What the demonstration did
Replaying Mandiant's WireServing demonstration / published August 2024; the run date is not stated
- 1
Pod reaches the node's platform services
Not dated · published Aug 19, 2024From an ordinary pod, WireServer hands out the settings key and the host plugin returns the node's settings, which decrypt to the node credentials and a TLS bootstrap token.
- 2
Node credentials, then every workload secret
Not dated · published Aug 19, 2024The node credentials list the nodes, the bootstrap token gets a certificate signed for each node, and each node identity reads its workloads' secrets.
- 3
Disclosure and fix
Before Aug 19, 2024 · dates not statedMandiant reports the issue to Microsoft through MSRC, and Microsoft fixes the underlying issue before the publication.
From a single pod with no special privileges, the chain reached the key that decrypts the node's provisioning settings, took the node credentials and the TLS bootstrap token, had a certificate signed for every node and read the secrets of all running workloads; Microsoft fixed the underlying issue.
What the demonstration shows about your AKS clusters
The chain needed only code in one pod. No Azure setting that AKS supports on its nodes refuses a pod's request to WireServer, and the cluster signed bootstrap requests whatever node identity they named. The one control in the chain sits in Kubernetes: a NetworkPolicy that keeps your pods' egress to the destinations they need, on a network plugin that enforces it, which Mandiant names as the control that stops the whole chain. Microsoft fixed the underlying issue; the public sources do not say what the fix changed.
Would the controls have stopped it?
In hindsight, no control would have stopped it. 1 control would have limited how far it went. 6 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 0
- Prevented
- 1
- Contained
- 6
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying Mandiant's WireServing demonstration / published August 2024; the run date is not stated
1 · Pod reaches the node's platform services
1 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds2 · Node credentials, then every workload secret
3 Not covered3 · Disclosure and fix
1 Not coveredKey facts
- Mandiant started from command execution in a pod of an AKS cluster that used Azure CNI and the Azure network policy; the pod needed no host networking and no root
- Building on CyberCX's May 2023 research, the pod requested from WireServer the key that encrypts protected extension settings, and the host plugin returned the node's extension settings
- The decrypted Custom Script Extension settings held the node's provisioning script with its client key and certificate, the cluster certificate authority certificate and a TLS bootstrap token
- With the bootstrap token, Mandiant submitted a certificate signing request in each node's identity, and AKS signed it automatically
- As each node, the Node Authorizer gave the secrets of the workloads scheduled on it; repeated for every active node, this gave the secrets of all running workloads in the cluster
- Mandiant reported the issue to Microsoft through MSRC, and Microsoft fixed it before the August 19, 2024 publication; no source gives the report date, the fix date or what the fix changed
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1."WireServing" Up Credentials: Escalating Privileges in Azure Kubernetes ServicesMandiant (Google Cloud Threat Intelligence) · Aug 19, 2024 · Researchthe affected configuration, the assumed initial access, the WireServer key, the HostGAPlugin extension settings, the provisioning script secrets, the node credentials listing nodes, the bootstrap token creating certificate requests, the automatic signing, the Node Authorizer and workload secrets, the disclosure through MSRC, Microsoft's fix, the NetworkPolicy advice
- 2.Azure SSRF MetadataCyberCX · May 15, 2023 · ResearchWireServer and HostGAPlugin roles, the protected settings key from WireServer, extension settings from the HostGAPlugin, the assumed access (local access or a server-side request forgery)
- 3.Mandiant uncovers critical privilege escalation vulnerability in Azure Kubernetes serviceSiliconANGLE · Aug 20, 2024 · NewsMicrosoft's fix before publication as reported, the affected configuration, outside comment
The estate in the replay follows the researchers' description of their own test environment. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the run. They are not an assessment of any company's security program.