What happened
Replaying the Bling Libra intrusion / date not stated; reported in August 2024
- 1
Exposed key: an IAM user key from the internet
Date not statedThe group takes the access key of an IAM user from a sensitive file exposed on the internet and uses it to call the AWS API of the account. The key's permissions come from the AWS managed policy AmazonS3FullAccess. Where the file was exposed is not stated.
- 2
Discovery: what the key can reach
Date not statedThe key calls IAM ListUsers, which fails for lack of permission, then ListBuckets through the AWS CLI, then iterates through the buckets with S3 Browser.
- 3
Data access and deletion
Almost a month after the discovery; date not statedThe ransom note later proves data access, but which objects were read is unknown because CloudTrail S3 data events and S3 server access logging are off. Almost a month after the discovery, the key lists the buckets through WinSCP and deletes buckets with DeleteBucket; the report says both 'a handful' and 'all'.
- 4
Mocking buckets and extortion
After the deletion; date not statedAn automated AWS CLI script creates buckets named after the group's contact address, all within ten minutes; Unit 42 sees no motive other than to mock the organization. An extortion email then gives the victim one week to pay.
S3 buckets were deleted (the report says both 'a handful' and 'all'), buckets named after the group's contact address were created, and an extortion email gave the victim one week to pay. Which data was read is unknown because CloudTrail S3 data events and S3 server access logging were off; the key's permissions kept the impact to S3. Whether the victim paid or recovered data is not stated.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
Every AWS step of this intrusion ran on one IAM user access key taken from an exposed file. A service control policy that denies every call of an IAM user without MFA binds that key only in a member account of an AWS organization, and the source does not say whether this account was one. If the key still works, a permissions boundary caps the buckets it reaches, and a network condition in a service control policy or a resource control policy caps where it works; where the calls came from is not stated. A bucket policy that requires MFA for DeleteBucket refuses the deletion signed with a long-term access key. A service control policy that keeps DeleteBucket and CreateBucket to an approved administrator role bounds the deletion and the mocking buckets under the same condition, a member account of an AWS organization. S3 Object Lock in compliance mode keeps the locked versions for you to restore. The extortion email travels outside every cloud: what it can hold over you depends on the data the key could read and the copies you kept.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 9 controls would have limited one. 1 step has no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 1
- Prevented
- 9
- Contained
- 1
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Bling Libra intrusion / date not stated; reported in August 2024
1 · Exposed key: an IAM user key from the internet
3 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Discovery: what the key can reach
2 Contained3 on other clouds3 · Data access and deletion
1 Prevented3 Contained6 on other clouds4 · Mocking buckets and extortion
1 Contained1 Not covered3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Unit 42 handled the incident response engagement and attributed it to Bling Libra, the group behind the ShinyHunters ransomware; the victim is not named and no date of the chain is stated
- The group obtained AWS credentials from a sensitive file exposed on the internet; the report's summary says public repositories, and where the file was exposed is not stated further
- The IAM user's access key held the AWS managed policy AmazonS3FullAccess, so its IAM ListUsers call failed while ListBuckets through the AWS CLI and browsing with S3 Browser succeeded
- The group waited almost a month, then listed the buckets through WinSCP and deleted buckets with DeleteBucket; the report says 'a handful' in one place and 'all the S3 buckets' in another
- CloudTrail S3 data events and S3 server access logging were not enabled, so no log showed which S3 data left the environment; the ransom note gave proof of data access
- An automated AWS CLI script created buckets named after the group's contact address, all within ten minutes, and an extortion email gave the victim one week to pay; whether the victim paid is not stated
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Bling Libra's Tactical Evolution: The Threat Actor Group Behind ShinyHunters RansomwareUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) · Aug 29, 2024 · ResearchInitial access, permissions, discovery calls, logging gap, bucket deletion, bucket creation, extortion email, tool behavior, recommendations
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.