What happened
Replaying the AWS account backdoor intrusion, 2024 / start not stated; reported December 2024
- 1
Stolen key to console
Day 1, date not statedA long-term access key of a compromised IAM identity, used from a VPN provider's addresses, mints a federated user with an allow-all session policy through GetFederationToken, and the attacker signs in to the console with it without MFA; how the key was obtained is not stated.
- 2
Backdoor role for the attacker's account
Day 1, date not statedFrom the console the attacker creates a role whose trust policy lets an AWS account the attacker controls assume it, attaches AdministratorAccess to it, and an IAM user of that account switches into the role.
- 3
Admin user of its own
Day 1, date not statedThe role session creates an IAM user with a console password and AdministratorAccess, and the attacker signs in to the console as that user twice, from two regions, without MFA.
- 4
SES sending capacity checked
Day 1 and day 2, dates not statedThe attacker reads the account's Amazon SES settings, identities and send quota, and the next day the same IP address calls SES GetAccount across several regions with the original key; no email is seen sent.
Two backdoors with AdministratorAccess in the account, a role the attacker's own AWS account could assume and an IAM user with a console password, and the account's Amazon SES sending status read; Datadog saw no email sent.
Where the provider's controls fit
On AWS, the controls that fit this intrusion are organization policies, and the write-up does not say whether the account belonged to an organization or was its management account, which these policies do not reach. In a member account, a service control policy that refuses IAM user calls without MFA refuses the stolen long-term key, if it belonged to an IAM user, and one that accepts calls only from your organization's networks refuses it from the VPN provider's addresses, where your keys are used only from known networks. A service control policy that denies sts:GetFederationToken refuses the call that gave the key a console session. A resource control policy that keeps role assumption to your organization's principals refuses the attacker's account whatever the role's trust policy allows. Service control policies on IAM writes and AdministratorAccess attachments bound the role, though an approved administrator's session still passes and the write-up does not say what the stolen identity held, and refuse the backdoor user's creation and its console password. A service control policy that denies Amazon SES in accounts that send no email refuses the SES calls. With those facts open, none of these refusals is certain for this account, so each control counts as bounding its step. Resource control policies date from November 13, 2024 and the write-up gives no date for the intrusion; the AWS Sign-In policies that refuse console sign-in off your networks came on June 10, 2026, after the write-up. Where the key leaked is not stated, and no cloud control reaches that place.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 15 controls would have limited how far it went. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 15
- Contained
- 1
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the AWS account backdoor intrusion, 2024 / start not stated; reported December 2024
1 · Stolen key to console
5 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Backdoor role for the attacker's account
3 Contained6 on other clouds3 · Admin user of its own
5 Contained6 on other clouds4 · SES sending capacity checked
2 ContainedKey facts
- The attacker used a long-term access key (AKIA) of a compromised IAM identity from a VPN provider's addresses; how the key was obtained was not stated
- The key called GetFederationToken with an inline session policy that allowed every action on every resource, for 3600 seconds, and the attacker signed in to the console with the federation credentials without MFA
- From the console the attacker created a role whose trust policy let an AWS account the attacker controlled assume it, attached AdministratorAccess to it, and an IAM user of that account switched into it
- The role session created an IAM user with a console password and AdministratorAccess, and the attacker signed in as that user twice, from two regions, without MFA
- The attacker read the account's Amazon SES settings and send quota; the next day the same IP address called SES GetAccount across several regions with the original key
- Datadog saw no email sent and suspected that the attacker meant to return later or to resell the access; it listed 13 attacker IP addresses among the indicators
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Tales from the cloud trenches: Unwanted visitorDatadog Security Labs · Dec 11, 2024 · ResearchEntry credential, federation token, console sign-in, backdoor role and its trust policy, AdministratorAccess attachments, cross-account role assumption, backdoor IAM user, SES enumeration, indicators
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.