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ExposureAWS
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Exposed storage held ESHYFT nurse staffing records

Owner
ESHYFT users and staff represented in the records
When
Discovered January 4, 2025 – Mar 5, 2025Disclosed Mar 11, 2025
Entry
A publicly accessible collection on Amazon S3 held records associated with ESHYFT. Its operator and the precise configuration that allowed access were not established.

A researcher found ESHYFT staffing records in Amazon S3 storage that could be read without a password. The exposed collection contained 86,341 records, including identity documents, work schedules and health information. Access was closed by March 5, 2025. The researcher could not establish who operated the storage or whether anyone else had read it.

What was exposed

Independent discovery
Researcher
Internet
Amazon S3 storage
Staffing records

ESHYFT exposure

  1. 1

    Staffing files exposed

    By January 4, 2025

    A publicly accessible collection on Amazon S3 held records associated with ESHYFT. Its operator and the precise configuration that allowed access were not established.

  2. 2

    Sample reviewed

    January 2025

    Jeremiah Fowler inspected a limited sample without a password. The material included staffing and health records. He could not establish other access.

  3. 3

    Found and closed

    By March 5, 2025

    Fowler reported the issue to ESHYFT and received an acknowledgment. The Register reported that the bucket was closed by March 5. The person who changed access was not identified.

Impact

Jeremiah Fowler reviewed a limited sample of a collection containing 86,341 records totaling 108.8 GB. Records included identification documents, professional credentials and health information. The record count does not measure the number of people affected.

Could this have been prevented?

Block public access to private staffing files

If authorized staff and users can access records through the application, all four S3 Block Public Access settings can close the bucket’s public read path. Closing access after discovery cannot retrieve copies someone has already made.

Incident control assessments

1
Prevented
1
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Independent discovery
Researcher
Internet
Amazon S3 storage
Staffing records

ESHYFT exposure

1 · Staffing files exposed

1 Prevented

2 · Sample reviewed

1 Contained

3 · Found and closed

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Fowler dated discovery to January 4, 2025. The Register reported that he notified ESHYFT two days later.
  • Fowler reported 86,341 records totaling 108.8 GB. His observations of the contents came from a limited sample.
  • The Register reported that the S3 bucket was no longer public by March 5. Fowler published his findings on March 11.
  • In a separate August notification, Shiftster said it learned around March 12 of researcher access to S3 data associated with its ESHYFT app. The notification does not identify Fowler or the bucket he found.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    ESHYFT data exposure investigationWebsite Planet / Jeremiah Fowler · Mar 11, 2025 · ResearchFirsthand observations from a limited sample, total records and size, company acknowledgment, later closure and uncertainty about ownership and other access.
  2. 2.
    ESHYFT nurse staffing records exposed in Amazon S3The Register · Mar 11, 2025 · NewsDirect interview with the finder identifies Amazon S3, January 4 discovery, January 6 notification and closure verified by March 5.
  3. 3.
    Notice of data security incidentShiftster, doing business as ESHYFT · Aug 5, 2025 · Vendor reportAugust 5 notice reports awareness around March 12 of unauthorized access to an S3 bucket associated with the ESHYFT app. It does not identify Fowler or establish that this was the same collection.
  4. 4.
    Blocking public access to your Amazon S3 storageAWS · undated · Vendor reportBucket-level public-access blocks, policy and ACL enforcement, and the combined effect of more restrictive settings.
  5. 5.
    Resource control policiesAWS · undated · Vendor reportScope of effective denies for supported member-account resources and service exceptions.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.

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