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IntrusionAWS · SaaS
15 min read

UNC6426 GitHub-to-AWS OIDC intrusion

Victim
An organization using GitHub Actions and AWS, unnamed in every source
When
not stated; Day 1 to Day 4 in 2025Disclosed Mar 11, 2026
Entry
A malicious update of the nx npm package, installed by the Nx Console editor plugin on a developer's workstation, ran the QUIETVAULT credential stealer, which took the developer's GitHub personal access token and uploaded it to a public GitHub repository.

A malicious nx package version, installed by the Nx Console editor plugin, ran the QUIETVAULT stealer on a developer's workstation and uploaded the developer's GitHub personal access token to a public GitHub repository; Google Cloud's report dates the upstream nx compromise to August 24, 2025 and gives the intrusion in relative days only. Two days after the initial compromise UNC6426 exposed a GitHub service account's credentials with NORDSTREAM, and three days after it used the account to abuse the GitHub-to-AWS OIDC trust, assume the overly permissive Github-Actions-CloudFormation role and deploy a new stack that created an IAM role with AdministratorAccess. With that role UNC6426 accessed S3 objects, terminated production EC2 and RDS instances and decrypted application keys; it also renamed every internal GitHub repository and made it public, and the victim detected the activity on Day 4, three days after the initial compromise, and contained it quickly.

What happened

External Parties
Nx maintainers
npm registry
Public repo
Internet
AWS STSOIDC token exchange
GitHub Environment
AWS Production
+ Nx Console plugin
+ GitHub token
+ AI CLI tools
Developer Workstation
Developer Token
Actions Workflows
Service Account
Internal Repositories
CloudFormation Role
New Stack
Admin Role · new
S3 Buckets
EC2 and RDS
Application Keys

Replaying the UNC6426 2025 intrusion

  1. 1

    A poisoned package reaches a developer

    Aug 24–27, 2025; Day 1

    An unknown group publishes malicious nx versions; on Day 1 an Nx Console update runs QUIETVAULT on a developer's workstation, which uploads the developer's GitHub token to a public repository.

  2. 2

    Into the GitHub environment

    Day 1 – Day 3

    The stolen token is accepted by the victim's GitHub environment; on Day 3 UNC6426 runs NORDSTREAM there, which exposes a GitHub service account's credentials.

  3. 3

    OIDC trust to AWS administrator

    Day 4

    With the service account, NORDSTREAM's --aws-role function abuses the GitHub-to-AWS OIDC trust for the Github-Actions-CloudFormation role, and a new stack creates an IAM role with AdministratorAccess.

  4. 4

    Administrator in production

    Day 4; some steps undated

    With the administrator role S3 objects are accessed, production EC2 and RDS instances terminated and application keys decrypted; every internal GitHub repository is renamed and made public.

Impact

Full administrator permissions in the AWS production environment in less than 72 hours from a stolen token; S3 objects enumerated and accessed, production EC2 and RDS instances terminated, application keys decrypted, and every internal GitHub repository renamed and made public. No source gives a count of buckets, objects, instances, keys or repositories.

Outcome

Where cloud-provider controls fit

A trust policy whose sub condition names one repository and one protected branch or environment would have limited which workflow contexts AWS STS issues the CloudFormation role's credentials to. The sources do not say which context the attacker's workflow ran from, so the condition bounds the step and does not show this one was outside it. A service control policy that denies IAM role creation and policy attachment fails the stack in a member account of your organization, and one that denies the termination of protected instances refuses it there; the sources do not say which account held the roles, so these policies bound the steps and do not show these calls were under them. A resource control policy would have refused S3 reads from outside your production network, and a key policy that names its users the decrypt by an administrator role it does not name. The poisoned package, the developer workstation and the GitHub tokens, pipelines and repository settings stay with the package vendor, your endpoints and your GitHub organization: no cloud-provider policy reaches them.

Could this have been prevented?

In hindsight, not as a whole. 1 control would have refused a step outright, and 16 controls would have limited one. 6 steps have no cloud-provider control. The counts below are control assessments, not attack stages: several can address the same step. The same replay with the controls in place before the incident shows where each phase would have been refused or bounded.

