What happened
Replaying the Azure Cassandra VM 2018 intrusion
- 1
Default password
Date not statedTwo outside addresses log into the Linux VM, likely with a Cassandra account that kept its default password.
- 2
Profiling and toolkits
Date not statedFrom the VM the attacker profiles the host, fetches scanning toolkits from internet servers and points them at two class B ranges.
- 3
Password spray on other clouds
Date not statedThe VM sprays over 35,000 SSH credential pairs at port 22 across ranges of 26 cloud and hosting companies.
A customer's Azure Linux VM was taken over and used to scan two class B ranges and to spray SSH passwords at ranges of 26 cloud and hosting companies, until Azure Security Center alerts led to the activity stopping. No result of the scans or the spray is stated.
Where Azure network rules fit
If you run a VM like this one, a network security group that admits the database and remote-login ports only from approved ranges would have dropped the logins from the internet, and an outbound rule that denies port 22 to the Internet service tag would have kept the spray inside the VM. Outbound rules that allow only the destinations the VM needs would have bounded the toolkit downloads and the scans, though the source gives no ports for them. The default password still works from any range the rules admit: changing it belongs to the Cassandra installation, which no Azure control reaches.
Could this have been prevented?
In hindsight, not as a whole. 2 controls would have refused a step outright, and 3 controls would have limited one. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.
- 2
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 0
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Azure Cassandra VM 2018 intrusion
1 · Default password
1 Prevented1 Contained3 on other clouds2 · Profiling and toolkits
2 Contained6 on other clouds3 · Password spray on other clouds
1 Prevented3 on other cloudsKey facts
- Two addresses that resolved to Romania logged into a customer's Linux VM in Azure; Microsoft's analysis suggests an Apache Cassandra account with a default password was used
- The attacker downloaded and ran a host enumeration script, and Azure Security Center raised an alert for a download from a known malicious source
- In a second session the attacker fetched a scanning toolkit over a secure FTP connection and pointed it at two class B ranges, just over 65,000 addresses; whether the scans completed is unclear
- About two hours later the attacker deleted that toolkit and fetched an SSH password spray toolkit from a public website
- The spray ran over 35,000 username and password pairs against port 22, with target lists of 26 cloud and hosting companies; no successful login is stated
- The customer received multiple Azure Security Center alerts and the activity stopped soon after; Microsoft published its analysis on November 7, 2018
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Leverage Azure Security Center to detect when compromised Linux machines attackMicrosoft Azure Blog · Nov 7, 2018 · Vendor reportInitial access, login sources, host enumeration, toolkits, scanning, password spray, target lists, honeypot contact, detection, end of activity
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.