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DemonstrationMicrosoft Entra
9 min read

Cross-tenant Entra Agent ID compromise staged by Datadog Security Labs

Environment
A staged corporate Microsoft Entra tenant and its subsidiary tenant in Datadog Security Labs' scenario (no real victim)
When
May 8–11, 2026Disclosed Jun 18, 2026
Entry
The scenario starts with a compromised corporate-tenant user who holds the Agent ID Administrator role; how the user was compromised is not part of the scenario.

In a scenario Datadog Security Labs staged in May 2026 and published on June 18, 2026, an attacker who controls a corporate user with the Agent ID Administrator role adds a client secret to the People Team Agents blueprint. The blueprint secret returns a token for the blueprint principal in a subsidiary tenant, and a two-step exchange returns a Microsoft Graph token as the Temporary Access Agent, which holds UserAuthMethod-TAP.ReadWrite.All and User.Read.All. The agent lists the subsidiary's users, creates a multi-use Temporary Access Pass on the globaladmin account, and the attacker signs in to the Azure portal as a Global Administrator; no real tenant was affected.

What the demonstration did

Internet
Microsoft Entra IDissues the blueprint and agent tokens
Entra Agent ID
Corporate Tenant
Subsidiary Tenant
Agent ID Administrator user
People Team Agents blueprint
Guest account
Third-party blueprint principal
Temporary Access Agent
globaladmin account

Replaying Datadog's cross-tenant Agent ID demonstration

  1. 1

    Setup and starting point

    May 8, 2026, before 19:53 UTC; the compromise date is not stated

    The subsidiary tenant runs an agent of the corporate blueprint with rights over authentication methods, and the attacker controls a corporate user who holds Agent ID Administrator; how the user was compromised is not part of the scenario.

  2. 2

    A backdoor secret on the blueprint

    May 8, 2026, about 19:53 UTC

    With the compromised user's Microsoft Graph token, the attacker calls addPassword on the blueprint's application object and gets a new client secret valid to August 5, 2027.

  3. 3

    Across the tenant boundary

    Between May 8 and 11, 2026; times not given

    A guest account's domain leads to the subsidiary's tenant ID, the blueprint secret returns a token for the blueprint principal there, and that principal finds the Temporary Access Agent.

  4. 4

    Acting as the agent

    Between May 8 and 11, 2026; the pass at 14:45:46 UTC on May 11, 2026

    A two-step token exchange returns a Microsoft Graph token as the Temporary Access Agent, which lists the users and creates a multi-use Temporary Access Pass of 480 minutes on the globaladmin account.

  5. 5

    Global Administrator of the subsidiary

    May 11, 2026, from 14:46 UTC; the exact sign-in time is not given

    The Temporary Access Pass signs the attacker in to the Azure portal as the globaladmin account, which holds Global Administrator; the article concludes that the agent's permissions enabled the compromise of the entire subsidiary tenant.

Impact

No real victim: in Datadog Security Labs' staged scenario, a new client secret on a corporate blueprint got the attacker a token as the blueprint principal in a subsidiary tenant, then a Microsoft Graph token as an agent there. The agent listed the subsidiary's users and created a multi-use Temporary Access Pass on a Global Administrator account, and the attacker signed in to the Azure portal as that account; the article calls it the compromise of the entire subsidiary tenant.

Outcome

Where Microsoft Entra controls fit

In this staged scenario the chain ran to a Global Administrator sign-in in the subsidiary tenant. An application management policy in your publishing tenant with Block password addition turned on would have refused the new blueprint secret that every later step depended on. In the consuming tenant, an Authentication methods policy that enforces one-time use and limits the Temporary Access Pass to a recovery group would have refused the multi-use pass as requested. A Conditional Access policy that requires the Phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength for Global Administrator would have refused the sign-in with the pass, if the role assignment is active and the policy does not exclude the account. The same strength on the Agent ID Administrator role, and eligible-only assignments in Privileged Identity Management, would have bounded the starting role and what the Global Administrator sign-in gives. Your subsidiary's own controls do not reach a third-party blueprint's credential, and no setting refuses an administrator's consent that gives an agent the Temporary Access Pass permission, so check which agents in your tenants hold UserAuthMethod permissions and who publishes their blueprints.

