerned the key used for stored object data.
  • In its companion article, Rhino recommended a bucket policy requiring a designated key.
  • The researchers discussed versioning because an earlier readable version can preserve a recovery option.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack VectorRhino Security Labs · Jun 10, 2019 · ResearchThe study demonstrates object availability depending on a key outside the data owner’s control and discusses the role of earlier object versions.
  2. 2.
    S3 Ransomware Part 2: Prevention and DefenseRhino Security Labs · undated · AdvisoryThe companion report discusses version protection and restricting uploads to the approved KMS key.
  3. 3.
    Using server-side encryption with AWS KMS keysAmazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryAWS documents using a bucket policy to require a specific KMS key and the permissions needed to decrypt.
  4. 4.
    Locking objects with Object LockAmazon Web Services · undated · AdvisoryRetention applies to a particular version and permits new versions and delete markers.

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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