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IntrusionAWS
2 min read

An AWS ransomware incident sent 718 GB to one external server

Victim
An unnamed Darktrace customer
When
Early 2025. Darktrace gives no exact start date.Disclosed Jul 8, 2025
Entry
Internet-facing SonicWall remote access gateway on Amazon EC2.

Darktrace saw an AWS customer’s servers send 718 GB to one external server before ransomware ran. Investigators traced the activity back to an internet-facing SonicWall remote access gateway. They did not establish how the intruder took control of it.

What happened

Outside the organization
External network
Internet
Remote access
Customer workloads
Internet gateway
EC2 servers

Incident overview

  1. 1

    An exposed remote gateway

    Early 2025

    Darktrace observed external HTTPS connections to a SonicWall remote access gateway on EC2. It identified that gateway as the likely entry point.

  2. 2

    Customer data left the network

    Before the ransomware

    Darktrace observed multiple EC2 instances uploading data to one external server. The uploads totaled 718 GB.

  3. 3

    Ransomware ran

    After the uploads

    Darktrace reported that ransomware ran inside the affected virtual networks after the uploads. It did not name the ransomware family.

Impact

Darktrace observed 718 GB uploaded to one external server before ransomware ran in the customer’s AWS environment.

Could this have been prevented?

Network limits could reduce the reach of the intrusion

Restrict the remote gateway to the sources and ports that legitimate users need. Separately limit new connections from application servers to approved destinations. Both controls depend on the workloads’ network requirements. Darktrace did not establish that either would have stopped this incident.

Incident control assessments

0
Prevented
2
Contained
1
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

Outside the organization
External network
Internet
Remote access
Customer workloads
Internet gateway
EC2 servers

Incident overview

1 · An exposed remote gateway

1 Contained

2 · Customer data left the network

1 Contained

3 · Ransomware ran

1 Not covered

Key facts

  • The remote access gateway ran on an Amazon EC2 instance.
  • The gateway allowed incoming traffic on any port.
  • Several EC2 instances transferred data to the same external server.
  • Darktrace reported that its automated response was not enabled on the affected devices.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Stopping cloud threats in Azure and AWS with DarktraceDarktrace · Jul 8, 2025 · Vendor reportCase 3 documents the gateway’s network exposure, transfers between EC2 instances, the external upload and subsequent ransomware.
  2. 2.
    Security group rulesAWS · undated · AdvisoryOnly the combined allow rules of every attached security group govern sources and destinations at the interface.
  3. 3.
    Control traffic to your AWS resources using security groupsAWS · undated · AdvisorySecurity groups are stateful, including response traffic on allowed connections.

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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