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IntrusionAWS
6 min read

AntiFox agentic platform used against IIS applications and AWS accounts

Victim
Unnamed organizations with internet-facing IIS applications and AWS accounts; no source names a victim or counts the intrusions
When
Not stated (AntiFox repository created October 9, 2026)Disclosed Nov 10, 2026
Entry
A compromised internet-facing IIS application, or valid AWS credentials. Arctic Wolf did not identify the IIS flaw or establish how the credentials were acquired. AWS attributed the credentials to compromised customer applications.

Arctic Wolf linked AntiFox, a tool that automates intrusion tasks, to attacks on Microsoft IIS web servers and AWS accounts. On the web servers, operators read configuration files and tried to connect to an internal database. In AWS, they read a production secret. A separate intrusion included requests to read, copy and delete S3 objects, with unknown results. AWS traced the credentials to compromised customer applications. Neither source tied them to the IIS servers Arctic Wolf investigated.

What happened

External Parties
AntiFox operators
Alibaba Cloud hosts
Internet
AWS APIsIAM keys, role sessions
Microsoft IIS
Internet-facing IIS Applications
AWS Accounts
+ production database
+ web.config credential tried
+ outcome not stated
Internal Production Data
IIS Application Server
ASPX Web Shell
web.config Files
Upload Directory
IAM Users, EC2 Role
18 AWS Services
Secrets Manager
S3 Buckets

Replaying the AntiFox November 2026 intrusion / undated intrusions, reported November 10, 2026

  1. 1

    Two ways in

    Date not stated; reported November 10, 2026

    An IIS worker creates a web shell on a compromised application. In separate activity, IAM users and an assumed EC2 role sign AWS requests. Arctic Wolf did not establish how those credentials were acquired.

  2. 2

    Inside the web server

    Date not stated; reported November 10, 2026

    PowerShell reads web.config connection strings and app settings, an extracted credential is tried against an internal production database with the outcome not stated, and configuration and log files are copied to a web-accessible upload directory.

  3. 3

    Mapping the AWS accounts

    Date not stated; reported November 10, 2026

    In one intrusion a single source rotates through several AWS identities and sends hundreds of requests in about 30 minutes across 18 services; most are denied, and an Amazon ECR token request has no stated outcome.

  4. 4

    Secrets and storage

    Date not stated; reported November 10, 2026

    A GetSecretValue call reads a production Secrets Manager secret; in a separate intrusion an identity runs S3 list, read, copy and delete operations whose results the report does not give.

Impact

On IIS servers the actors planted an ASPX web shell, read web.config connection strings and app settings, attempted a connection to an internal production database with the outcome not stated, and copied configuration and log files to a web-accessible upload directory. In AWS accounts they sent hundreds of discovery requests across 18 services, most of them denied, attempted an Amazon ECR authorization token with the outcome not stated, and read a production Secrets Manager secret; in a separate intrusion an identity ran S3 list, read, copy and delete operations, and the report does not say which succeeded. Amazon Bedrock was enumerated, and no model invocation is reported.

Could this have been prevented?

The assessed controls could have limited the impact of this incident.

Incident control assessments

0
Prevented
12
Contained
4
Not covered

How it could have been prevented

The same replay with the controls in place. Green marks where a step is refused, blue where it is bounded, and red where no control reaches it. Open a row to read the control, why it acts, and its caveat.

External Parties
AntiFox operators
Alibaba Cloud hosts
Internet
AWS APIsIAM keys, role sessions
Microsoft IIS
Internet-facing IIS Applications
AWS Accounts
+ production database
+ web.config credential tried
+ outcome not stated
Internal Production Data
IIS Application Server
ASPX Web Shell
web.config Files
Upload Directory
IAM Users, EC2 Role
18 AWS Services
Secrets Manager
S3 Buckets

Replaying the AntiFox November 2026 intrusion / undated intrusions, reported November 10, 2026

1 · Two ways in

3 Contained2 Not covered6 on other clouds

2 · Inside the web server

1 Contained2 Not covered3 on other clouds

3 · Mapping the AWS accounts

2 Contained3 on other clouds

4 · Secrets and storage

6 Contained9 on other clouds

Key facts

  • Arctic Wolf Labs published its report on November 10, 2026; it named no victim, gave no dates for the intrusions and did not count them
  • In one intrusion a single source rotated through several AWS identities and sent hundreds of cross-service requests in about 30 minutes, with List, Get and Describe calls across 18 services; most were denied and successful calls were mixed in
  • ListSecrets was followed by a successful GetSecretValue on a production Secrets Manager secret, and an Amazon ECR GetAuthorizationToken was attempted with its outcome not stated
  • In a separate intrusion a valid identity ran ListBuckets, ListObjects, ListObjectVersions, HeadObject, GetObject, CopyObject and DeleteObject; the report did not say which succeeded
  • On IIS servers w3wp.exe created an ASPX web shell, PowerShell read web.config connection strings and app settings, an extracted credential was tried against an internal production database, and configuration and log files were copied to a web-accessible upload directory
  • AWS said its services operated as designed and attributed the credentials to compromised customer applications. Arctic Wolf did not establish how the AWS credentials were acquired, and neither account identified the IIS application as their source.

Sources

Every fact in this breakdown comes from the public reporting below. The replay is a model of that reporting, not a reconstruction of the environment it describes.

  1. 1.
    Antifox Agentic Pentesting Platform Used to Steal AWS Credentials and Move Laterally in Compromised EnvironmentsArctic Wolf Labs · Nov 10, 2026 · ResearchAWS API calls, identities, IIS web shell, infrastructure indicators, defensive guidance
  2. 2.
    Hackers use AntiFox AI agents in AWS credential theft attacksBleepingComputer · Nov 11, 2026 · NewsAWS statement, AntiFox background
  3. 3.
    AntiFox AI pentesting platform linked to AWS and IIS intrusionsThe Hacker News · Nov 11, 2026 · NewsAWS statement, restates the Arctic Wolf findings
  4. 4.
    AntiFox AWS credential theft and CloudTraileSecurity Planet · undated · Newslogging visibility, AWS statement
  5. 5.
    CSA research note on AntiFox agentic cloud intrusionsCloud Security Alliance · Nov 12, 2026 · Researchsummary of the chain, no named victims, no Bedrock invocation reported

The estate in the replay is illustrative and drawn at the level of attack stages; the victim's real environment is not public. Verdicts describe what a control does when it is in place before the incident. They are not an assessment of the victim's security program.

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