What was exposed
Replaying the Cariad vehicle data exposure
- 1
Configured: a heap dump endpoint left open
Before Nov 26, 2024; date not statedA Cariad Spring Boot application answers heap dump requests from the internet without authentication; how long the endpoint stood open is not stated.
- 2
Reachable: the dump's keys open the data
Not stated; the data ran Oct 2022 to Sep 2024The heap dump holds an AWS access key that reads 9.5 TB of vehicle event data, and client credentials that give tokens for the data of over 600,000 users.
- 3
Found and closed: hours after the report
Nov 26, 2024A whistleblower passes the data to Der Spiegel and the CCC; the CCC alerts Cariad, which closes access within a few hours.
Event data of 807,357 vehicles, with geocoordinates precise to about 10 cm for 468,721 of them, enrollment data of over 15 million vehicles and user data of over 600,000 users were reachable with the credentials in the heap dump. How long the endpoint stood open is not stated; Volkswagen says no one other than the CCC accessed the data, and Cariad's analysis was not complete.
Where cloud-provider controls fit
The open heap dump endpoint and the credentials in the application's memory sat in the application, outside the provider's controls, and so did the group's identity service that exchanged the client credentials for user tokens. A service control policy that denies IAM-user calls without MFA refuses calls signed with an IAM user's long-term access key, but the sources do not say the key was one or that the account was a member account of an AWS Organization, so it would have capped the key's reach rather than stopped it; one that denies iam:CreateAccessKey would have left only an expiring role session to dump; Microsoft Entra, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud refuse the creation of their own static workload credentials the same way. Where the store was Amazon S3, which is not stated, a resource control policy or a bucket policy with network conditions would have capped reads to your own networks. The finder's report and your fix stay outside the provider's controls.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 5 controls would have limited how far it went. 4 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 5
- Contained
- 4
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Cariad vehicle data exposure
1 · Configured: a heap dump endpoint left open
1 Not covered2 · Reachable: the dump's keys open the data
5 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds3 · Found and closed: hours after the report
1 Not coveredKey facts
- The heap dump endpoint of a Cariad Spring Boot application answered requests from the internet without authentication; subdomain and directory enumeration found it, and the speakers said Volkswagen forgot to disable it
- The dump, with no password, held two AWS credentials objects with an access key and a secret key in plain text, active per CSO Online, and the client ID and secret of the group's identity service
- The key read the Amazon cloud storage of 9.5 TB of JSON event data: 807,357 vehicles, 468,721 of them with geocoordinates to about 10 cm, and 893,392,605 geocoordinates from October 2022 to September 2024
- The client credentials gave a token for any user ID in a token exchange, per the speaker, and reached user data of over 600,000 users; the data also held enrollment records of over 15 million vehicles
- The CCC alerted Cariad on November 26, 2024 with 30 days before publication; Cariad closed access within a few hours, Volkswagen invalidated the AWS credentials, and one compromised password was at first left active
- Which AWS service held the data, the identity behind the key and how long the endpoint stood open were not stated; Volkswagen said no one other than the CCC accessed the data, and Cariad said its analysis was not complete
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Wir wissen, wo dein Auto steht – Volksdaten von Volkswagen (talk slides)Chaos Computer Club (38C3 speakers) · Dec 27, 2024 · ResearchSubdomain and directory enumeration, the heap dump endpoint, the AWS access key and the OAuth client credentials in the heap dump, the token exchange, data categories and counts, data date range, the disclosure, the remaining credential
- 2.Wir wissen wo dein Auto steht – Volksdaten von Volkswagen (38C3 recording)Chaos Computer Club (media.ccc.de) · Dec 31, 2024 · ResearchTalk date, abstract (800,000 vehicles, contact data of owners, unprotected on the internet)
- 3.Wir wissen, wo dein Auto stehtChaos Computer Club · Dec 27, 2024 · ResearchScope, brands, sensitive sites, the data was openly reachable on the internet, publication date
- 4.In der Cloud abgelegt: Terabyte an Bewegungsdaten von VW-Elektroautos gefundenheise online · Dec 28, 2024 · NewsAmazon cloud storage, memory dump held the storage access data, anonymous whistleblower, Cariad's response within hours, Cariad's statement on third-party access
- 5.Datenleck bei VW: 800.000 Autos waren betroffenADAC · Dec 27, 2024 · NewsNotification date November 26, Volkswagen statement on third-party access, Amazon cloud storage
- 6.Volkswagen massive data leak caused by a failure to secure AWS credentialsCSO Online · Jan 2, 2025 · NewsHeap dump not password protected, active AWS credentials in plain text, token exchange with an arbitrary user ID, AWS credentials invalidated after the report
- 7.Kommentar zum VW-Datenleck: DSGVO, zeig deine Zähne!heise online (iX) · Jan 17, 2025 · NewsAPI endpoint found by a subdomain search, AWS access data and identity-service client secrets in the dump, data counts
- 8.Telemetry data from 800K VW Group EVs exposed onlineThe Register · Jan 6, 2025 · NewsDiscovery path, memory dump with AWS cloud storage credentials, whistleblower, linking through a VW service
- 9.Major data leak in Volkswagen electric carselectrive · Jan 2, 2025 · News30-day disclosure period, AWS cloud storage, Cariad's response within hours
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of the exposure; the owner's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the data is exposed. They are not an assessment of the owner's security program.