What happened
Replaying the Qubole October 2026 intrusion
- 1
Trusted vendor access
October 14 to 26, 2026IAM user keys of Qubole's AWS account reach AWS STS from Mullvad VPN and OVH VPS addresses. Each AssumeRole carries the customer's External ID, and every attributed request succeeds. How the actor got the keys and the External IDs is unconfirmed.
- 2
Discovery
October 14 to 26, 2026Inside the assumed-role sessions the actor lists what each account holds. Buckets and objects come first, then databases and tables, EC2 instances, security groups and VPCs, RDS instances and snapshots, IAM roles, and KMS keys with their policies.
- 3
Credential harvesting
October 2026; key checks October 16 to 19The roles read Secrets Manager secrets, SSM parameters and Lambda environment variables, and EC2 user data is scraped. Sentra counts about 100 passwords and keys in 7 minutes. TruffleHog validates AWS keys with GetCallerIdentity, signs in as Entra service principals and requests Okta tokens. Wiz does not report whether Okta issued tokens.
- 4
Data theft
Within October 14 to 26, 2026; days not statedThe roles list buckets and objects, then read objects with GetObject, whole buckets in some sessions. A final pass from a different VPN address pulls production database backups, per Sentra. No write operation is observed.
Impact
Every attributed role assumption succeeded, per Wiz. Through the roles the actor read Secrets Manager secrets, SSM parameters, Lambda environment variables and EC2 user data, about 100 passwords and keys in 7 minutes, per Sentra. It read S3 objects, whole buckets in some sessions, production database backups included, and several victims could not see what was read. The actor validated AWS keys with GetCallerIdentity, signed in as Entra service principals and requested Okta tokens. Wiz does not report subsequent Entra access or Okta token issuance. Sentra counted more than a dozen organizations (dozens of Qubole customers in its introduction) as of November 9, 2026, and observed no write operation
Could this have been prevented?
The review identifies controls that could have blocked a step and controls that could have limited the impact.
Incident control assessments
- 4
- Prevented
- 3
- Contained
- 2
- Not covered
How it could have been prevented
The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.
Replaying the Qubole October 2026 intrusion
1 · Trusted vendor access
1 Prevented2 on other clouds2 · Discovery
1 Prevented2 on other clouds3 · Credential harvesting
1 Prevented3 Contained2 Not covered2 on other clouds4 · Data theft
1 Prevented2 on other cloudsKey facts
- From October 14 to 26, 2026, IAM user credentials of Qubole's AWS account were used to assume customer integration roles, and every attributed AssumeRole carried the correct External ID and succeeded, per Wiz
- Sentra traced the AWS activity it observed to Mullvad VPN addresses and an OVH server. From October 18, 2026, a second IAM user of the account, which also carried legitimate Qubole traffic from AWS infrastructure, was used, per Wiz
- About 100 passwords and keys were read in 7 minutes from Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store and Lambda environment variables, and EC2 user data was scraped, per Sentra
- Wiz observed TruffleHog validating AWS keys and signing in as Entra service principals from October 16 to 19, 2026. It also observed Okta token requests and did not report whether Okta issued tokens
- S3 objects were read, whole buckets in some sessions, production database backups included. File access logs showed millions of files from one company's accounts, and the downloaded files held thousands of credential records, per Sentra. Several victims lacked the logs to see what was read, per Wiz
- Sentra observed no write operation and counted more than a dozen organizations (dozens of Qubole customers in its introduction) as of November 9, 2026. AWS said its services operated as designed, and Qubole did not respond to The Register
Sources
Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.
- 1.Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the WildWiz Research · Nov 11, 2026 · ResearchTimeline, entry, discovery, credential harvesting, credential validation, S3 reads, indicators, mitigations, attribution claim
- 2.Inside the Qubole Supply Chain AttackSentra · Nov 9, 2026 · ResearchDetection, victim scope, credential reads, bulk downloads, no write operations
- 3.The Register report on Qubole AWS cross-account role abuseThe Register · Nov 10, 2026 · NewsAWS statement, Qubole non-response, counts declined by Wiz
- 4.Hackers Exploit Qubole's Trusted AWS Access to Breach Customer Accounts and Steal DataThe Hacker News · Nov 9, 2026 · NewsNo vendor statement at publication, External ID guidance, Qubole ownership by Idera
The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.