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IntrusionAWS
7 min read

S3 buckets deleted for ransom with a fake recovery tool

Victim
An unnamed customer of the InfoGuard incident response team
When
Jan 18, 2024 – Feb 5, 2024Disclosed Feb 21, 2024
Entry
An AWS identity of unknown origin; which credential it was and how it was obtained is not stated.

dfir.ch and InfoGuard describe an InfoGuard customer whose S3 buckets were all deleted on February 5, 2024 by an AWS identity whose credential and origin are not stated. The identity read an Amazon SES sending quota and listed the buckets on January 18, then read each bucket's recovery settings, found versioning off and called DeleteBucket. The ransom note claimed the data was downloaded, but network traffic analysis showed that most likely only about 2 GB of more than 1 TB was taken, and the decoy recovery tool makes no network connection.

What happened

Outside parties
Attacker's restore address
InfoGuard CSIRT
Internet
AWS APIcredential not stated
Customer S3 Buckets
+ identity of unknown origin
+ Amazon SES
+ CloudTrail records
Customer AWS Account
S3 buckets
Bucket recovery settings

Replaying the S3 bucket ransom 2024 intrusion

  1. 1

    Access and first look

    January 18, 2024

    An AWS identity of unknown origin is accepted by the AWS API and calls GetSendQuota against Amazon SES and ListBuckets against Amazon S3. Which credential it is, and how it was obtained, is not stated.

  2. 2

    Checking for a way back

    February 5, 2024

    The identity reads each bucket's versioning, replication, Object Lock, logging, request payment and transfer acceleration settings. Versioning is not enabled.

  3. 3

    Data out, buckets gone

    February 5, 2024; when the data was taken is not stated

    Network traffic analysis shows that about 2 GB of the more than 1 TB in the buckets is most likely taken; when, and with which calls, is not stated. The identity deletes every bucket with DeleteBucket, and with versioning off no earlier version survives.

  4. 4

    Ransom and a fake way back

    February 5, 2024

    A ransom note asks for 0.2 BTC within five days and claims the files were downloaded. A decoy recovery binary asks for an AWS key, reads a local file and makes no network connection; where the note and the archive were placed is not stated.

Impact

Every S3 bucket of the victim was deleted with versioning off, so the data in them was lost; about 2 GB of more than 1 TB was most likely taken, so the promised restore was not possible. Whether a ransom was paid is not stated.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

Every step of this intrusion ran on one AWS identity whose credential and origin are not stated, so no control here is shown to refuse its calls. A service control policy that keeps your identities to known networks bounds where a credential works, and one that denies the creation of new access keys bounds how many can leak. A service control policy that keeps bucket deletes, object deletes and lifecycle rules to approved administrators bounds who can empty your buckets; service control policies bind only member accounts of an AWS organization, and membership is not stated. S3 Object Lock in compliance mode keeps locked object versions from deletion, but it needs versioning, which was off here, and so does AWS Backup for Amazon S3. The ransom note and the decoy tool sit outside every cloud: the responder found that most likely only about 2 GB was taken, so the promised restore was not possible anyway.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 8 controls would have limited how far it went. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

0
Prevented
8
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside parties
Attacker's restore address
InfoGuard CSIRT
Internet
AWS APIcredential not stated
Customer S3 Buckets
+ identity of unknown origin
+ Amazon SES
+ CloudTrail records
Customer AWS Account
S3 buckets
Bucket recovery settings

Replaying the S3 bucket ransom 2024 intrusion

1 · Access and first look

3 Contained6 on other clouds

2 · Checking for a way back

1 Contained3 on other clouds

3 · Data out, buckets gone

4 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Ransom and a fake way back

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • On January 18, 2024 the attacker's AWS identity called GetSendQuota against Amazon SES and ListBuckets against Amazon S3, the first actions traced in CloudTrail
  • On February 5, 2024 it read each bucket's versioning, replication, Object Lock, logging, request payment and transfer acceleration settings; versioning was not enabled
  • The same day it deleted all the S3 buckets with DeleteBucket and left a ransom note and a decoy recovery archive
  • The note asked for 0.2 BTC within five days and claimed the files were downloaded; the decoy recovery binary asked for an AWS key and made no network connection
  • Network traffic analysis showed that the attackers most likely took only about 2 GB of the more than 1 TB in the buckets, so a restore would not have been possible anyway
  • Which credential made the calls, how it was obtained, how many buckets were deleted and whether a ransom was paid are not stated; dfir.ch published the case on February 21, 2024 and InfoGuard on February 27, 2024

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    AWS Ransomwaredfir.ch (Stephan Berger) · Feb 21, 2024 · ResearchReconnaissance calls, bucket configuration reads, bucket deletion, versioning state, ransom note, decoy recovery binary, exfiltrated volume, timeline
  2. 2.
    AWS ransomware - and what's really behind itInfoGuard · Feb 27, 2024 · ResearchReconnaissance calls, bucket configuration reads, bucket deletion, versioning state, ransom note, decoy recovery binary, exfiltrated volume, responder identity

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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