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DemonstrationAzure · Kubernetes
2 min read

A Kubernetes provisioning defect leaves Azure disk blobs publicly readable

Environment
The reporter’s Kubernetes cluster using Azure storage
When
Reported June 15, 2017Disclosed Jun 16, 2017
Entry
The reporter found that the Kubernetes Azure provisioner created storage for persistent volumes with public container permissions.

The reporter found that the Kubernetes Azure provisioner created storage for persistent volumes with public container permissions. The reporter confirmed that readers who knew the full URL of an affected disk blob could read it without authentication at the ordinary Azure Blob endpoint.

What the demonstration did

Research team
5π Consulting
Internet
Azure Blob Storage
Volume storage

Replaying the Azure Blob Storage demonstration

  1. 1

    Volume provisioning

    Reported June 15, 2017

    The reporter found that the Kubernetes Azure provisioner created storage for persistent volumes with public container permissions.

  2. 2

    Anonymous blob reads

    Reported June 15, 2017

    The reporter confirmed that readers who knew the full URL of an affected disk blob could read it without authentication at the ordinary Azure Blob endpoint.

Impact

The reporter found that anyone with the complete URL for an affected volume could read the Azure disk blob without authentication. The finding applied to a specific series of Kubernetes versions. The report does not establish that outsiders read production volume data.

Would the controls have stopped it?

Disable anonymous reads on storage accounts that hold private volumes

An Azure storage account can disallow anonymous Blob access even when a container grants public read access. This current setting protects the ordinary Blob endpoint if workloads can use authenticated requests. Upgrade the affected provisioner and review existing containers because upgrading software alone does not establish that earlier permissions changed.

Incident control assessments

1
Prevented
0
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Research team
5π Consulting
Internet
Azure Blob Storage
Volume storage

Replaying the Azure Blob Storage demonstration

1 · Volume provisioning

1 Not covered

2 · Anonymous blob reads

1 Prevented

Key facts

  • The vulnerable Azure disk provisioner shipped in Kubernetes versions 1.6.0 through 1.6.5.
  • The researcher reported the issue on June 15, 2017.
  • The Kubernetes security team dated the public fix to the June 16 release of version 1.6.6. It sent a separate security announcement June 22.
  • The issue was assigned CVE-2017-1002100 in July 2017.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Found severe Azure Kubernetes Bug but ain’t even got a lousy T-Shirt5pi Consulting (the reporter) · Feb 17, 2018 · ResearchFirsthand account of the test environment, observations and disclosure.
  2. 2.
    Kubernetes Security Announcement - v1.6.0-v1.6.5 Azure Persistent Disk Issue fixed in v1.6.6Kubernetes Security · Jun 22, 2017 · AdvisoryAffected versions, complete URL prerequisite, first public release on June 16 and mitigation of existing volumes.
  3. 3.
    Remediate anonymous read access to blob dataMicrosoft · undated · Vendor reportProvider documentation for the scope and limits of Remediate anonymous read access to blob data.

The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.

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