Would the controls have stopped it?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright, and 4 controls would have limited one. 5 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

3
Prevented
4
Contained
5
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Internet
Microsoft Entra IDissues the blueprint and agent tokens
Entra Agent ID
Corporate Tenant
Subsidiary Tenant
Agent ID Administrator user
People Team Agents blueprint
Guest account
Third-party blueprint principal
Temporary Access Agent
globaladmin account

Replaying Datadog's cross-tenant Agent ID demonstration

1 · Setup and starting point

2 Contained1 Not covered3 on other clouds

2 · A backdoor secret on the blueprint

1 Prevented3 on other clouds

3 · Across the tenant boundary

3 Not covered1 on other clouds

4 · Acting as the agent

1 Prevented1 Contained1 Not covered

5 · Global Administrator of the subsidiary

1 Prevented1 Contained

Key facts

  • The new blueprint client secret was valid from about 19:53:38 UTC on May 8, 2026, to August 5, 2027, per Datadog Security Labs
  • Creating the subsidiary's agent from the corporate blueprint needed only an administrator's consent and no tenant-level relationship between the two tenants, per Datadog Security Labs
  • The subsidiary's tenant ID was resolved from a guest account's domain in the corporate directory through the public OpenID configuration endpoint
  • The agent's Microsoft Graph token carried UserAuthMethod-TAP.ReadWrite.All and User.Read.All; the attacker listed the users and found an account named globaladmin
  • The multi-use Temporary Access Pass of 480 minutes was created at 14:45:46 UTC on May 11, 2026, and the account it signed in to the Azure portal held Global Administrator
  • Datadog Security Labs published hardening, detection and response guidance on July 6, 2026; no source mentions a report to Microsoft or a product change

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Entra Agent ID: Inside a cross-tenant agent compromiseDatadog Security Labs · Jun 18, 2026 · ResearchThe premise (Agent ID Administrator), the third-party blueprint and the subsidiary agent, addPassword on the blueprint, tenant discovery, the blueprint principal token, agent enumeration, the two-step token exchange, the Temporary Access Pass on a Global Administrator, the Azure portal sign-in, the lab timestamps
  2. 2.
    Entra Agent ID: The blueprint blast radiusDatadog Security Labs · Jun 11, 2026 · ResearchThe object model, credentials only on the blueprint, third-party blueprints, inheritable permissions, the token exchange mechanics, the roles an agent can still hold
  3. 3.
    Entra Agent ID: Protect, detect, respondDatadog Security Labs · Jul 6, 2026 · ResearchHardening advice, the audit log entry for a blueprint credential, the sign-in log fields for blueprint secret use, detection limits, Microsoft's statement on blueprint secrets, risky-agent detections offline
  4. 4.
    Create an agent identity blueprintMicrosoft Learn (Microsoft Entra Agent ID documentation) · undated · Vendor reportThe roles that can add blueprint credentials, owners creating agent identities, addPassword and AgentIdentityBlueprint.AddRemoveCreds.All, credential recommendations, credential lifetime policies
  5. 5.
    Authenticate and acquire tokens for autonomous agentsMicrosoft Learn (Microsoft Entra Agent ID documentation) · undated · Vendor reportThe blueprint token request with fmi_path, the agent identity token request, the client secret allowed for local development, the warning against secrets for blueprints in production
  6. 6.
    Create temporaryAccessPassMethodMicrosoft Learn (Microsoft Graph documentation) · undated · Vendor reportThe permissions the call accepts, the delegated role requirement, isUsableOnce and the Temporary Access Pass policy, the lifetimeInMinutes range

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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