1
Prevented
16
Contained
6
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
Nx maintainers
npm registry
Public repo
Internet
AWS STSOIDC token exchange
GitHub Environment
AWS Production
+ Nx Console plugin
+ GitHub token
+ AI CLI tools
Developer Workstation
Developer Token
Actions Workflows
Service Account
Internal Repositories
CloudFormation Role
New Stack
Admin Role · new
S3 Buckets
EC2 and RDS
Application Keys

Replaying the UNC6426 2025 intrusion

1 · A poisoned package reaches a developer

4 Contained3 Not covered

2 · Into the GitHub environment

2 Contained2 Not covered

3 · OIDC trust to AWS administrator

1 Prevented3 Contained6 on other clouds

4 · Administrator in production

7 Contained1 Not covered9 on other clouds

Key facts

  • The report dates the upstream nx compromise to August 24, 2025; eight malicious nx versions were on npm from 22:32 UTC on August 26 to 02:44 UTC on August 27, 2025, about four hours
  • On Day 1 an Nx Console update ran QUIETVAULT on a developer's workstation and uploaded the developer's GitHub personal access token to a public repository named /s1ngularity-repository-1; an unknown threat group, which the report keeps separate from UNC6426, made the first unauthorized requests with it
  • On Day 3, two days after the initial compromise, UNC6426 ran NORDSTREAM in the victim's GitHub environment, which exposed the credentials of a GitHub service account
  • On Day 4 NORDSTREAM's --aws-role function abused the GitHub-to-AWS OIDC trust for temporary credentials of the Github-Actions-CloudFormation role, which the report calls overly permissive; a new stack with CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM and CAPABILITY_IAM created an IAM role with AdministratorAccess
  • UNC6426 went from a stolen token to full AWS administrator permissions in less than 72 hours; the report gives no count of the S3 objects accessed, the EC2 and RDS instances terminated, the keys decrypted or the repositories made public
  • The victim detected the activity on Day 4, three days after the initial compromise, and contained it quickly, removing all unauthorized access; Google Cloud published the case on March 11, 2026 with relative days in place of dates

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Cloud Threat Horizons Report H1 2026, pages 24-28: From CI/CD to Cloud Compromise: Real-World Breach via OpenID Connect AbuseGoogle Cloud (Office of the CISO, Google Threat Intelligence Group, Mandiant Consulting) · Mar 11, 2026 · ResearchAttack chain, relative timeline, QUIETVAULT behavior on the endpoint, NORDSTREAM use, OIDC abuse, CloudFormation escalation, impact, detection, recommendations
  2. 2.
    Cloud CISO Perspectives: New Threat Horizons report highlights current cloud threatsGoogle Cloud Office of the CISO · Mar 11, 2026 · ResearchDisclosure date, 72-hour framing, report context
  3. 3.
    GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Advances in Threat Actor Usage of AI ToolsGoogle Threat Intelligence Group · Nov 6, 2025 · ResearchQUIETVAULT definition, first public naming
  4. 4.
    Malicious versions of Nx and some supporting plugins were publishedNx maintainers (nrwl/nx) · Aug 27, 2025 · AdvisoryUpstream compromise root cause, affected versions, publication window, malware behavior, maintainer remediation
  5. 5.
    S1ngularity - What Happened, How We Responded, What We LearnedNx (nrwl) · Sep 5, 2025 · Vendor reportUpstream root cause, publishing-pipeline changes, Nx Console provenance checks
  6. 6.
    s1ngularity: Popular Nx Build System Package Compromised with Data-Stealing MalwareStepSecurity · Aug 27, 2025 · ResearchPublication times in UTC, telemetry.js behavior, AI CLI invocation, exfiltration mechanics, second wave
  7. 7.
    Security Alert | NX Compromised to Steal Wallets and CredentialsSemgrep · Aug 29, 2025 · ResearchResponse timeline, Nx Console auto-update trigger, AI CLI refusal observation, early victim count
  8. 8.
    s1ngularity: supply chain attack leaks secrets on GitHub: everything you need to knowWiz Research · Aug 29, 2025 · ResearchExfiltration repositories takedown, leaked token counts, second phase window and counts, root cause
  9. 9.
    s1ngularity's Aftermath: AI, TTPs, and Impact in the Nx Supply Chain AttackWiz Research · Sep 3, 2025 · ResearchVictim counts, token validity, revocation campaign, phases two and three, AI CLI success rate
  10. 10.
    The Nx "s1ngularity" Attack: Inside the Credential LeakGitGuardian · Aug 29, 2025 · ResearchExfiltration repository count, leaked secret counts and types, LLM client share, phase-two secret counts
  11. 11.
    AI-powered malware hit 2,180 GitHub accounts in 's1ngularity' attackBleepingComputer · Sep 6, 2025 · NewsThree-phase totals, phase dates

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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