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IntrusionMicrosoft Entra · Azure · SaaS
13 min read

Storm-2949 intrusion into Microsoft 365 and Azure

Victim
An organization using Microsoft 365 and Azure (unnamed)
When
not statedDisclosed May 18, 2026
Entry
Social engineering that Microsoft assesses with high confidence abused Microsoft self-service password reset (SSPR): the actor started the reset for a targeted privileged user, got a fraudulent multi-factor authentication prompt approved, reset the password and enrolled its own authenticator.

Microsoft reported on May 18, 2026 that Storm-2949 took over privileged Microsoft Entra ID accounts of an unnamed organization through what it assesses with high confidence was self-service password reset abuse: a fraudulent MFA prompt approved by the user, then a new password and the actor's own authenticator. With those identities the actor downloaded thousands of files from OneDrive, accessed dozens of Key Vault secrets through one compromised user's Owner role over the vault, opened a SQL server firewall and listed storage account keys, taking data from the production environment. Microsoft gives no date for any step, only that the storage downloads continued over multiple days since the initial access.

What happened

Internet
Microsoft Entra IDpassword reset, MFA
Entra ID Tenant
Azure Production
+ OneDrive files
+ SharePoint sites
+ shared directories
Microsoft 365 · files
+ guest systems
+ host logs
+ file shares
Endpoint · VM guest OS
Privileged Users
Users and Apps
Service Principal
Secondary Web Apps
Production Web App
Key Vault
Azure SQL Server
Storage Accounts
Virtual Machines

Replaying the Storm-2949 intrusion reported in May 2026

  1. 1

    Identity compromise

    Undated

    Microsoft assesses that a self-service password reset, approved through a fraudulent MFA prompt, hands the actor a privileged identity; the actor enumerates the directory, and three more accounts are taken the same way.

  2. 2

    Microsoft 365 data

    Undated

    The compromised accounts search OneDrive and SharePoint and download thousands of files in a single action, repeated across the accounts.

  3. 3

    Azure control plane

    Undated · storage downloads continued over multiple days since the initial access

    The identities hold privileged custom Azure RBAC roles and one holds the Owner role over a Key Vault; the actor pulls publishing profiles, accesses dozens of the vault's secrets, opens a SQL server firewall, lists storage account keys and uses VM management, and, Microsoft believes, takes over the production web app with credentials found among the secrets.

  4. 4

    Endpoint

    Undated

    On multiple VMs the actor works inside the guest operating system, which the endpoint layer owns.

Impact

Thousands of files downloaded from OneDrive, dozens of Key Vault secrets accessed, and data taken from a production web app, an Azure SQL server and several storage accounts; the sources give the volumes only as words and no date for any step.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

A self-service password reset scope that leaves out the targeted accounts, or the administrator setting for holders of an administrator role, would have refused the reset itself. Conditional Access that requires phishing-resistant MFA strength would have limited the sign-in after the reset to the methods it lists; Microsoft's documentation does not say that the holder of a reset password is refused the registration of such a method. A session control and the SharePoint access control for unmanaged devices would have limited what an unmanaged device could download from OneDrive. In your subscriptions, storage accounts with shared key access off would have refused the listed keys and SAS tokens, though not the OAuth-based requests the actor alternated with. An Azure Policy deny on Key Vault access-policy writes would have refused the change to the vault only if it was an access-policy write, which the sources do not say. The directory reads, the production web app and the guest operating systems of your VMs stay with their own layers: the directory, the application and the endpoint.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 3 controls would have refused a step outright, and 13 controls would have limited one. 3 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

3
Prevented
13
Contained
3
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Internet
Microsoft Entra IDpassword reset, MFA
Entra ID Tenant
Azure Production
+ OneDrive files
+ SharePoint sites
+ shared directories
Microsoft 365 · files
+ guest systems
+ host logs
+ file shares
Endpoint · VM guest OS
Privileged Users
Users and Apps
Service Principal
Secondary Web Apps
Production Web App
Key Vault
Azure SQL Server
Storage Accounts
Virtual Machines

Replaying the Storm-2949 intrusion reported in May 2026

1 · Identity compromise

2 Prevented3 Contained1 Not covered9 on other clouds

2 · Microsoft 365 data

2 Contained

3 · Azure control plane

1 Prevented8 Contained1 Not covered15 on other clouds

4 · Endpoint

1 Not covered3 on other clouds

Key facts

  • Microsoft assessed with high confidence that the actor started self-service password reset for targeted users, got the fraudulent MFA prompt approved, removed the existing authentication methods and enrolled Microsoft Authenticator on its own device
  • The targeted users included IT personnel and senior leadership; three additional cloud user accounts were compromised the same way, and no total was stated
  • The actor downloaded thousands of files in a single action through the OneDrive web interface, repeated across the compromised accounts
  • One compromised user held the Owner role over a Key Vault; over four minutes the actor changed its access configurations and accessed dozens of secrets
  • The actor opened a SQL server firewall and deleted the rules after taking data, and opened storage accounts to a closed set of its own IP addresses before listing keys; the storage downloads continued over multiple days since the initial access
  • Microsoft published its account on May 18, 2026 with no date for any step; in a statement BleepingComputer added on May 20, 2026, Microsoft reported no follow-on extortion and no indicated link to ShinyHunters

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    How Storm-2949 turned a compromised identity into a cloud-wide breachMicrosoft Security Blog, Microsoft Defender Security Research Team · May 18, 2026 · AdvisoryAttack chain, initial access technique, counts and durations as worded, Azure operations, indicators, Defender detections, Microsoft's mitigation guidance
  2. 2.
    Microsoft Self-Service Password Reset abused in Azure data theft attacksBleepingComputer · May 20, 2026 · NewsMicrosoft statement on attribution and extortion as reported, Storm designation, publication dates

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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