What happened
Apify customer accounts / Apify operates a cloud platform for web automation.
- 1
Staff token misuse
November 9, 2026An intruder already held working Apify API tokens, including a privileged staff token that it used to gain access. Apify has not disclosed how the intruder got the staff token.
- 2
Internal sessions exposed
November 9–10, 2026A flaw in an Apify networking service gave the intruder access to an internal cache that held active sessions, including staff sessions. At 18:00 UTC on November 10, tighter network rules closed that path.
- 3
Customer records read
November 9–10, 2026The intruder used privileged staff sessions in Apify’s admin tools to read customer account records in bulk. Apify also confirmed that some stored data was read for a small subset of active accounts.
Impact
Apify confirmed bulk reads of customer account records and access to some stored data for a small subset of active accounts. It has not published a count of affected accounts. Encrypted secret fields used by customers’ automation jobs were outside the disclosed exposure.
Could this have been prevented?
Network isolation could have limited access to staff sessions.
Apify confirmed that changing its network rules closed the internal path. Restricting access to the session cache could have limited the breach earlier. Once the intruder had valid staff sessions, Apify also had to end those sessions and rotate the affected credentials.
Incident control assessments
- 0
- Prevented
- 1
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Apify customer accounts / Apify operates a cloud platform for web automation.
1 · Staff token misuse
1 Not covered2 · Internal sessions exposed
1 Contained3 · Customer records read
1 Not coveredKey facts
- On November 9, the intruder used a privileged staff token that Apify had issued. Its preliminary report leaves the token’s origin open.
- A change to network rules closed the internal access path at 18:00 UTC on November 10, before Apify knew about the intrusion.
- Apify detected the activity at 12:13 UTC on November 11. It ended Console sessions, rotated credentials for affected accounts and contacted the owners.
- Apify found no sign that GitHub connection tokens in the cache were used. It revoked those tokens on November 11.
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Preliminary report: November 2026 security incidentApify · Nov 20, 2026 · Vendor reportStaff token and session misuse, records and stored data accessed, network changes, credential rotation and limits on observed impact
- 2.Security incidentApify · Nov 11, 2026 · Status pageNovember 11 disclosure and detection time, customer notifications and November 20 report publication
- 3.Platform architectureApify · undated · Vendor reportAWS hosting of the platform and the distinction between its application services and customer storage
- 4.Security group rulesAmazon Web Services · undated · Vendor reportAllowed sources and cumulative permissions on the network interfaces associated with security groups
- 5.General resource accessApify · undated · Vendor reportWhat the Restricted setting requires for access to supported customer resources
- 6.Apify APIApify · undated · Vendor reportResource permissions and expiry for customer-issued Apify API tokens
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.