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DemonstrationAWS
1 min read

BreakingFormation exposed an internal CloudFormation service identity

Environment
AWS CloudFormation research demonstration by Orca Security
When
Research in September 2021; individual test dates not statedDisclosed Jan 13, 2022
Entry
Orca demonstrates file disclosure inside an AWS-operated CloudFormation service worker.

In their BreakingFormation research, Orca researchers demonstrated that they could read files on a host that ran AWS CloudFormation, the service that deploys infrastructure from templates. A denied request to their own S3 bucket identified an internal AWS service identity in the access log. AWS reviewed its logs and confirmed that the exposed files and credentials could not access customer data or resources.

What the demonstration did

Research team
Orca Security
Internet
AWS research scope
Service worker
Test bucket

Research demonstration / Orca Security

  1. 1

    Service-side processing

    September 2021

    Orca demonstrates file disclosure inside an AWS-operated CloudFormation service worker.

  2. 2

    Test bucket authorization

    September 2021

    A request to Orca’s own bucket is denied and identifies an internal AWS service principal in the log.

Impact

Orca read files on a CloudFormation service host. Its own S3 bucket denied a test request. AWS examined its logs and confirmed that these files and credentials could not access customer data or resources.

Would the controls have stopped it?

AWS fixed the CloudFormation service worker

AWS corrected its service-side processing in every Region. Customers control access to their own resources, but they cannot patch the CloudFormation worker or set permissions on AWS’s internal identity.

Incident control assessments

0
Prevented
0
Contained
2
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Research team
Orca Security
Internet
AWS research scope
Service worker
Test bucket

Research demonstration / Orca Security

1 · Service-side processing

1 Not covered

2 · Test bucket authorization

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • Orca reported a CloudFormation service-side file disclosure on September 9, 2021.
  • The researchers identified an internal AWS service identity in their own bucket’s access-denied event.
  • AWS told Orca it had begun deploying a code change on September 10.
  • The fix reached every AWS Region by September 15, according to Orca’s timeline.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    AWS CloudFormation VulnerabilityOrca Security · Jan 13, 2022 · ResearchOrca read files on a CloudFormation service host. Its own S3 bucket denied a test request. AWS examined its logs and confirmed that these files and credentials could not access customer data or resources.
  2. 2.
    Shared Responsibility ModelAWS · undated · Vendor reportAWS documents its responsibility for infrastructure that runs managed services.
  3. 3.
    Reported AWS CloudFormation IssueAWS · Jan 13, 2022 · AdvisoryAWS found that the host credentials and local files did not permit access to customer resources. Its log analysis placed the researcher activity on one host. No customers were impacted or required to take action.

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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