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IntrusionAWS
9 min read

AWS keys from public .env files used to empty S3 buckets and scan for more

Victim
Unnamed organizations whose web applications served .env files
When
Not stated; Unit 42 reported it in August 2024Disclosed Aug 15, 2024
Entry
Long-term AWS IAM access keys read from .env files that the victims' web applications served to the internet.

Unit 42 investigated an extortion campaign in which long-term AWS access keys were read from .env files that the victims' web applications served to the internet. The stolen credential was not an administrator but could create roles, so the attackers made a role with AdministratorAccess, failed to launch an EC2 instance, and deployed a Lambda function to every enabled region that scanned other domains for .env files. They copied S3 objects out through a VPN, deleted them and left a ransom note in the emptied bucket; no source dates the steps or names the organizations.

What happened

External Parties
Tor and VPN exit nodes
Attackers' public S3 buckets
Unit 42
Internet
AWS APIlong-term access key
Victim Web Applications
Victim AWS Account
Web Application Server
Public .env File
Application Access Key
New Admin Role
Scanner Function
EC2 Launch
Victim S3 Buckets

Replaying the .env file extortion intrusion / reported by Unit 42 in August 2024

  1. 1

    Exposed .env file

    Date not stated

    Scanners request the .env file from victims' web applications, and the servers return it with long-term AWS access keys in cleartext.

  2. 2

    The stolen key in the account

    Date not stated

    The key is used through Tor to map the account's IAM users, S3 buckets and SES settings, then creates a role and attaches AdministratorAccess to it.

  3. 3

    Compute for the attacker

    Date not stated

    An EC2 instance launch fails for lack of permissions; a Lambda function with the new admin role then runs a .env scanner in every enabled region and stores the credentials it finds in the attackers' public bucket.

  4. 4

    Data held for ransom

    Date not stated

    Bucket objects are copied out through a VPN and deleted, and a ransom note is uploaded to the emptied bucket; the data is not encrypted.

Impact

S3 buckets of multiple organizations were copied out, emptied and left with a ransom note; the campaign targeted 110,000 domains. How many organizations were extorted, which buckets were emptied and how much data was taken are not stated.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

An AWS WAF protection pack (web ACL) that blocks requests for the .env file's path refuses the request only where your site's traffic passes through a resource the pack protects; the sources do not say where the web servers ran. With the key in hand, a service control policy that refuses calls from outside your networks would have refused the account mapping from Tor. One that refuses IAM user calls without MFA refuses it only if the key belonged to an IAM user; the report also calls the credential a role, and the MFA statement does not refuse a role's calls. A service control policy that keeps role creation and administrative policy attachment to approved administrators would have refused the admin role. A permissions boundary refuses the same calls only while the credential cannot remove it, and the sources do not state its other permissions. The EC2 launch failed in the incident for lack of permissions, so a service control policy on EC2 launches had nothing left to prevent there. Service control policies on Lambda creation and on approved regions would have bounded the scanner, though the sources do not say whether the key belonged to an exempt deployment pipeline. A resource control policy that keeps S3 to your networks would have refused the reads from the VPN; resource control policies date from after the incident. A bucket policy carries the same deny, but the attackers' admin role could edit it. S3 Object Lock in compliance mode would have kept the deleted versions.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright, and 9 controls would have limited one. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

3
Prevented
9
Contained
0
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Tor and VPN exit nodes
Attackers' public S3 buckets
Unit 42
Internet
AWS APIlong-term access key
Victim Web Applications
Victim AWS Account
Web Application Server
Public .env File
Application Access Key
New Admin Role
Scanner Function
EC2 Launch
Victim S3 Buckets

Replaying the .env file extortion intrusion / reported by Unit 42 in August 2024

1 · Exposed .env file

1 Contained3 on other clouds

2 · The stolen key in the account

2 Prevented2 Contained6 on other clouds

3 · Compute for the attacker

3 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Data held for ransom

1 Prevented3 Contained6 on other clouds

Key facts

  • The campaign targeted 110,000 domains; Unit 42 counted over 90,000 unique leaked variables, about 7,000 of them for cloud services and 1,515 for social media accounts
  • The stolen key was used through Tor for reconnaissance; the identity check, the IAM user and S3 bucket listings and the SES discovery calls succeeded
  • The credential was not an administrator but could create roles and attach policies; a new role received the AWS managed policy AdministratorAccess. The report calls the credential both an IAM user and an IAM role
  • A security group open on all ports, a key pair and an EC2 instance were attempted within a minute and failed for lack of permissions; Unit 42 judged the instance was meant for cryptomining
  • A Lambda function with the new role was deployed to every other enabled region within a second; the scan lists in the attackers' public bucket held more than 230 million unique targets
  • S3 objects were copied out through a VPN and deleted, and a ransom note was left in the emptied bucket; the data was not encrypted. Unit 42 published on August 15, 2024, and AWS said its services were not affected

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Leaked Environment Variables Allow Large-Scale Extortion Operation in Cloud EnvironmentsUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) · Sep 3, 2024 · ResearchEntry vector, discovery calls, privilege escalation, failed EC2 attempt, Lambda scanner, S3 exfiltration and deletion, ransom note, counts, source networks, remediation advice
  2. 2.
    Large-scale extortion campaign targets publicly accessible environment variable files (.env)Security Affairs · Aug 18, 2024 · NewsAWS statement on the cause

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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